No doubt? None at all?

Volodymyr Zelensky vented his frustration this week after NATO made the understandable decision to postpone any consideration of membership for Ukraine until after the war prompted by Russia’s invasion comes to an end. To add Ukraine before then would be to instantly declare war on Russia, at least under the current understanding of Article V. Nevertheless, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told CNN this morning that there is “no doubt” that Ukraine will join NATO as soon as the shooting’s over:

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin tells CNN's @wolfblitzer he has “no doubt” that Ukraine will become part of NATO after Russia’s war against the country ends https://t.co/cGlIsGLvuM pic.twitter.com/Xz6Dg39bQ4

— CNN (@CNN) July 13, 2023

“I have no doubt that will happen, and we heard just about every country in the room say as much,” Austin said in an interview with CNN’s Wolf Blitzer in Vilnius, Lithuania, following a two-day summit that was dominated by the question of when Kyiv would join the alliance.

“I think that was reassuring to [Ukrainian President] Volodymyr Zelensky, there are other things that should happen, like judicial reform and things that make sure that the democracy is in good shape,” Austin added. …

“In terms of training and equipping, there is still work to be done,” Austin said. “But we are doing this work now as they fight this war and so things have been done up to this point there is more that will need to be done to ensure that they have a full complement of capabilities.”

If you missed Jazz’ essay on this issue, be sure to read it now. I don’t share Jazz’ hostility to the idea, but that doesn’t mean I’m not deeply skeptical of it — especially in light of the current war. My skepticism doesn’t come from Zelensky’s performance as a wartime leader during a foreign invasion and an existential struggle against a genocidal enemy. It doesn’t even come from any consideration of what Putin might do, at least not directly.

Rather, it comes from this: what purpose would adding Ukraine serve for the rest of NATO? That question has an easy answer with Sweden and especially Finland, given their stability (as Jazz points out) and the 850-mile strategic frontier that makes Russia vulnerable where it counts. That has clear strategic implications for any Russian move on the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, both NATO members. When NATO positions forces on a border just 100 miles from St. Petersburg, the deterrent value becomes obvious against any attempt to seize back NATO territory by force on the basis of ethnocentricity, Vladimir Putin’s favorite rationalization for more than a decade.

The case for Ukraine on the basis of strategic value seems a lot harder to make. NATO already has strength in the countries bordering Ukraine to the west, as well as uncomplicated supply lines and materiel. Any Russian attempt to seize the Balkans to the south and connect up to the Serbs would have to go through Hungary, Romania, and first-class NATO units. Russian supply lines would be very lengthy and complicated for even a competent military with skill at combined arms, and clearly the Russians don’t come close to qualifying. We don’t need Ukraine as a member to close up vulnerabilities for other members, and adding Ukraine would only add to NATO vulnerabilities rather than resolve them.

The impulse to add Ukraine comes from three factors. One, NATO promised at some point to consider membership (and to Georgia as well). Two, Putin’s escalating efforts to expand Russia by military conquest requires a response. Three, and by no means least, the valiant fight of Ukrainians against a genocidal Russian invasion has captured our sympathy, admiration, and an impulse to offer any and all support possible.

None of these are bad reasons, but none of them are compelling either. Let’s take the first: promise of consideration. That turned out to be a bad idea even in the moment, but it wasn’t a promise of acceptance. Circumstances have changed, and even if they hadn’t, the strategic calculation should take precedence. On the second and third, we have already provided a response to Putin’s aggression by adding Finland and Sweden to NATO, which probably would never have happened without the invasion of Ukraine. We have also — correctly — supported the Ukrainian people against the Russian invasion and genocide, but without going to war ourselves over it. And while that may frustrate Zelensky, that balance has allowed the world to avoid a full-scale war between nuclear powers.

That strategy has been so successful, in fact, that it’s amazing that anyone’s proposing to do anything different in the future.

Finally, there is the stability issue that argues against NATO membership, but more importantly, the nature of the stability issue. Ever since Ukraine broke away from the collapsed Soviet Union, its population has struggled over its identity. Western Ukraine wants to be more European while eastern Ukraine identifies with Russia. The series of political movements that began at the turn of the century all struggled with that orientation, and successive elections kept delivering conflicting messages. The 2014 invasion by Russia (mainly via local proxies) and seizure of Crimea was the result of the Eurocentric political forces taking power. Nothing that has happened since has settled the issue, although if Russia does get pushed out, presumably the pro-Russian population will be much smaller and likely more discreet for a while.

A NATO membership in this situation would only add to that fire. Even in a restored Ukraine, it clearly wouldn’t be a consensus position within the country. And that means NATO assets and personnel in Ukraine could be at risk, and that local conflicts over the political issue could rapidly turn into a war even without Russian invasions. The only way NATO membership would make sense would be in the Eurocentric areas of a partitioned Ukraine as a form of security guarantees to ensure no further Russian incursions — and Zelensky refuses to consider permanent partition.

A better political solution for supporting Zelensky would be to add Ukraine to the EU. That would also be provocative for Putin, but not militarily provocative, while expressing Ukraine’s European identity. Ukraine applied for EU membership shortly after the war started, and that has also stalled while waiting for the conflict to end. EU membership more directly addresses the issue of identity while refraining from putting NATO in a position where we either have to fight a war or fatally weaken Article V’s declaration of common defense. That’s the strategic calculation that matters.