Contrary to the nugget thinkers who see every Umar Farouk as a security failure, the fact that terrorists are reduced to smuggling explosive materials on-board in their underwear, without the casings and detonators that make for an efficient explosion, is proof of our success in deterring them from even trying to board with a capable bomb. Amazingly, our checked-baggage screening, as imperfect as it’s known to be, also appears to pose an unacceptable risk of detection.
Silly are the outrage and accusations simply because Mr. Abdulmutallab was on a list (along with 550,000 others about whom suspicions have been raised) without keeping him off a flight. Critics really seem to be saying that, politically, security personnel can’t maintain any lists that are bigger or different from the no-fly list—which is ridiculous.
Let’s be realistic—efficient counterterrorism requires the setting of priorities. There has to be more than one list. Yet the reaction to Farouk Abdulmutallab may soon mean there will be one list and eventually everybody will be on it and nobody will be able to fly.
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