The case against the Iran deal

Is there any reason to believe that it will be less of a game changer in 10 years than it would be now? That is certainly what the president—and indeed the rest of the world—hopes will happen, but we cannot predict such a positive outcome with any degree of confidence, because although 10 years is a blink of an eye for purposes of assessing dangers to national security, it is an eternity for purposes of making predictions.

That is why this deal is indeed a roll of the dice—or perhaps more aptly a game of Russian roulette for us and our allies. Although the odds of losing in Russian roulette are only one in six, no one would praise a leader who got us into a situation where playing Russian roulette is the best alternative available, especially if we got into that situation by putting our own weapons away.

Having concluded that the negotiations with Iran were deeply flawed and that the resulting deal is extremely dangerous, it might be expected that I would advocate its rejection by Congress by means of overriding the promised presidential veto.

But the latter conclusion doesn’t necessarily follow from the former. Perhaps one of the worst consequences of the negotiation and deal is that they put us in a position where rejecting a bad deal may be worse than accepting it. It is impossible to know.