The holdouts generated the most distress. At one point, it was feared that Collins and Murkowski were lost, even though they admired Gorsuch. Murkowski “really liked Gorsuch and never expressed” any qualms, a pro-confirmation lobbyist said. Collins was “iffy all along.” So the efforts to persuade the two senators to back the nuclear option—thus guaranteeing Gorsuch would wind up on the court—continued. In the end, they weren’t lost.

The pro-Gorsuch campaign emphasized his popularity among legal experts, GOP politicians, and the Republican grassroots—practically everyone except mean-spirited Democrats and left-wing crazies. This allowed Republicans to dismiss the charge that Gorsuch is a cold-hearted right-wing extremist as outrageous.

Corker was described as “iffy until the final few days.” As a result, he got the full treatment from the Gorsuch forces. He was bombarded with phone calls, letters, digital messages, and newspaper editorials. “Anything that could be brought to bear was brought to bear on Corker,” a pro-Gorsuch leader said.

The senator didn’t like the treatment. A friend of his confronted an ally of Gorsuch on Capitol Hill and demanded the barrage of phone calls to Corker’s office stop. They’ll stop, he was informed, when Corker tells Senate leaders he will vote for the nuclear option.