The organizations that didn’t consolidate—the CIA and FBI, the culprits that mishandled intelligence about al-Qaida in the first place—elevated their counterterrorism units, redirected their focus, and strung new lines of communications between them. Meanwhile the Department of Homeland Security subsumed 22 agencies from eight federal departments—with a combined budget of $40 billion (back then) and a payroll of 183,000 employees—into one hydra-headed, crossbred, poorly conceived monstrosity.

It wasn’t just the size that was the problem: Most of these agencies had been performing distinct functions; shmooshing them together wouldn’t necessarily make them more cohesive or efficient. In fact, it made each component less effective. Several of those agencies had been headed by officials with the standing of Cabinet secretaries, who could focus laser-like on their specific domains and had the clout to request direct access to the president. This is no longer true. The Secretary of Homeland Security, even a very good one, has the time and bandwidth to focus on maybe two or three of the department’s 22 areas. The other areas are now handled by undersecretaries or assistant (or deputy assistant) secretaries—people with less clout and less access, leaving issues less attended.

The place is a well-known mishmash unable to attract top talent in the upper tiers, where policy is made, and unable to retain top talent in the middle tiers, where operations are managed.