There is no global jihadist "movement"

Such kaleidoscopic patterns are not uncommon: What’s sometimes referred to as the global jihadist “movement” is actually extremely fractured. It’s united by a general set of shared ideological beliefs, but divided organizationally and sometimes doctrinally. Whether to fight the “near enemy” (local regimes) or the “far enemy” (such as the United States and the West), for example, has been contentious since the 1990s, when Osama bin Laden declared war on the United States. Rivalry among like-minded militant groups is as common as cooperation. Identities and allegiances shift. Groups align and re-align according to changing expectations about the future of the conflicts they’re involved in, as well as a host of other factors, such as competition for resources, leadership transitions, and the defection of adherents to rival groups that appear to be on the ascendant.

Governments combating terrorist groups can seem blind to these complications, especially to the consequences of weakening one group at the expense of another. When a state faces multiple terrorist adversaries—and there are almost always several different ones—encouraging splintering and factionalism, by killing top leaders for example, is not always the best option for reducing violence in the long run. Since at least the 1998 bombings of the American Embassies in East Africa, the U.S. has worked to undermine al-Qaeda, a campaign given new urgency and momentum after 2001. That goal has largely been accomplished if one thinks of al-Qaeda as the original organization Osama bin Laden founded around 1988. However, one affiliate (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), one former affiliate now transformed into a rival (the Islamic State), and one potentially soon-to-be ex-affiliate (the Nusra Front) have emerged as formidable successors. And jihadist groups—some affiliated with al-Qaeda, some not—have proliferated in Africa and Asia.