The administration’s repeated references to “the Geneva process” are particularly illuminating as we near the 40th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt. During that conflict, the parties also looked to a conference in Geneva to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger brilliantly capitalized on the fact that Israeli forces had surrounded a large part of the Egyptian army around the southern end of the Suez Canal.

The momentum favored the Israelis, and the U.S. deftly used that leverage to accomplish major strategic goals of long-term significance. The Geneva Conference of 1973ushered in a new Middle East: Soviet influence was dramatically diminished, and with it the power of extremist elements; the U.S. became entrenched as the dominant stabilizing force in the region; and the foundations were laid for peace between Israel and most of its Arab neighbors, leading to the historic Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, and ending the era of Arab-Israeli wars to the present day.

In the current circumstances, with Assad on the ascendant, an international conference would do the opposite: It would confirm Assad’s victory; elevate the influence of Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia; and diminish our own.