Actually the Crimea is not what the Russians want—they want much more. The “Novy Russia” plan prepared in the Kremlin—worked out in detail down to the design of its flag—would separate all the territory east of the great Dnieper River into a new state, “affiliated” with the Russian Federation, until its accession can be worked out in due course. This Trans-Dnieper territory is many times larger than the Trans-Dniestr republic (a.k.a. Republica Moldovenească Nistreană) that the Russians successfully sliced off the Moldovan Republic and keep till this day, but unlike the latter which is separated from the Russian Federation by Ukrainian territory, “Novy Russia” would seamlessly form its southern extension down to the Black Sea.

The Dnieper as a dividing border gives Crimea to Russia including its irreplaceable naval base, but mostly has the decisive advantage of enclosing a population that includes many ethnic Russians, many Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and many Ukrainians who see their future with Moscow because their livelihood depends on Russian firms or is in Russia itself. Certainly the outlook of the populations living east of the Dnieper is very different from the outlook of the protagonists of the revolt: the activists from Lviv, that city being the Lvov of Galicia that was only annexed in 1944, many of whose inhabitants are Uniate Catholics rather than Orthodox. Putin could therefore appeal to the impeccably Wilsonian principle of self-determination to legitimize his new state. Finally, the trans-Dnieper Novy Russia could still have Kiev as its capital in the three districts (raions) east of the great river, allowing the Ukrainians their Kyiv as their historic capital. Putin could even boast of his restraint in giving up Odessa, historically Russian but west of the Dnieper.