Was the U.S. naive about the Chen Guangcheng deal?

The first false assumption is that the Chinese government’s assurances are ironclad. To be sure, there has to be some trust among negotiators. But the Chinese government has meted out overly harsh treatment to dissidents in recent years. What confidence do we have that it will make an exception in Chen’s case? The American trust that the Chinese government will honor its promises was misplaced, if not outright naïve.

Second, U.S. officials assumed the word “safety” means the same thing for both sides. The Chinese negotiators may have had a totally different arrangement in mind when they spoke of safety. For them, Chen was “safe” when he was confined in his home in Shandong, surrounded by armies of security guards.

Third, the United States should not have thought of the case as just zealous local Shandong officials abusing their power when they confined Chen. It is hard to believe that Shandong officials did what they did to Chen, a high profile activist, without consent from above. That local officials from elsewhere will not abuse their power is hard to believe. Would Chen not be viewed as a threat to “stability” by his handlers once he enters a Chinese university?