Quote of the Day

Reading Gen. McChrystal’s Afghanistan assessment is easier than reading tea leaves, but judging by the murkiness of the debate about Afghanistan, few in the media or politics have read it. I say this having watched public discussion turn disagreement over troops levels into The Question of Consequence regarding overall strategy. Conservatives, listening to “the commander in the field,” play McChrystal as The Hawk who wants to crush America’s enemies into rubble (or, at least, more rubble than they are already in) as opposed to Obama The Wimp, whose hesitation and apparently dwindling support for a “surge” in Afghanistan threaten to turn McChrystal’s winning strategy into a politically correct and ineffective recipe for defeat.

But what really separates Obama and McChrystal? Judging by publicly available statements and writings, nothing much. Which is why — prediction time — McChrystal probably won’t quit when Obama gives him fewer forces than McChrystal is asking for.

Why? If you read McChrystal’s report, the general makes it very clear that his change in strategy, not his change in troop levels, is his top priority. But this change in strategy is almost always left out of debate — and certainly out of the conservative end of the debate, which focuses on giving the general the forces he wants to win. What McChrystal actually wants to win — the support of the Afghan people, which is the basis of his new strategy — is never mentioned.

But might the benefits be worth the costs? President Obama says we have to prevent Afghanistan from becoming “an even larger safe haven from which Al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans.” But defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan isn’t the key to thwarting Al Qaeda. Indeed, even if our counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts exceed all expectations, the Afghan government will still have only limited authority over much of the country and will be unable to prevent Al Qaeda cells from relocating there.

Moreover, Al Qaeda doesn’t need lots of territory or elaborate bases to plot attacks and other conspiracies; all it needs are safe houses in various parts of the world and a supply of potential martyrs. Al Qaeda clones already exist in Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere; so denying its founders a “safe haven” in Afghanistan will not make that network less lethal. If Al Qaeda is our main concern, fighting in Afghanistan is increasingly a distraction.

Fortunately, pulling US troops out of Afghanistan will not make Al Qaeda stronger. If the Taliban regain power, they may conclude it is too risky to let Osama bin Laden return. But even if they did, a backward and landlocked country like Afghanistan is a poor location from which to attack the United States, which is why the 9/11 plot was conducted out of Hamburg, Germany. If Al Qaeda’s founders have to hide somewhere, better in Afghanistan than anywhere else.

And hide they will, because Afghanistan won’t be a safe haven. Bin Laden could operate somewhat freely there before 9/11, because the United States wasn’t going after him all-out. Those days are long gone. The Taliban will not be able to protect him from US commandos, cruise missiles and armed drones. He and his henchmen will always have to stay in hiding, which is why even an outright Taliban victory will not enhance their position very much.