But allied forces on the ground may justifiably ask how “winning over” the population leads inexorably to the desired chain of events that ends in US and coalition success. And how will progress in implementing this open-ended mandate be credibly measured? How much of the population needs to be “won” and how is this manifested? Who should do the “winning?”
Perhaps more important, there are serious questions about how achievable this objective is in Afghanistan.
Recent research suggests that financial blandishments do not buy hearts and minds, and that pumping money into poor and troubled societies alienates more people than it wins. The US and its allies are providing billions in aid to a country with a per-capita GDP of less than $400 – a formula destined to supercharge the very corruption that impedes the development of good governance and builds resentment among ordinary people.
What if military restraint backfires and the population sees the US and NATO as weak and unable to defend them? And is it realistic to suppose that a foreign power could ever gain the trust and esteem of the largely tribal people of Afghanistan, whose suspicion of outsiders is legendary? Without such specifics, the theory is reduced to a large-scale charm offensive, with no means to link action with outcomes.
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