Israeli conservatives claim that concessions on these issues are out of the question and are a betrayal to the nation. Such attacks are a familiar, and often successful, tactic in Israeli politics. After the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993, the Israeli right condemned Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin as a traitor. A national referendum this time around would insulate Netanyahu from such attacks. If the prime minister could claim to have the support of the Israeli people, opponents of a deal would have a difficult time saying his government betrayed the country through compromise.

What if a majority of Israelis were to reject a hard-won settlement? That would be a real risk, but not an insurmountable one: In a poll for Haaretz, 55 percent of Israelis said they were likely to support a peace settlement in a national referendum. More importantly, the risk is worth it.

Politicians worked for years to end the conflict between Catholic nationalists and Protestant unionists before reaching the Good Friday Agreement. Previous attempts to reach a lasting peace in Northern Ireland, such as the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, had failed. In substance, the Good Friday Agreement differed little from the prior attempts at settlement. But unlike Sunningdale, the Good Friday Agreement was endorsed by a national referendum. A resounding 71 percent of the Northern Ireland electorate approved the settlement. Both unionists and Irish nationalist parties used this popular mandate to stave off attacks on their legitimacy.

The referendum sent a powerful message: Those in favor of an agreement work in the name of the people; those that oppose it betray the popular will.