Iran admits to secret uranium enrichment facility; Update: Built near Iranian holy city; Update: Iran working on detonators too? Update: Ahmadinejad warns Obama

posted at 8:55 am on September 25, 2009 by Ed Morrissey

Iran scurried to the IAEA in order to reveal a previously-secret uranium enrichment facility after it got wind that the US and its allies had discovered it.  Iran, which has insisted that it had fully disclosed its nuclear work and research, now has to provide an explanation for their deception.  If history is any guide, they won’t have to sing and dance for long:

Iran revealed the existence of a covert uranium enrichment facility to the U.N. nuclear watchdog this week after it discovered the project’s secrecy had been breached by Western intelligence agencies, FOX News has learned.

The U.S., Britain and France will accuse Iran on Friday morning of building the facility underground in secret and charge that it has hidden the facility for years from international weapons inspectors, a senior White House official said.

At an announcement before the opening of the G-20 economic summit in Pittsburgh, President Obama, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy will demand weapons inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency be granted immediate access to the facility.

An official told FOX News that Iran revealed the existence of the second plant in a letter sent Monday to IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei.

Seven years ago, the secret of Iran’s uranium enrichment efforts broke as the world learned the extent of the AQ Khan network.  Afterward, the world reacted by … applying half-baked sanctions and doing next to nothing.  Russia began helping Iran build bigger nuclear facilities despite Tehran’s covert nuclearization, and they openly supported the mullahcracy’s continued assertions that Iran has, er, nothing to hide.

How’s that working out today?

What will be different this time?  Except for some diplomatic embarrassment for Moscow, not much.  Barack Obama has practically built his international reputation on the basis of offering talks to Iran, so he’s not going to be inclined to shun the mullahs now.  He and the Western allies will demand IAEA inspections, which Iran will likely grant now, and that will allow them to relieve some of the diplomatic pressure that this revelation will create.

As for Russia, they still see Iran as critical to their economic health, so don’t expect much from Moscow.  Earlier this week, they sounded fatalistic about new sanctions, and some wondered if Obama hadn’t worked out some quid pro quo based on the shift on missile defense in eastern Europe.  Instead, it looks as though Obama may have shared this intel with Russia, which is probably how Iran found out about it.

Update (AP): No surprise that the secret facility is apparently located near Qom, which is ground zero for Shiite theological scholarship. If Israel hits the enrichment plant, Tehran will scream that it’s an attack on an Islamic holy city to rally the public towards religious war. Here’s another fun detail:

The second nuclear facility, on a military base near the Shia Muslim holy city of Qom, is thought to be capable of housing 3,000 centrifuges, not enough to produce nuclear fuel to power a reactor, but sufficient to manufacture bomb-making material, a U.S. diplomatic source who read the letter told CNN.

Remind me again, how many secret nuclear facilities did the 2007 NIE suspect Iran of having? Hot Air readers know the answer by now.

Update (AP): I missed this earlier — apparently, Obama acknowledged in his comments this morning that the secret site wasn’t designed for nuclear “energy.”

President Obama said “the size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program” and called its construction a “direct challenge to the basic compact at the center of the nonproliferation regime. These rules are clear: All nations have the right to peaceful nuclear energy, those nations with nuclear weapons must move toward disarmament, those nations without nuclear weapons must forsake them.”

Update (AP): Another detail I missed earlier: The September deadline for Iran to respond to the west’s negotiations offer has now been quietly extended to December, notwithstanding the revelation of a new nuke facility that appears to have no peaceful purpose. Oh, and via Israel Matzav, there’s this too:

An Iranian exile group said Thursday that it has identified two previously unknown sites in and near Tehran where it says Iranian scientists are researching and trying to manufacture detonators for nuclear weapons.

The allegation, from the Paris-based Mujaheddin-e Khalq, or MEK, was designed to reinforce the exiles’ long-standing contention that the Iranian government, despite repeated denials, has an active program to develop a nuclear arsenal under the aegis of the Defense Ministry and the Revolutionary Guard Corps…

Abrishamchi said the two sites house programs designed to research and produce high-explosive detonators for atomic bombs.

The information came from “dozens of sources at different levels of the Iranian regime’s various organs” and was cross-checked with dozens more, he said in a statement.

Update (Ed): Looks like Ahmadinejad has decided to lower his profile today (via The Corner):

Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has cancelled a press conference scheduled for later Friday at United Nations headquarters in New York.

