In the Floyd case, however, the state vigorously prosecuted Chauvin—perhaps too vigorously, since Minnesota's quirky felony murder law allowed prosecutors to treat an unintentionally lethal assault, which ordinarily would be charged as manslaughter, as murder instead. But even without that count, Chauvin would still face a presumptive sentence of 150 months for third-degree murder (although the propriety of that charge is also a matter of dispute). While some people might think that penalty is not severe enough, it is the punishment recommended by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, which was charged with doing so by the state legislature. And since we still don't know what Chauvin's state sentence actually will be, it is premature to say whether it is proportionate to his crime. In any case, federal prosecutions aimed at "correcting" the criminal penalties that states deem appropriate second-guess the good-faith decisions made by state legislators and judges. Given the broad sweep of federal law, that practice opens the door to routine interference in cases that should be handled by state courts. The Justice Department's history of bringing duplicative "hate crime" charges against people who also face state prosecution for the same conduct suggests how arbitrary those decisions can be. Since the Constitution does not give the federal government a general "police power," the Justice Department should step in only when there is a clear federal interest that cannot be vindicated by state prosecution.