If only Obama were as tough as Carter

Upon closer examination, however, the caricature of the Carter foreign policy that has endured since he left office willfully neglects his contributions to the lasting Egyptian-Israeli peace and his firm enunciation of the Carter Doctrine in his 1980 State of the Union Address, both of which projected strength and a serious regard for U.S. interests, as opposed to weakness. In a process that began in the Nixon and Ford administrations with Secretary of State Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” and the Sinai I and Sinai II agreements, Carter entered office hoping to capitalize on his predecessors’ diplomatic accomplishments and to cement a durable, permanent peace between Egypt and Israel, as well as bringing the former solidly into the U.S. sphere of influence and, as a result, further away from the Soviet Union. Additionally, Carter never strove publicly to be more Israeli than the Israelis themselves, a standard that, for the most part, has been observed by every president since.

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Despite his oftentimes soaring rhetoric on democracy and human rights, Carter approached the then stalled Egyptian-Israeli peace talks soberly, realistically and in the context of the Cold War. He understood that a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, while desirable, was not something that could be achieved overnight, or even during his own presidency. Instead, Carter diligently focused on securing a bilateral peace accord between Egypt and Israel, one that would end the cycle of war between the two countries and bolster U.S. interests in the region by formally bringing Egypt into the American camp, a prospect all the more profound in light of the political turmoil that was sweeping across Iran and threatening the Shah’s rule at that time.

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