No reasons were provided to the UN secretariat, which organizes the event that Ahmadinejad is given each year when he comes to New York to attend the UN General Assembly.

The cancellation coincided with news that Iran has started a second nuclear plant for uranium enrichment. US President Barack Obama said at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania that the second plant is ‘inconsistent’ with claims it is being used to produce civilian nuclear power.

I’d say no explanation was necessary.

Update (AP): His presser might have been canceled but Time magazine was sitting down with the tiny terrorist while Obama was making the announcement. I’m sensing the the fist is still clenched.

Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad has warned his U.S. counterpart not to press Tehran on new revelations about a uranium enrichment plant. “If I were [President] Obama’s adviser, I would definitely advise him to refrain making this statement because it is definitely a mistake,” Ahmedinejad told TIME in New York on Friday. “It would definitively be a mistake.”…

But he seemed nonplussed by questions about the newly-revealed plant, which TIME informed him that Obama was revealing in Pittsburgh; Ahmadinejad’s response meandered from the defensive to the aggressive. “This does not mean we must inform Mr. Obama’s administration of every facility that we have,” he said. He warned that if Obama brings up the uranium facility, it “simply adds to the list of issues to which the United States owes the Iranian nation an apology over. Rest assured that this will be the case. We do everything transparently.” He added, “I’m not the person who should be giving this advice to Mr. Obama because principally, Mr. Obama’s mistakes work in our favor. But still, we do not want to see a president of a country like the United States of America to make blunders of the sort, to make mistakes of the sort.”


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Basically they’re agreeing that unless we go dig up a bunch of concrete in Syria we’re never gonna prove anything. We haven’t even dug up the concrete in Iraq in the places we were told Saddam buried stuff.

We’ve found Saddam’s documents saying they were going to hide the chemical WMD’s by keeping them in precursor form which could be called fertilizer but could be mixed within minutes to form deadly weapons. And we’ve found the precursors just as he said – but just as Saddam had planned, the “see-no-evil” folks at the IAEA and the “screw America” crowd called it fertilizer. No threat at all.

What we all learned is that there is no way to convince the blind of what they refuse to see. So why waste the time trying? The quotes mentioned basically say “We don’t know and we’re not going to find out.”

justincase on September 25, 2009 at 2:17 PM

I agree justincase. What galls me is the fact that these people keep coming up with these moral eqivolent arguments or some other b.s. Again, why can’t they separate their opposition to the war from that. In a way, I am personally torn on Iraq. I’m glad Saddam Hussein is gone, but on the other hand, I feel like Iraq wasn’t worth invading. I think Bush did what he felt was right at the time, but there was a rush to war. His judgment was that Hussein would never allow the inspectors all the way in. That’s the problem; we will probably never know if they had weapons or not. That argument cuts both ways.
Sorry for pretty much hijacking the thread, but subject of Iraq is very upsetting. People making smarmy, snarky comments about it sets me off.

NathanG on September 25, 2009 at 2:23 PM

The Calibur on September 25, 2009 at 2:12 PM

Stick around, Sunshine.

You are the bestest, funnest kind of troll.

Really.

hillbillyjim on September 25, 2009 at 2:23 PM

runner on September 25, 2009 at 2:20 PM

Dude I know I was making a crack on satellite imagery a million posts back I was just responding to responses. Chill.

The Calibur on September 25, 2009 at 2:25 PM

justincase on September 25, 2009 at 2:22 PM

Since Rapid City & Minot will eventually be targets, I will probably get vaporized eventually.
But if not, I’ll be there to help pick up the pieces.
Islam may very well be the death of many freedom-loving people.

Badger40 on September 25, 2009 at 2:26 PM

Well, even mushroom clouds can have a silver lining: when the Iranian nuke goes off in a coastal city, we can line Copperheads like dave742 up against the wall. Clean out the fifth column and secure our country first.

SDN on September 25, 2009 at 2:26 PM

Well, even mushroom clouds can have a silver lining: when the Iranian nuke goes off in a coastal city, we can line Copperheads like dave742 up against the wall. Clean out the fifth column and secure our country first.

SDN on September 25, 2009 at 2:26 PM

Ahmadinejad doesn’t have to nuke the US to destroy it. Cutting off access to Persian and Arabian gulf oil would pretty much do it. And I’d be betting he’s confident that Obama would not use nuclear weapons in response to an attack on any other country.

ProfessorMiao on September 25, 2009 at 2:30 PM

I hear ya, NathanG. If people were more open-minded it would help. But there’s so much venom that people can’t seem to even think straight on it.

