Between March and August 2013, the Assad regime was blamed for carrying out anywhere from six to eight of these attacks in Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. Only when the large-scale attack in Eastern Ghouta on Aug. 21 produced overwhelming and undeniable evidence of the Assad regime’s use of sarin, did the international community mobilize. As evidenced by leaked cables between Iran and Hezbollah regarding the attack, even the Assad regime and its allies understood they had pushed their luck too far.

Fast-forward to April 2014 and it is quite reasonable to assume that Assad believes he may once again have a free hand to use the world’s most deadly weapons against his own people. The American naval destroyers that threatened to send hundreds of tomahawk missiles into Syria last September have long since departed the Mediterranean, and the eyes of the world’s policy makers, including those in Moscow and Washington, are intently focused on the crisis in Ukraine. Despite missing several crucial deadlines in the chemical-weapons disarmament process, the U.S. has been careful to avoid accusing the Assad regime of specifically violating its international agreements, lest Washington be forced to resort to an unpopular military intervention.