The thing is, as satisfying as it might feel in the current moment, “imposing costs” cannot be an end in itself. Sanctions should be a means to achieving a larger end. Maybe the goal is to nudge Putin’s elite coalition — you know, the guys sitting at the other end of the long table — into forcing him out. Maybe it is to delegitimize Putin in the eyes of a country that remembers the pre-Putin 1990s as a time of humiliation.

If the goal is to compel, then the sanctioners need to be explicit about what Russia can do to get the sanctions lifted. I saw nothing in the joint statement that suggested any demands that could cause these sanctions to be lifted. That lack of clarity undermines coercive bargaining, because the targeted actor believes that sanctions will stay in place no matter what they do.

An exception to this rule is if the goal is not to coerce but to contain. If the aim is to weaken Russia’s long-term power projection capabilities, then no demand needs to be announced. If that is the case, however, then some thought needs to be given to how ordinary Russians beyond Putin’s elite circle will cope under this new normal. They are already paying a high price, and things are likely to get worse as the sanctions bite harder.