The assumptions about Ukraine were wrong. We need new assumptions.

All this suggests a pearl of new conventional wisdom is replacing the old—one that may be just as flawed as its predecessors but is justified in its audacity. That is the assumption that Ukraine could actually win.

Today, few could envision the circumstances that would produce such an outcome. Most observers of the conflict can’t foresee a successful Ukrainian mechanized assault on the positions Russia currently occupies. They can’t imagine how Kyiv recaptures the coastline along the Sea of Azov. They can’t conceive of a counteroffensive that relieves the pressure on Kharkiv and Mariupol, much less the liberation of long-occupied territories such as Crimea and the Donbas. There is no basis yet for such a pie-eyed view of this conflict’s trajectory.

But the war in Ukraine has surprised the experts. Few predicted that Russia would invade when it did, that it would fail as it has, and that Ukraine would endure as it has. None could have predicted the extent of Western support for Ukraine, and even fewer had such a low opinion of Russia’s strategic capabilities that they thought Moscow would fail to respond to Western provocations. The assumptions that underwrote the West’s circumspect approach to prosecuting a proxy war against Russia inside Ukraine were wrong. It is time they were replaced with new assumptions.