Is Assad on the ropes?

But the balance of military power remains heavily slanted in favor of Assad, so it’s hard to count him out. A truly accurate prediction would require knowing far more than anyone seems to about the rebels’ order of battle and the thoughts of millions of average Syrians who have stayed largely on the fence until now. If a collapse comes, it will probably come fast, involving the defections of members of his inner circle. Lots of important regime insiders could be thinking of such a exit strategy at the moment – or very few of them.

In a piece 10 days ago, C.J. Chivers, a former Marine who now works for The New York Times, argued that the writing is on the wall for Syria’s Baath regime. His view is that the Syrian rebels have adopted the tactics that served Iraqi insurgents so well in the war against the US presence there, and that the government is going to slowly find its ability to move forces strangled.

The opposition’s rapid mastery of improvised explosives since the spring changed the character and momentum of this conflict, and put Syria’s army, notwithstanding what seems its enduring material strength, in a highly unenviable position… But the Syrian army’s continued capacity for lethality will not change the uprising’s military arc. And more killing might only exacerbate the Syrian army’s difficulties. Why? Because looked at coldly the Syrian army, which began the war as the biggest man in the bar, has been on a bloody and agonizing one-direction ride. You can make a social argument here, which should serve as a warning for other crackdown artists or champions of conventional military units’ roles in the irregular wars or our age: This is the modern-day outcome of using blunt force against a potentially large, determined and angry enemy on its own turf with a bulky and a doctrinally incoherent force that must make things up as it goes.