I hope the effort in Iraq will bear fruit. Basically the whole southern hemisphere other than Australia is either in the grips or potentially in the grips of Islamism. And it’s headed north through immigration, including in our own country. If the extremism wasn’t confronted somewhere – anywhere – we could just as well hang up our hats and call it over.

Maybe Iraq wasn’t the right place to start. I don’t know. But it seems like we had a better chance there than we’re seeing we have now in Afghanistan. Sandstorms and heat are one thing, but mountains for terrorists to hide in every nook and cranny are another story altogether.

justincase on September 25, 2009 at 2:31 PM

Why will Minot and Rapid City eventually be targets, Badger?

justincase on September 25, 2009 at 2:32 PM

Why will Minot and Rapid City eventually be targets, Badger?

justincase on September 25, 2009 at 2:32 PM

Air Force bases.
There were a ton of missiles in ND & SD but they dismantled a lot of them in the 80s.
But there are still some around & I hAve no doubt some of them may be nukes.

Badger40 on September 25, 2009 at 2:36 PM

Cutting off access to Persian and Arabian gulf oil would pretty much do it. And I’d be betting he’s confident that Obama would not use nuclear weapons in response to an attack on any other country.

ProfessorMiao on September 25, 2009 at 2:30 PM

I agree about BO’s use of nukes-he’s too much of a coward to use them back.
But if they cut off oil supplies there, I’m sure we’ll make up what we get from there through Canada & Mexico.
Plus it may be the thing that opens up more of our domestic reserves for production.

Badger40 on September 25, 2009 at 2:38 PM

dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 11:31 AM

I see your point. I just cannot square the comparison between the Kyoto accord and a state sponsor of terrorism getting their hands on nuclear weapons. I pray that you weren’t trying to equate the two and are simply making the point about treaty ratification.

csdeven on September 25, 2009 at 2:41 PM

ACORN took lessons from this guy:

He warned that if Obama brings up the uranium facility, it “simply adds to the list of issues to which the United States owes the Iranian nation an apology over. Rest assured that this will be the case. We do everything transparently.”

unclesmrgol on September 25, 2009 at 3:03 PM

Dave472, those of us who can actually read know that the US has known about this site for some time, but chose not to make that knowlege “public”, perhaps as preparations for preconditionless talks continued.
Iran went public because they found out we knew and once again took the initiative by choosing the time. In any case, govt has clearly had plenty of time to make an eval of the intel and the site’s capabilities.
If it walks, talks, and is hidden like a duck, it isn’t a kitten, it’s a DUCK.

Empiricist on September 25, 2009 at 3:05 PM

If they go after old missiles the heartland will all be targeted, I think.

I don’t know. If a huge bomb went off would it do the EMP thing, or do they have to do a special kind of bomb for that? I have a hard time thinking if there was a big bomb that life would ever get back to where it is now. The world is too connected, too dependent on technology.

justincase on September 25, 2009 at 3:11 PM

Explain to me how you can look at a building from a satellite and determine how many centrifuges can fit into it. Do you take the area of a centrifuge and multiply it by 3,000? What if there are two floors? You guys have me splitting my sides laughing.

dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 1:35 PM

Off the top of my head.
1. Watch it being built.
2. Combine the information on time of day, and length of shadow.
3. Look at an angle, other than directly from above.

darktood on September 25, 2009 at 3:16 PM

What exactly did Amaddyjad warn Obama not to do?

Not to give them talks without preconditions, not to grant face-to-face negotiations immediately or not to drop the possibility of tougher sanctions?

Track-A-'Crat on September 25, 2009 at 3:40 PM

Why will Minot and Rapid City eventually be targets, Badger?

justincase on September 25, 2009 at 2:32 PM

A B-1 bomber group is also based at Ellsworth Air Force base outside of Rapid. I think they do carry nukes, as there was a stink a year or so ago about a bomber going down to the TX B-1 base armed. Apparently they are not to fly armed over US territory unless ordered up to defend.

Wethal on September 25, 2009 at 3:44 PM

justincase on September 25, 2009 at 3:11 PM

Nuke goes off in air, electromagnetic energy converts to heat and pressure as it fries the air while initially expanding. EMP results when blast is above atmosphere and the electromagnetic (x and gamma) remain EM.
Much wider effect as well. Just have to lob one above target area without much precision required. Harder to shoot down as well (on this end anyway). Fits well for an immature program…

Empiricist on September 25, 2009 at 3:57 PM

csdeven

I just cannot square the comparison between the Kyoto accord and a state sponsor of terrorism getting their hands on nuclear weapons. I pray that you weren’t trying to equate the two and are simply making the point about treaty ratification.

