That (huge) young Arab generation, he notes, is less prone to fall for the logic of illiberal democracy versus undemocratic faux-liberalism: It is far more literate, urban and connected and, crucially, measurably less religiously observant or interested in sharia law. Or most of it is: There is a “polarization” of Arab millennials “with most of them tending to be less observant but a significant number supporting fundamentalism. Some of the vehemence of the religious right,” he notes, “may be in part a reaction against this decline in the proportion of observant Muslims in this generation.” As other scholars have noted, fundamentalism tends to be a response to a wider secularization of society.

So there may continue to be extremist movements such as ISIL (which is supported by only 4 per cent of Syrians), but far less support for mainstream electoral religious parties – or for the dictators and generals who oppose them.

From these studies comes an image of a region that, for the moment, is trapped between extremes. But it is only a moment – 2011, whatever its price in blood and instability, at least allowed change to begin, and created an opening for something other than dictatorship or religious extremism. The Arab countries are not descending into chaos, but rather passing through it.