While leaflets and graffiti are alarming, they don’t necessarily demonstrate any concrete planning or actions. But in January 2016, Hafiz Saeed Khan, the head of the TTP’s Orakzai branch, was appointed as the chief of the Islamic State Khorasan, the official Islamic State chapter that operates in Afghanistan-Pakistan. Five other commanders and the Taliban spokesman defected along with Khan and pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi. (Khan was killed in a drone strike last August.)

Since then, the Islamic State has claimed several attacks in Pakistan, either carried out by its Khorasan chapter or by existing militant factions. The group has made extensive use of such allies, who hold similar sectarian ideologies. Rather than sending its own fighters or planning attacks directly from Syria, the Islamic State recruits online, while also tapping into well-established local networks, bringing disaffected rivals (like Taliban commanders) into the fold or reinvigorating militant groups degraded by Pakistan’s crackdown.

In return, the local militants earn attention by linking up with an internationally known organization, and down the line, may even receive operational support.

“These local groups want to make a big impact,” says Muhammad Amir Rana, a Islamabad-based security analyst. “This is good for Daesh as well because they have a partner without spending resources.”