Yes. My point is that what Iran did is perfectly legal. I brought up Kyoto in response to a “good faith” argument. All Iran wants is for the IAEA to act in good faith, and if they do, Iran will as well. The IAEA illegally referred Iran to the SC. This is a violation of the NPT. Iran cannot be expected to act in good faith when the IAEA violates the NPT. Iran got mad when the IAEA broke the treaty, and at that point said they will only follow the letter of the law. They have their pride, too.

dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 4:05 PM

Explain to me how you can look at a building from a satellite and determine how many centrifuges can fit into it. Do you take the area of a centrifuge and multiply it by 3,000? What if there are two floors? You guys have me splitting my sides laughing.

Really, Mr. Scientist? Because an expert in a production process can look at a building and decide whether that production is going on, and how much of it. Speaking as a noob, if you’re refining radioactive sludge in a building, you’ve got to have freight access to bring in the raw material, you’ve got to have an adequate power supply, you’ve got to radiate off heat, and you’ve got to have a means of dealing with the waste. I suppose you COULD be doing that in a department store, if you’re willing to kill your workers. On the presumption that Iran thinks of centrifuge operators as highly trained techs worth sparing death from carbon monoxide poisoning, heat stroke, and radiation burns, they probably work in a building designed for the purpose. So we film that, and bring our sixty year expertise in building nuclear weapons and even older expertise in photographic analysis and a century of industrial-process engineering to come up with a range of production.

Chris_Balsz on September 25, 2009 at 4:10 PM

Explain to me how you can look at a building from a satellite and determine how many centrifuges can fit into it. Do you take the area of a centrifuge and multiply it by 3,000? What if there are two floors? You guys have me splitting my sides laughing.

dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 1:35 PM

Yeah, that’s pretty much how it’s done. It doesn’t give you an exact number, but the game of intel is played mostly through deductive reasoning. When a big piece is missing and an educated guess won’t answer the question, you utilize other methods of getting the info. A little piece here, a little piece there. Get a lot of little pieces, you’ve got something.

When you know what you’re looking for, in this case a nuclear facility, you also know how to determine what it is you see. Mainly because you have the same thing at home.

Now, if Iran was building some sort of device that no one has ever seen or thought of, then no amount of satellite intel will give up good data. That’s not the case here.

BobMbx on September 25, 2009 at 4:33 PM

Pacifism in the face of evil aggression only leads to greater carnage when the war comes. Striking down Iranian nukes NOW, is preferable to any alternative. In fact, there are NO other alternatives. War is the last resort, but it is a resort. Allowing Iran to continue on its course is disaster. Mankind`s is not a history of peace occasionally disturbed by war, but rather one of war punctuated by short periods of peace. Dispute it if you like. But it is true. Wish man`s nature to be different than it is, but it is not.

In this regard, I have a classic book recommend for those of you interested:
Once an Eagle by Anton Myrer. It is a one book mini-education on man, history, and war. I wish liberals would read it, but I think we have passed that juncture already. Closed minds will NOT read such a book.

Domestically,there are already some signs indicating the birth of an oppressive government here our own country as I write. This is urgent and pending.

So far, we have stymied this oppression through the workings of Democracy. Let us hope we can continue to do so.

But let us remain vigilant.

That is what Thomas Jefferson would have wanted.

Sherman1864 on September 25, 2009 at 4:44 PM

This ain’t good.

Terrye on September 25, 2009 at 4:50 PM

But if they cut off oil supplies there, I’m sure we’ll make up what we get from there through Canada & Mexico.
Plus it may be the thing that opens up more of our domestic reserves for production.

Badger40 on September 25, 2009 at 2:38 PM

IIRC we import over 50% of our oil from our NAFTA partners. Wonder of wonders the third runner up is [drum roll please] Chavez. Texas produces as much oil as we import from Arabia. Did you catch Hannity listing the recent finds. There’s this HUGE field in the Gulf. I heard it puts ANWR to shame.

Blacksmith8 on September 25, 2009 at 4:57 PM

Ahmadinejad’s response meandered from the defensive to the aggressive.

Poor guy, that’s what happens when you get caught with your pants around your ankles.

