When Iran goes nuclear

The West’s recent experience with Iran suggests that working with its rulers to build a stable practice of deterrence would be more confounding than was dealing with the Kremlin in the 1960s and 1970s. The awkward grappling with each other over Iran’s nuclear program and potential sanctions is a case in point (imagine trying to negotiate with Tehran in a crisis over a hotline, if one existed).

“Iranian leaders tend to believe that the best defense is a good offense, and under strain are prone to lash out rather than to moderate their policies or yield to external demands,” writes Suzanne Maloney, an Iran expert at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East policy.

“For Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and even more so for the younger generation hardliners who surround Ahmadinejad, there is no middle ground for dealing with Washington or the West. In their view, any act of compromise would merely initiate a perilous process of intensifying pressure intended to eliminate the Islamic Republic,” she explained.

So much for cooperation, even of the suspicious and grudging sort that long characterized U.S.-Soviet exchanges.