And can Vladimir Putin survive without them? The Kremlin has relied on manipulated narratives of Russian success in Ukraine — as well as outrageous propaganda against Ukrainians and the West — sourced mainly through milbloggers and nationalist front-line reporters. Those have fed Putin’s state-run media since the start of the war, especially after Putin outlawed any true independent reporting in February.

Now that Russian troops are running from Kharkiv and getting overrun in key strategic locations like Lyman and Kherson, the milbloggers have turned on their masters. ISW reports today that “dramatic changes in the Russian information space” took place over the weekend after Putin’s forces abandoned Lyman and rumors of a collapse in Kherson floated out late yesterday.

Now the propagandists aren’t just questioning Russia’s military performance, but also Putin’s annexation — his key political maneuver (emphasis mine): 

The Russian defeat in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman, combined with the Kremlin’s failure to conduct partial mobilization effectively and fairly are fundamentally changing the Russian information space. Kremlin-sponsored media and Russian milbloggers – a prominent Telegram community composed of Russian war correspondents, former proxy officials, and nationalists – are grieving the loss of Lyman while simultaneously criticizing the bureaucratic failures of the partial mobilization.[1] Kremlin sources and milbloggers are attributing the defeat around Lyman and Kharkiv Oblast to Russian military failures to properly supply and reinforce Russian forces in northern Donbas and complaining about the lack of transparency regarding the progress of the war.[2]

Some guests on heavily-edited Kremlin television programs that aired on October 1 even criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to annex four Ukrainian oblasts before securing their administrative borders or even the frontline, expressing doubts about Russia’s ability ever to occupy the entirety of these territories.[3] Kremlin propagandists no longer conceal their disappointment in the conduct of the partial mobilization, frequently discussing the illegal mobilization of some men and noting issues such as alcoholism among newly mobilized forces.[4] Some speaking on live television have expressed the concern that mobilization will not generate the force necessary to regain the initiative on the battlefield, given the poor quality of Russian reserves.[5]

The Russian information space has significantly deviated from the narratives preferred by the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that things are generally under control.

Disillusionment creates all sorts of political dangers, especially in a society with top-down control of information and debate. Until now, Putin had used these milbloggers as a kind of expert class to replace actual reporting by independent media. And in the beginning, with the impact of the war far from the lives of most ordinary Russians, they bought into the propaganda. It fit their own perspective, perhaps especially Putin’s long list of grievances against the West for the destruction of the Soviet form of Russian imperialism.

The so-called partial mobilization stripped away those fantasies of Putin’s propaganda. Suddenly, the war had arrived on their doorsteps, and with it the realization that Ukraine was actually besting Russia’s supposedly mighty military. The milbloggers, who went along with Putin for political/ideological reasons, have now realized that Putin’s military is woefully incompetent at all levels. They understand that Ukraine isn’t NATO and what that means for Russian boasts of superiority over the West in both military and imperial terms. And now they have been stripped of the illusion of Putin’s political genius too — at least for now.

Perhaps the Kremlin can regain the Russian information space, but not while Russian troops lose ground in Ukraine. Unfortunately, Putin doesn’t have enough effective troops to reverse the momentum, and he may end up with the bulk of his army trapped in short order. From the ISW map, Ukraine’s next moves look clear — taking back Kremina to the southeast and Svetove to the northeast. That would sever the rail lines for Russia into the portion of Donetsk they still control and threaten Luhansk as well. Ukrainians appear to be focused more on Lysychansk and its rail hub, and a liberation of Kremina would allow Ukrainians to surround Lysychansk in short order.

Meanwhile, in Kherson the news got even worse for Putin and his milbloggers:

Ukrainian forces are advancing in the south and may have scored a major breakthrough of Russian lines as they also take more territory in the east.

Kyiv’s troops are attacking down the west bank of the Dnipro River and have taken the town of Zolota Balka, it was reported Monday, amid claims from pro-Kremlin sources that troops had retreated as far as Dudchany, around 15 miles further south. …

However, pro-Russia military bloggers were far more pessimistic – claiming Ukraine had scored a major breakthrough of the frontlines.

According to multiple accounts, Putin’s troops have been forced to pull back to the town of Dudchany – meaning the Ukrainians had advanced around 20 miles.

If confirmed, it would be one of the largest breakthroughs in Kherson since Ukraine began its offensive in early August, and would be a heavy blow for Putin’s men.

It’s more than just a morale deflater. If Ukraine liberates Kherson, they will cut off Russian ground lines of communication with Crimea. The Russian navy has steered clear of the area since Ukraine sunk the Moskva and other ships early in the war, and Putin can’t afford more losses of his Black Sea fleet — not without ending up a fourth-rate power unable to protect its trade routes after the war. Without relief to Kherson, Putin will lose his originally annexed territory — and a massive amount of face in Russia. And right now, Putin can’t even relieve Lyman, let alone Kherson.

Update: Is Putin even losing control of the media still left in operation? This Russian newspaper seems willing to risk Putin’s wrath in describing the Russian rout out of Lyman:

In an unusually candid article published Sunday, the prominent Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda reported that in the last few days of their occupation, Russian forces in Lyman had been plagued by desertion, poor planning and the delayed arrival of reserves.

“The risk of encirclement or shameful imprisonment became too great, and the Russian command made a decision to fall back,” a war correspondent traveling with the fleeing Russian forces wrote, adding that dispirited soldiers with “empty eyes” had barely escaped Lyman with their lives. …

Russian soldiers retreated chaotically, breaking from their units and escaping in smaller groups into the surrounding forests, Colonel Cherevaty said, and many were killed or captured. About 2,000 to 3,000 Russian soldiers were in Lyman as Ukrainian forces arrived on the outskirts of the city on Friday, he said.

As Ukrainian soldiers and police officers fanned out across Lyman to search for Russian stragglers, it was unclear on Sunday how many had fallen into Ukrainian hands.

The shamefulness doesn’t come from imprisonment. And it’s very telling that the newspaper notes that the chaotic retreat got ordered by the local commander to save face, and not ordered by Moscow for the same reason.