On pirates and patience

posted at 7:30 am on April 13, 2009 by Kid from Brooklyn

The events of the past week and a half bring the ancient Chinese curse to memory, for we are most certainly living in interesting times.   First comes news of the failed ‘Dong launch and our limp reaction, followed by news of our friends and collective mortgagees the ChiComs using New York banks to funnel resources to the non-existent Iranian nuclear program.  Meanwhile, a new Iranian hostage situation flares up, our President bows submissively to the Saudi king (while brazenly denying it in this YouTube age), and over in the Indian Ocean, the most powerful Navy in history is held at bay by four Somali pirates.  Interesting times, indeed.

 The pirate incident brought to mind a wonderful Mamet essay I read only because I made an impulse purchase at the airport.  I quote below, but highly recommend reading the entire piece. 

In A Farewell to Arms, Ernest Hemingway creates a scene between a young lieutenant and an old European count. They are discussing the great war the lieutenant has been fighting. The count assures the young man that the Allies will win. How does he know? It is always the young nations that win the wars. But, the lieutenant says, will they, then, become powerful forever? No, the count says, they will become the old nations.

Writers from Edward Gibbon ( The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 1776) through Oswald Spengler ( The Decline of the West, 1918-1922) to Samuel Huntington ( The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order, 1996) have documented the progression. Power attracts sycophants, and worth attracts predators. The sycophants spawn bureaucracy, the predators scheme to overcome might with cunning, and find, as Frederick the Great taught, that he who defends everything defends nothing.

The underdog, on the other hand, must pick his shots—when and how he means to fight—and hemust have a defined objective. (The notion of an “exit strategy” indicates an absence of such. “Exit ­strategy” means the physical implementation of an excuse for abandonment of a failed enterprise.) In a contemporary war—a war between the weak and the strong—fast, audacious, and unconventional are not merely “better,” that’s all there is. Three murderers in caves could plan and ­successfully execute a devastating attack on the United States, while Jimmy Carter, executive of the greatest concentration of power in history, could not extract the Iran hostages.

As I saw these events unfold, I saw the contrast between this pirate crisis, and the original pirate crisis over 200 years ago.  Once again, a few bandits find and exploit weaknesses inherent within our bloated bureaucratic decision-making processes.  Thankfully, Capt. Phillips’ bravery gave this Administration a Mulligan.  Our forces, of course, performed admirably, even with one hand tied behind their backs by layers of bureaucratic numbskullery.  I wonder how many JAGs had to sign off on this operation before the pirates were engaged.  The White house claims this to be a major interagency success.  Seriously?  Interagency?  Homeland, Justice, Defense…all gave their two cents’ worth.  How many agencies did the pirates have to consult before seizing the Maersk Alabama?  We would do well to consider what our institutional bloat has done to our ability to respond to such situations…or to respond, period.  China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and the rest of the global rogues’ gallery have certainly done so…and have planned accordingly. 

By the way…as I write this, the NBC News and WaPo fawn machines are touting Capt. Phillips’ rescue as passage of the Obama Administration’s first major foreign-policy test.  Our media would be well-served to remember that signing your name correctly does not pass anyone a test.  Especially this weeklong test.  

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