Looks like Donald Trump may well lock down another eight-figure settlement to fund his presidential library. And the New York Times v Sullivan standard for defamation cases will likely remain safe a little longer – mainly because the NY Times' alleged defamation goes well beyond that shield. 

Judge Steven Merryday denied a motion to dismiss Trump's $15 billion defamation lawsuit against his media bete noire yesterday, allowing the case to proceed to trial. In his relatively terse ruling, Merryday struck down several claims after spending more than half the ruling explaining Sullivan. However, the federal judge also decided that several passages of the book Lucky Loser fell within the "actual malice" standard under Sullivan:

A federal judge is allowing President Donald Trump to move forward with part of a $15 billion libel lawsuit he filed last year against The New York Times, several of its reporters and a major publishing house over reporting on his business and financial dealings.

U.S. District Judge Steven Merryday ruled Thursday that some of the statements suggesting Trump had likely committed “complex” tax crimes appeared to have been based on insufficient input from those with expertise to make such assessments. Those statements came in the book “Lucky Loser,” written by NYT reporters Russ Buettner and Susanne Craig.

“Knowing of the necessity for that opinion but failing to procure that opinion is a fine example of the purposeful avoidance of the truth,” the Tampa-based George H.W. Bush appointee wrote.

Merryday threw out other parts of Trump’s lawsuit that claimed he was defamed by statements in Times articles written by Buettner, Craig and the newspaper’s chief White House correspondent, Peter Baker.

Sullivan will not suffice as a defense for the claims of defamation regarding claims that both Donald and Fred Trump committed tax fraud. Merryday made clear in his ruling that the NY Times and its reporters should have known to consult with tax experts before making those claims, and publishing those accusations was a reckless and wanton act that meets the standard of "actual malice":

However, as alleged in the complaint, the book, Lucky Loser, includes these statements: (1) “Donald Trump had received the equivalent of more than $400 million from his father, much of it through fraudulent tax evasion schemes” (Doc. 99 at ¶32); (2) “In the language of the tax code, Fred had given his son taxable gifts masquerading as loans, a likely tax fraud that went unnoticed” (Doc. 99 at ¶59); (3) “A plan was soon devised to funnel some of Fred’s cash to Donald and his three siblings. They would accomplish that goal by adding a sham layer to Fred’s business, one designed to evade the gift and estate taxes” (Doc. 99 at ¶75); (4) “So the Trumps began submitting the padded bills to request rent increases from state officials. Part of the cost of Donld Trump’s off-the-books inheritance would be passed along to this father’s middle-income tenants” (Doc. 99 at 81); (5) “Between the trust funds, the invoice-padding operation, and other devices created to siphon off his father’s wealth outside the gift and estate tax system, Donald was already collecting almost $2 million a year from his father companies. His own business failures meant he kept that money tax-free” (Doc. 99 at 84); and (6) “Donald Trump had faced these moments before, periods when it seemed his failures could not be saved only by aggressive tax maneuvers or not paying his debts” (Doc. 99 at 108). As described in the complaint, the second article includes the statement (7) “Federal, state and local authorities looked into his ties with the Mafia, found violations of money laundering rules and penalized him for skirting stock trade rules” (Doc. 99 at 170).

In these seven instances, the allegations of the complaint quite plausibly and reasonably create an inference that the authors and the publishers knew that these statements, accusing the plaintiff of planning and perpetrating complex crimes and knowingly receiving the proceeds and other benefits of these crimes, were “based on incomplete, minimal information” and that the author and the publisher “realized that a responsible assessment of the Trump family’s compliance with tax laws would have required forensic auditing, expert tax and legal advice, and other expensive investigatory tools.” Further, the complaint alleges that the authors and the publishers knew that “neither President Trump nor Fred Trump was investigated for, charged with, or convicted of tax fraud . . . .” (Doc. 99 at ¶231) In other words, the facts alleged in the complaint create at least a plausible inference that the authors and the publishers knew that no reliable conclusion about violations of the tax laws, including especially the estate and gift tax laws, is possible without reliance on qualified opinion formulated after the necessary factual and legal research and analysis, which they knowingly failed to obtain. 

