The case for letting Iran (almost) build a bomb

In this hypothetical scenario, Iran would develop the technology and capability for a nuclear weapon without actually building one. They would be close enough to a bomb to feel secure in their deterrent — if they fear an imminent foreign invasion, as Tehran sometimes does, they could always “break out” and put together a bomb — but far enough away that the U.S. and Israel wouldn’t have to worry about a surprise attack…

Speculation aside, there are good reasons to think Iran might be tempted to stop at nuclear latency. It balances the danger of retribution by U.S., Arab or Israeli forces against the domestic political successes Iran has sought with its nuclear research since the program began in the late 1980s. Iran would accrue some measure of international leverage and prestige as a nuclear-capable power, and it would enjoy a commensurate boost to its domestic legitimacy, without becoming an actual nuclear pariah. It could also claim to have succeeded in its goal of nuclear independence in spite of the West.

Western hawks such as Lieberman usually frame a nuclear-capable Iran as a policy failure, but it could benefit the U.S. and Israel as well. The United States could credibly claim a diplomatic coup — after all, it would have convinced Iran not to build a nuclear weapon. Washington would be able to avoid committing troops to a destructive conflict it would rather not wage (and Iran would rather not suffer). Regionally, Israel would retain its current first-strike nuclear advantage as well as an overwhelming conventional superiority, and other Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, would have less of an incentive to equip themselves with nuclear weapons, given the cost of developing the know-how and infrastructure to achieve parity with Iran.