The inspector general of the CIA, by contrast, is appointed by the president and can be dismissed only by the president. That person reports to both the CIA director and the congressional intelligence committees. Although the director may impose constraints on the inspector general’s work, the committees must be advised of such constraints and the reasons for their imposition. This has rarely happened because, as a practical matter, the CIA director has not wanted to put himself in that position vis-à-vis the committees.

Some may point out that the NSA falls under the jurisdiction of the Defense Department’s inspector general, whose office is independent. The NSA, of course, is one of numerous defense agencies, not all of which require an independent inspector general. But a stronger, more independent inspector general is necessary, given the NSA’s size, capabilities, mission and, most important, potential for violating the rights of Americans on a grand scale.

In addition, the Defense Department inspector general’s office lacks the personnel and expertise to oversee the highly technical, compartmentalized world in which the NSA operates. Although the Pentagon inspector general should retain the ability to undertake oversight reviews as may be appropriate — such as studying alleged violations of departmental regulations — the lion’s share of the oversight work belongs with an inspector general within the agency.