But what hurt was that Washington appears to have gone further, turning its back on them and leaving them at the mercy of the post-Ottoman states. They should be excused, perhaps, for now believing that the U.S. has simply used them essentially like private security companies, a tactical alliance in pursuit of its own, eventually diverging, strategic agenda. Now, the contract with the YPG seems to have expired.
Iraqi Kurds have the advantage of controlling a federal region that has been on reasonably good terms with Baghdad, and of having representatives in the central government that can help moderate Iraq’s approach toward the Kurds. The YPG, by contrast, is surrounded by enemies—Turkey, the Syrian regime, and even Barzani’s Kurds, who view them with suspicion.
So what is next for the YPG? It could choose to put up a fight, but the low-lying terrain does not favor them, especially against armies. It has two other options: to withdraw into the mountains of northern Iraq, where the PKK has long had its stronghold and where it could yet survive in the face of fire from Turkish forces; or to strike a deal with the Syrian regime to preserve some of its post-2012 gains.
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