GarandFan on September 25, 2009 at 5:03 PM

By Obama’s own standard, announced at the UN, Iran has every right to pursue… whatever the hell it wants. Who is the US to interfere in Iranian matters? If Iran wants to destroy Israel, what business is that of ours?

Fortunately, Obama was just reading pretty words on a prompter, so nothing he says matters. In a similar vein, Obama’s posturing about this new revelation is just empty blather. “You must complly with UN Resolutions” – OR WHAT?

If Iran pushes things too far, Obama might have to… ask the UN for a “strongly-worded protest”. Or even more sanctions. Ahmadinijad is clearly worried about the possibility, isn’t he?

hawksruleva on September 25, 2009 at 5:05 PM

Yes. My point is that what Iran did is perfectly legal. I brought up Kyoto in response to a “good faith” argument. All Iran wants is for the IAEA to act in good faith, and if they do, Iran will as well. The IAEA illegally referred Iran to the SC. This is a violation of the NPT. Iran cannot be expected to act in good faith when the IAEA violates the NPT. Iran got mad when the IAEA broke the treaty, and at that point said they will only follow the letter of the law. They have their pride, too.

dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 4:05 PM

You still haven’t commented on the fact the Iranians admitted to a covert enrichment plant in violation of the NPT only because the US, UK and France busted them.

And you dare whine about “good faith” with a straight face?

Chuck Schick on September 25, 2009 at 5:08 PM

dave742 is also full of hooey about the alleged IAEA violations of the treaty. The IAEA did not suddenly start violating the NPT after Iran signed it. The IAEA isn’t a party to the treaty and so cannot by definition violate it. Nor did the IAEA suddenly start enforcing it differently after Iran signed it. However what they did do, and not very effectively, was start to hold Iraq seriously to account to its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions regarding the nuclear weapons program it had had.

Furthermore, the treaty is about nonproliferation first and foremost, nonproliferation, meaning not the development of new weapons or acquisition of additional ones by states that already are recognized as nuclear powers but by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states that are not. On the matter of disarmament it talks about the desirability of disarmament, but does not bind its signatories to disarm.

ProfessorMiao on September 25, 2009 at 5:23 PM

ChuckSchick:

Iranians admitted to a covert enrichment plant

Are you talking about the incident today?

dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 5:25 PM

When elected my adnministration will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.

words straight form his mouth

The chicken sh*t lied again Joe

bluegrass on September 25, 2009 at 5:35 PM

Iran cannot be expected to act in good faith when the IAEA violates the NPT.

You are a babbling moron. You are using words over your pay scale. I’ll let you go figure what you just said.

Here’s a hint: A vendor breaches a contract, and the customer voids the contract. Who is justified to act in bad faith?

Iran got mad when the IAEA broke the treaty, and at that point said they will only follow the letter of the law.

Is the purpose of the system to see to it that IAEA responds to nuclear construction in a precise manner, or to see to it no illicit proliferation occurs?

They have their pride, too.

So what? Really. So what?

Chris_Balsz on September 25, 2009 at 5:39 PM

Are you talking about the incident today?

dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 5:25 PM

Yes.

Why did they not declare the facility to the IAEA until they were forced to by Western intelligence.

Even Russia is demanding they open the plant to inspectors.

Chuck Schick on September 25, 2009 at 5:40 PM

ProfessorMiao:
“The IAEA did not suddenly start violating the NPT after Iran signed it.”

You are correct. The IAEA violated the Safeguards agreement (yes, not the NPT) long before Iran. They violated the safeguards agreement with the DPRK back in the early 1990′s as well. (see note 1 below)

Nor did the IAEA suddenly start enforcing it differently after Iran signed it.

Yes, they did start enforcing it differently. They enforced it differently with Iran by illegally referring them to the Security Council. To show this, let’s compare how the IAEA enforced the safeguards agreement with Iran vs how they enforced it with the DPRK in the 1990’s. As with the Iran case, the IAEA acted illegally when dealing with the DPRK (1). However, the procedure used to refer the DPRK to the Security Council did follow the applicable laws, and comparing this to the Iranian case will illustrate the illegal actions the IAEA has taken against Iran. Before comparing the DPRK and Iran cases, it is important to understand the meaning of Articles 71-77, and Articles 18 and 19 of the safeguards agreement.

When issues arise concerning violations of safeguards agreements by member states, the IAEA may take the following steps, which ultimately lead to the referral of the states to the Security Council.

