The Ukrainians have also undertaken serious military reforms and attempts to modernize. To be sure, and to the great credit of the country, these have been undertaken in the context of a struggle to become a true and liberal democracy, in the face of both domestic corruption and constant Russian interference. Indeed, by his actions in 2014, Putin has made Ukrainians more nationalistic, independent and ideological.

If the Ukrainian army has been unable to become as modern or lethal as its Russian opponents, it has become a much more professional and tactically competent force, at least in some part. The army’s best units, for example, excel at employing terrain for cover and concealment in ways that consistently impress U.S. and other Western partners in joint training exercises. Kyiv is also well aware of its shortcomings—the Russian air force would own the skies, for instance, and while the Ukrainians have a lot of artillery tubes that could make life miserable for any invading armored force, they lack modern ammunition and sufficient or sufficiently trained crews.

Moreover, Ukrainian terrain is more complex and defensible than current red-arrow maps contemplate. Consider the prospect of a thrust southward from Belarus toward Kyiv. Yes, this is the shortest route, maybe 150 miles as the crow flies. But it would be farther as the tank drives—the Russians aren’t likely to create massive and vulnerable assembly areas right on the border. Also, there’s really only one militarily important route directly southward and it would be folly to channelize an attack so drastically.