The opposition, in contrast, lacks cohesion and organization. As is often the case in these conflicts, the most radical elements demonstrate the greatest discipline such as Al Qaeda in Syria – Jabhat al-Nusra. It is what makes arming the opposition such a dangerous and uncertain proposition. Weapons intended for relative moderates such as the Free Syrian Army may well be seized by the radicals who are gaining ground against other opposition elements. But the arms are flowing, reminding us this is a proxy regional war as well as a vicious conflict in Syria. Iran will do everything in its power to see that its single Arab ally for more than three decades does not fall to a virulently anti-Shia opposition. Hezbollah has been a formidable element in the regime’s order of battle. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, on the other hand, see an opportunity to weaken Iranian influence in the region and are pumping arms to the opposition. Who gets them and to what end is another question.

Much has been said about a political settlement. The conditions are simply not present. Neither the opposition nor the regime is ready to deal seriously with each other, and the opposition is too divided in any event to develop a coherent position. Nor will a meeting between regime representatives and opposition elements in exile produce meaningful outcome, even if it could be convened. The influence of the exiles on those actually doing the fighting is approximately zero.