Step 1) The IAEA may call for a Special Inspection: There are three types of inspections available to the IAEA. The first are called ad hoc inspections, which relate to the period just after a Safeguards Agreement comes into force, and the purpose of which is to verify the information contained in the initial report provided to the IAEA. These inspections are provided for in Article 71. The second types are called regular inspections, which are the routine inspections that are run in order to verify reports, status of nuclear materials, etc. These are provided for in Article 72. Article 76 states that for regular inspections, “the inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.” Subsidiary Arrangements are provided for in Paragraphs 39 and 40, and contain the details as to how the safeguards agreement will be applied in a particular country. These details include the monitoring of “strategic points,” where inflows and outflows of nuclear material can be measured and verified by the IAEA. For a regular inspection, access outside of these “strategic points” is not allowed.
The third types are called special inspections, and may be used if “information obtained from routine inspections is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities.” These are provided for in Article 73. The scope of special inspections are contained in Article 77. Article 77(a) says that the IAEA may “make inspections in addition to the routine inspections provided for in Articles 78-82.” Articles 78-82 outline the “frequency and intensity of routine inspections.” Although Article 77(a) says that the frequency of the regular inspections may increase in a special inspection, it says nothing about increasing the areas of access allowed in regular inspections. Article 77(b) does address issues relating to access, and says that the IAEA may “obtain access…to information or locations in addition to those specified in Article 76.” In light of what was said about Article 76 above, this means access to information outside of the “strategic points” agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. This additional access, however, must be “in agreement with [the member state].” If the IAEA and the member state cannot agree to the details of this additional access, the issue will then be resolved “in accordance with Articles 21 and 22,” which involves a discussion of the issue before the Board, or arbitration.

Step 2) The IAEA may decide that an issue is “essential and urgent”. Article 77, which discusses Special Inspections, introduces this next step available to the IAEA if Special Inspections do not resolve a problem. It says that if an action by the member state is considered to be “essential and urgent,” then “Article 18 shall apply.”
Articles 18 and 19 fall under the heading “Measures in Relation to Verification of non-Diversion.” These are the articles that relate to possible measures that the IAEA can take in relation to diversion issues. Article 18 says that if the Board “decides that an action by [the member state] is essential and urgent to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons,” then the Board may call upon the member state to “take the required action without delay.” Special Inspections involve minor issues that can possibly be resolved with additional inspections, but “essential and urgent” issues relate to “verification of non-diversion,” which is much more serious. The “exclusive purpose” (Article 1) of safeguards is to verify that “special fissionable material” is “not diverted to nuclear weapons,” and if an issue relating to diversion is identified, it is “essential and urgent” that it be resolved. If it is not, it will lead to the matter being referred to the Security Council via Article 19.

Step 3) Article 19 states that if the IAEA “is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded,” then the board “may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute.” The reports in Article XII of the Statute are made to “all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.” The two articles need to be read together to be understood correctly, because “paragraph 19 connects paragraph 18 to Article XII(C).” (2) If the “essential and urgent” issues of Article 18 cannot be resolved, then the board will “not be able to verify that there has been no diversion,” and, according to Article 19, they “may then make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII.” It is through unresolved “essential and urgent” issues that a member state gets referred to the Security Council. There are two possible ways that these “essential and urgent” issues can remain unresolved. Either the IAEA investigates the “essential and urgent” issues and does not come up with satisfactory results, or the particular nation does not allow the IAEA to investigate the issues to begin with.

