Iran is one of several policy cul-de-sacs into which Pompeo has swaggered. Days after he took office, the administration announced that it was scrapping the nuclear deal struck with Tehran by the Obama administration, the European Union, Russia and China. Trump proclaimed that he was “ready, willing, and able” to negotiate a new deal, and probably he meant it; after all, he has pivoted from confrontation to negotiation with North Korea and China.

Then Pompeo undercut him. Two weeks later, in his first major speech, the new secretary laid down a formidable gantlet of 12 conditions for Iran to meet, covering not just its nuclear program but also its support for militias in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and its domestic repression. These were not grounds for negotiation but a barely disguised call for regime change. If Trump actually wanted to bargain with the mullahs, he would have to repudiate Pompeo’s list; if Iran responds to the ultimatums by resuming nuclear activity, the only alternative may be war.

Something similar may have happened with North Korea, where Pompeo was assigned to follow up Trump’s June summit with Kim Jong Un. The secretary’s first visit to Pyongyang was a disaster: The regime condemned his “unilateral and gangster-like demand for denuclearization,” and talks lapsed for months.