Bush’s vision of democratization by force was at best highly ambitious, and in some ways fundamentally misguided. The War on Terror, however, is neither misguided, nor has it been unsuccessful.

Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump continued and expanded operations against al-Qaeda, and later ISIS. Both ordered ground raids that killed the leaders of jihadist organizations. Drone-strike data show remarkable continuity between those otherwise different administrations.

Although some people probably do join terrorist groups because someone they care about was killed or injured by an American drone strike, these attacks likely do not create more terrorists than they kill—or at least not terrorists of equal ability. As research by Patrick Johnston and Anoop Sarbahi, Asfandyar Mir, and other academics shows, the drone campaign has reduced the effectiveness of targeted groups by removing skilled leaders and frightening operatives into curtailing communication and recruitment. When strikes kill civilians, it’s tragic (and strategically counterproductive), but drones tend to cause fewer civilian casualties than other military options, and improved abilities led to fewer civilian deaths per strike in the 2010s than in the 2000s.

Congress has authorized drone strikes and other War on Terror operations in all sorts of ways, to the point where they’re a permanent part of the federal bureaucracy. There’s the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force against terrorists, which grants the president broad power to designate threats and determine appropriate responses. Congress passed it near-unanimously, with just one House Representative, the Democrat Barbara Lee of California, voting no. Every president since has interpreted the authorization expansively, using it to go after not only al-Qaeda, but also suspected terrorists who had no role in September 11.