If the United States loses to North Korea

Chinese and Russian “friendly persuasion” of North Korea may produce a deal at the center of which is a North Korean readiness to freeze nuclear/ballistic activities in exchange for a gradual US reduction of forces in the eastern Pacific. If the US has no better or more acceptable response, Japan and South Korea may be willing to at least consider the pros and cons of a Chinese initiative if it emerges.

What is at stake is therefore the sustainability of an effective nonproliferation order and the global balance that has existed among the major powers of the US, China and Russia. In its attempt to preserve the credibility, supremacy, influence of its role, the US is faced with wily brinkmanship players.

Threats of fire and fury may not immediately deter them. Quiet, remotely controlled and noninflammatory actions may be an efficient initial response. This proposed line of action needs to follow several stages in order to produce the desired results. The term “desired results” needs a precise definition, but for now a mere North Korean entry into negotiations that are not based on concessions will do.