Are targets too low for Afghan army?

What isn’t talked about is the kind of war that must be fought, and while COIN plays a part the active and kinetic part is Mountain Warfare. What stopped the British and Soviets? Acting like Empires, having centralized bases and not engaging in Mountain Warfare. Consider that every adult male outside of the cities has a culture of passing the warrior history of his tribe and clan down to him, and that is the culture that defeated Soviets, British, Persians and many, many others. It is not a modern form of the Nation State and we would have to look to European history to understand it better: the Scots come to mind, Vikings, Gauls, Germans (especially defeating a Roman Legion) with a bit of the Huns and Mongols thrown in for good measure. That is the culture you are looking at, a tribal agreement culture, not as sophisticated as, say, the Iriquois Nations but close to the Plains Indians of our continent.

The Swiss were not Swiss until they banded together and got organized, before then they had internecine conflicts between Cantons and no one considered the region to be particularly dangerous, beyond Hannibal in ancient times when his army crossed through there and then, like all high mountain ranges, it was the elements he had to fight. If he had to face even 100 Roman soldiers who knew Mountain Warfare, he would have been screwed, royally. The Swiss were just a people with a cross-roads that everyone wanted until they got organized and took down larger armies with small forces. That took some time for the Swiss to get organized, and Napoleon was the last to clean sweep the region and even he had the brains to put in local administrators and keep changes to the laws minor, and by 1812 they were free, again.

Modern war of infrastructure and supply has major problems in mountainous terrain, because a squad can hold up an army, as the Germans found out when the Partisans were able to hold up and attrit an entire Armor Division and only once the Alpenkorps got sent in did things run half-way well. We have a grand total of two choke points through which 90% of our supplies go through, and those choke points run through the Pashtun tribal territories. They have been periodically interrupted time and again, and a concerted effort by local tribes and suicide bombers could close that up entirely in a day.

What does win?

Overwhelming force can push back, but the casualty rates are high and the results can only be held with lots of forces that are not garrison troops. You can’t hold mountainous terrain without patrolling it constantly.

High tech gets equalized by lack of oxygen and air pressure, sudden changes in temperature that can go over 100 degrees in a day (from 90 above to 10 below with a temperature inversion), and by the way normal materials act in those conditions. Batteries freeze. Small wiring gets brittle along with plastic. And you have to carry all materials to survive with you. Not to mention weapons.

Bodies that are not acclimated to high altitude get worn out fast, very fast. No matter how rigorous the flatland training, only training at low oxygen and pressure can let you get mountain based stamina. Typically a year of training is necessary for this, and altitude sickness can still happen.

Thus to properly fight in the region you need troops acclimated to the altitude, specialized equipment to deal with sudden temperature inversions, tested equipment that has lubricants that won’t either evaporate or congeal, and generally a lot of stamina at altitude per trooper. Aircraft typically lose 30% of their lift capability in Afghanistan, so helicopters and AIRCAV become a tricky question and you need more airframes, per unit, than you do at lower altitudes.

These troops are specialized, and the US 10MD is typical of them: high morale, high pack loads, and fighting the old fashioned way on the ground with whatever you can get that works. The Canadians, in particular, surprised the locals by waging an effective Winter Campaign, which is nearly unheard-of in Afghanistan, and the spring after that yielded the famous 28 training bases found in Pakistan. Mountain Warfare is often just doing that: finding bases and camps for others to deal with. Small unit tactics are King in Afghanistan.

Who has won there?

Alexander the Great with an effective fighting force of 10,000. He took an impregnable fortress, on a mountain top, at night with 100 men… well, less if you believe the stories. Afghan tribes STILL talk about him and his exploits there, so he made an impression on them. His Empire fell with his death, not by insurrection. He won with small unit, mountain acclimated fighters who were willing to take on the terrain and still fight in a way the locals understood. Make no mistake about: audacity and capability get respect in Afghanistan, and if you can do the impossible in the way that is understood you get respect.

COIN must work hand in glove with Mountain Wafare or you are not successful, as the Nazis found out in Yugoslavia. The Alpenkorps couldn’t do it all and the COIN failed. We have a lot to unlearn about warfare in Afghanistan and a lot to brush up on… and we, as a Nation, are doing neither. Our troops could nail what needs to be done, but they also need leadership and backing that understands the problem. Too bad that requires history and understanding the cultures of the region, not Multi-Culti but actually understanding the warrior culture there. We cannot win as we understand it, therefore we must change our understanding and win with new parameters that still get us to where we want to be. A second Mountain Division would be a great start. That we aren’t thinking in those terms tells me much of just how sophisticated our modern culture is… or isn’t.

ajacksonian on December 2, 2009 at 12:17 PM