Now we can look at the DPRK issue. The Safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the IAEA went into force on April 10, 1992 and ad hoc inspections to confirm the initial report began in May of 1992. (3) Beginning in July of 1992, “inconsistencies began to emerge” between the information obtained from the IAEA inspections and the data supplied by the DPRK. (See note 61 about these “inconsistencies”). Over the next 7 months, the IAEA attempted to obtain additional information and access to two sites for further inspection. The DPRK did not cooperate with either request.
Due to the fact that the IAEA was unable to address these inconsistencies, on Feb. 9, 1993, the IAEA took Step 1 above and requested a “special inspection”. Over the next two weeks no further progress was made and therefore the Board proceeded to Step 2 by passing a resolution (4) deciding that it was “essential and urgent” for the DPRK to provide additional information and to provide access to two additional sites. The resolution was passed on Feb. 25, 1993, and gave the DPRK an additional month to respond. Instead of responding positively, on March 12, the DPRK gave a 90 day notice that it was withdrawing from the NPT. (5) On March 18, the IAEA adopted another resolution (6) notifying the DPRK that the Safeguards agreement remained in force in spite of the DPRK notice of withdrawal. The next day the Director General informed the DPRK that unless they cooperated within the next two weeks, he would have “no choice but to report non-compliance when the Board met again on 31 March.” (7) On March 31, the Director General reported to the BOG that “as of now, the DPRK continues to be in non-compliance with its general obligation to co-operate in the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement provided for in Article 3 of that Agreement, More specifically, it continues to be in non-compliance with Articles 18, 73, 77 and Article 71 of the Safeguards Agreement. This is because it continues to deny access both to the additional information and locations requested by the Director General on 9 February 1993 and determined by the Board to be essential and urgent to ensure verification of compliance with INFCIRC/403 (Articles 18, 73 and 77) and also to deny the access required for the purpose of ad hoc inspections (Article 71). As a result, the Agency is unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.” (8) It was the Director General who determined non-compliance and reported the non-compliance to the Board, and the specific reasons were given for the non-compliance finding. The non-compliance finding was reached because the DPRK was given one month to resolve the “essential and urgent” issues, and those issues were not addressed by the DPRK. Therefore, after the one month deadline the DG found the DPRK non-compliant and, as a result, declared that the Agency was unable to verify that there was no diversion.
Article 19 says that if the Board “is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded,” then they “may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute,” and this is exactly what the Board did. The day after the Director General reported to the Board that the DPRK was non-compliant because he was “unable to verify that there has been no diversion,” the Board passed a resolution (9) finding that “the DPRK is in non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency” and also found that “pursuant to Article 19 of the Agreement, that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the terms of the Safeguards Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” As a result, they decided, “as required by Article XII.C of the Statute and in accordance with Article 19 of the Agreement, to report the DPRK’s non-compliance and the Agency’s inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.” The resolution of the Board followed Article 19 to the letter. This is the way it should work.
Because the report was made to “all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations,” the General Assembly was able to act on the report by issuing a resolution (which passed by a vote of 140-1, with North Korea as the only dissenting vote (10)) that “urges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement.” (11)

The path to a legal Security Council referral, as seen above with the DPRK, is as follows: Serious issues can arise that bring into doubt the question of non-diversion, the “exclusive purpose” of safeguards. Because the issues relate to non-diversion, they are deemed “essential and urgent,” and need to be resolved promptly. A deadline is given, and if the state does not resolve the issues within that time, then the Director General decides that the state is in non-compliance. The non-compliance finding is made because the “essential and urgent” issues remain unresolved. Once the state is found non-complaint, the Board may decide that it is unable to verify non-diversion, and the state is then referred to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Let’s compare this to what happened with Iran. On 6 June 2003 the Director General released a report stating the Iran “failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement,” (12) and another DG report on 26 August 2003 (13) provided an update on the original report. On 12 September 2003, the BOG passed a resolution (14) based on these reports that decided it was “essential and urgent in order to ensure IAEA verification of non-diversion of nuclear material” that Iran takes certain actions by the end of October of that year. This is similar to the BOG resolution passed on 25 Feb. 1993 (15) against the DPRK which decided that it was “essential and urgent in order to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with [their safeguards agreement]” that the DPRK take certain actions within one month.
Up to this point the situation is very similar to that of the DPRK. In both cases issues arose that brought into doubt the question of non-diversion. (The issues brought up in the Iran case are without justification just as in the DPRK case, but we are concentrating on the procedures here and not the facts that they are based on). In both cases these issues were declared by the Board to be “essential and urgent” under Article 18, and in both cases a deadline was given for the issue to be resolved. The Board was slightly more lenient with Iran than with the DPRK, because they gave Iran 6 weeks to resolve the issues, and the DPRK was given only one month. How generous.
A decision by the Board deciding, in accordance with Article 18, that certain actions are “essential and urgent” is critical, because if these issues are not addressed satisfactorily, then the Board will likely find, in accordance with Article 19, that it “is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded.” The DPRK did not respond to their “essential and urgent” issues, and as a result they were found to be non-compliant and referred to the Security Council in accordance with Article 19 just over one month later. So what happened in the case of Iran? Unlike the DPRK, the IAEA stated that in response to the “essential and urgent” request, “Iran [showed] active cooperation and openness. This is evidenced, in particular, by Iran’s granting to the Agency unrestricted access to all locations the Agency requested to visit; by the provision of information and clarifications in relation to the origin of imported equipment and components; and by making individuals available for interviews.” The IAEA then stated that “this [was] a welcome development.” (16) As a result of Iran’s cooperation the IAEA was able to resolve the “essential and urgent” issues. On 26 November 2003 the IAEA reported that “Iran has taken the specific actions deemed essential and urgent and requested of it in paragraph 4 of the Resolution adopted by the Board on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69)” (17) The IAEA also stated that “there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons program.”
Unlike the DPRK case, Iran cooperated fully with the request for information to the “essential and urgent” issues, and those issues were resolved. Therefore, no referral to the Security Council was warranted at the time, and no referral was made at that time. The only way a referral to the Security Council can be made legally is if a request for “essential and urgent” information is ignored or if the issues cannot be resolved. Because the “essential and urgent” issues were resolved, a referral to the Security Council cannot be legally made until more “essential and urgent” issues arise. Only if Iran were not able to resolve any new issues could a legal referral be made. After this incident in 2003, however, no other decision has been made requiring Iran to provide “essential and urgent” information, and therefore the referral to the Security Council that eventually did occur is illegal because it did not follow Articles 18 and 19 of the safeguards agreement, which is the only legal route for referral to the Security Council. (18) When the BOG referred the DPRK to the Security Council, the resolution stated that they decided, “as required by Article XII.C. of the Statute and in accordance with Article 19 of the Agreement, to report the DPRK’s non-compliance and the Agency’s inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded…”. (GOV/2645) The referral was made legally through Article 19 because the DPRK did not respond to the “essential and urgent” issues. When the BOG referred Iran to the Security Council, however, the resolution simply stated that they decided “to report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these steps are required of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue.” (GOV/2006/14) There was no mention of Article 19, which is the only legal route to Security Council referral, because Iran had taken care of all the “essential and urgent” issues. There was also no mention of the “Agency’s inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded,” because in the case of Iran there was no diversion.