The inference here is that the NY Times and its reporters deliberately chose not to consult with tax experts on this point because they had good reason to suspect that these claims were bogus. Merryday certainly believes that amounts to actual malice under Sullivan, if proven at trial. 

The defendants attempted to claim that they had done good-faith consultations with experts, but the depth of the analysis left a lot to be desired. Their own experts never identified the crimes the book alleges, or even specifically identified a potentially criminal action:

Craig and Buettner “analyz[ed] about one hundred thousand pages of audited financial statements, tax returns, bank records, general records, and legal papers.” Their conclusions regarding tax fraud were informed by numerous experts. The 2018 Article quotes Lee-Ford Tritt, an “expert in gift and estate tax law,” who said the Trumps’ use of All County was “highly suspicious” and could constitute criminal tax fraud; Adam S. Kaufmann, “a former chief of investigations for the Manhattan district attorney’s office,” who said it “smells like a crime”; and Mitchell Gans, a tax law professor, who explained how gift tax returns can evade IRS scrutiny. Reliance on experts controverts actual malice—particularly when, as here, Plaintiff makes no effort to challenge such reliance. See, e.g., Levan v. Cap. Cities/ABC, Inc., 190 F.3d 1230, 1241-44 (11th Cir. 1999) (reliance on “numerous objective experts” and “industry professionals” defeated actual malice); Silvester v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 839 F.2d 1491, 1498 (11th Cir. 1988) (no actual malice where challenged publication “was thoroughly researched through interviews with experts”) (citation omitted). 

Merryday didn't buy the "smell test" CYA argument. In fact, Merryday wrote, the defendants didn't actually pursue a full analysis from the experts they named, and that in itself would establish actual malice, emphasis mine:

Obviously, even a qualified expert’s offering a superficial characterization such as a transaction is “suspicious” or “could” violate the law or attributing to a transaction the (unspecified and undefined) “smell” of crime or noting that a gift tax return can evade IRS scrutiny or generously giving his immensely valuable time to aid laypersons “lost in the weeds” is far from a formal legal opinion sufficient to remove serious doubt about the truthfulness and accuracy of a statement accusing a specific person of fraud or tax evasion or some related crime arising from a specific transaction, including a crime allegedly effected through “ties to the Mafia.” The confident detection of tax and other crimes, including money laundering, of the kind that some of the challenged statements attribute to the plaintiff, that is, tax crimes including estate and gift tax crimes and the like, is a task that is intensely fact-dependent, and the law that governs is singularly complex and within the immediate competence of only a relatively small cohort of specialized practitioners. Anyone who publishes the claim that someone else has committed a crime of the complex nature described in some of the challenged statements and who has not received an explicit opinion from a qualified source after a thorough examination of pertinent facts necessarily proceeds with particularized reason to doubt the truth of their statements and with knowledge of a high degree of probable falsity of the statements; in other words, they know that they don’t know, but they are undeterred. Knowing of the necessity for that opinion but failing to procure that opinion is a fine example of the purposeful avoidance of the truth, a knowing failure that remains actionable, even after Times v. Sullivan.

Applying Sullivan, Merryday dismissed several of the claims in Trump's lawsuit. However, Merryday refused to dismiss these seven claims and kept the lawsuit on track for trial. 

The NY Times remained defiant:

“The Times is encouraged to see Judge Merryday’s dismissal of almost all claims against us,” NYT spokesperson Charlie Stadtlander said. “We continue to believe the remaining claim in the filing has no legal merit. We look forward to making this argument as we continue to defend ourselves against this baseless attack on The Times and the rights of the free and independent press in this country.”

Well, maaaaybe. The trial will take place in the Middle District of Florida, which is not exactly friendly territory for the NY Times, and Merryday's ruling will overshadow that defiance. It seems much more likely that the NY Times will adopt the same strategy as ABC News and CBS News and start sharpening pencils for a settlement offer. If they take this to trial and lose, Trump might end up owning the NY Times, and that doesn't include whether Trump might appeal the dismissal of the other claims and let the Supreme Court rethink the Sullivan precedent altogether. The justices clearly are interested in that discussion, and that has the media industry petrified – petrified enough to keep writing checks to Trump's library fund for their terrible reporting. 

Let's see just how much humiliation and financial damage the NY Times is willing to risk. Stay tuned.