End the Syria slaughter now!

What form should the intervention take? And what would be the aims of the mission to protect Syrian civilians? With hypocrisy in seemingly endless supply in this debate, many pretend to believe that it would be necessary to launch a full-out war, as in Afghanistan, sending in infantry divisions. But that is not what is needed. Instead, we need a series of measures designed to stop the killings perpetrated by the Assad regime. This will require, first, a no-fly zone enforced from NATO bases in Izmir and Incirlik, in Turkey, to keep Assad’s aircraft from gunning down the women and children of Aleppo. A second element is a no-drive zone, also enforced from the air, that would prevent armored divisions from moving from city to city and spreading terror. A third component is the Qatari proposal to set up no-kill zones, secured by elements of the Free Syrian Army equipped with defensive weapons. A fourth is Turkey’s idea of buffer zones in northern Syria that would provide a refuge for civilians fleeing the fighting. In short, a graduated set of measures that would let the dictator know that the world will no longer stand for his butchery. It is a scenario that is fairly close to that envisioned in the early weeks by the anti-Gaddafi coalition, altered from its initial aims only by the dictator’s suicidal choice to fight to the death. It is certainly possible that Assad is as crazy as Gaddafi and as ready to embrace death (¡viva la muerte!), but that is not the most likely possibility, which is why the graduated approach involving a succession of steps may be able to persuade the regime to yield. Assad is a paper tiger. Only our weakness makes him strong. Once the friends of the Syrian people reveal their determination and show tangible signs of their willingness to strike, it is a reasonable bet that Assad will choose exile over suicide…

What role for the United States? The U.S. military, and the administration of Barack Obama, played a decisive role in Libya. Hillary Clinton had a personal bond with Nicolas Sarkozy that made it easy for them to work together. (I recall her asking me anxiously, months after the end of the -Libyan war, if Sarkozy would prevail against François Hollande in France’s presidential election. Her sympathies were clear.) But today the United States is embroiled in its own election. Mitt Romney’s clumsy statements on foreign affairs do not make things any easier. As for Obama, he seems to me to be the same idealist with whom I spoke at length in his hotel the day after his speech to the Democratic Convention in Boston in July 2004—an idealist who cared passionately about justice and human rights. Yet it is clear that this time the White House will not be able to do as much as it did in Libya. Logistical support, yes. The loan of intelligence capabilities, yes. Technology for targeting the Syrian antiaircraft batteries that, if not knocked out in advance, would make the no-fly zone impossible to enforce—yes, that too. But the political initiative will have to come from elsewhere. The necessary roles of initiator, facilitator, and architect will have to be played by another actor. And that actor must be France.