This gives rise to the second myth—that the nuclear deal must be maintained because Iran is honoring its terms. This was precisely the fear of Arabs and Israelis—not that Iran would violate the agreement, but rather, that it would uphold it. And why not? The deal enriched Iran financially while recognizing its right to enrich uranium. In fact, no such right exists—certainly not for a country that lied about its nuclear program for decades. Why wouldn’t Iran hold to a treaty that preserved its nuclear infrastructure, enabled it to develop more advanced centrifuges, and ignored its construction of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads? The agreement does not require Iran to come clean on its previous military nuclear efforts, to sever its ties with international terror, or to stop threatening neighboring states. It does not open all Iranian nuclear sites to unrestricted inspection. It even contains “sunset clauses” that will lift most of the minimal limits on Iran’s enrichment capacities within a decade. The ease with which Iran is now expanding uranium enrichment proves the flimsiness of the deal, even as it illustrates the reason Iran’s rulers are so keen on keeping it.

The last and most pernicious myth is that the only alternative to the JCPOA is war. It reflects understandable war weariness in the United States from the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and fears of further Middle Eastern entanglements. Those emotions enabled the Obama administration to move from the position that no deal is better than a bad deal, to insisting that any deal is better than no deal; from asserting that all options are on the table to claiming that there is no military solution, and then to promoting a policy of either diplomacy or war.