Apparently, Justice Scalia has come to realize that since public opinion in America has moved away from anti-LGBT prejudice, heavily salting his writings with a personal distaste for the idea that we should enjoy the same rights as our heterosexual brothers and sisters weakens the appeal of his legal reasoning. (Compare his angry screed in the sodomy case, essentially justifying the criminalization of private sexual conduct between consenting adults, with Justice Clarence Thomas’s terse statement that while he would have voted against the “silly” Texas statute in question, he believed it was a deeply flawed judgment that the Legislature was constitutionally permitted to make.) So in an unexplained abandonment of his vigorously anti-LGBT prior stance, Justice Scalia asks that his pronouncement that the Court’s opinion calls our democracy into question be judged not on the substantive issue, but as an expression of his view that “allow[ing] the policy question of same-sex marriage to be considered and resolved by a select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle even more fundamental than no taxation without representation: no social transformation without representation.”

The inconsistency between this dissent and several of Scalia’s prior opinions deepens my skepticism about his newfound tolerant stance. Even before reaching this, there is the question of how many people Scalia thinks were on the Court when it ordered a much further-reaching social transformation in its decisions on race—including, of course, on who could marry whom.