1) The DPRK Safeguards Agreement entered into force on April 10, 1992, and the DPRK filed an initial report on nuclear material subject to safeguards on May 4, 1992. According to the summary contained in INFCIRC/419 (fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html), after the ad hoc inspections started in May, “inconsistencies” between the DPRK declarations and the inspector’s findings began to emerge in July, 1992. It is doubtful, however, that there were really any inconsistencies. On July 22, 1992, a hearing was held by the House Foreign Affairs Committee titled “North Korean Nuclear Program,” where IAEA Director Hans Blix testified on the ongoing inspections. At that point the IAEA inspectors had already “gone to the installations which [the DPRK has] declared in the original inventory,” and were also “taken to some places which were also not in the original inventory.” According to Blix’ testimony, the IAEA had questions about why the DPRK was building what they called a “radio-chemical laboratory,” which the IAEA called a reprocessing plant. The DPRK said it would be for waste disposal as part of a closed fuel cycle, which is completely reasonable, but Blix was suspicious that other reasons were initially given. Regardless of his suspicions, the building of the facility was completely legal, and involved no “inconsistencies.” Blix also wondered whether the core of their 5 Megawatt reactor was the original core. This also was not an “inconsistency,” and the question would have been resolved on future routine inspections. Blix said himself that “there is no sign they have been devoting themselves to an enrichment program” and that there is no evidence of the DPRK cooperating with others on their nuclear program. Regarding uranium, Blix said that “we have not established any differences between or discrepancies between the inventory and what we have seen and verified so far.” Blix did not identify a single problem at the hearing, and it is doubtful there was any.
The IAEA’s illegal actions began on February 9, 1993, when the IAEA began to ask for access to two buildings at the Nyongbyon Nuclear Research Centre based on information from satellite photos obtained from the US (this request was reiterated in the BOG Resolution of Feb. 25, 1993, see GOV/2636) (Interestingly, it was not long before this that the US was confronted with a similar situation when negotiating the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention. At issue was a provision for “anytime, anywhere” on-site inspections with no right of refusal, which is similar to what the DPRK was being asked to submit to. When the Soviet Union decided to accept the idea of these types of inspections, it was the West, including the US, who said that these types of inspections would pose grave risks to sensitive facilities. Therefore, in 1991, the US, UK, Japan and Australia “formally proposed less intrusive inspections than those that the Soviet Union had supported.” See: “Recommended Text for Article IX – Challenge Inspection” UN Conference on Disarmament, CD/CW/WP.352, 15 July 1991, quoted in “Co-operative Security and the CWC: A Comparison of the Chemical and Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Regimes,” in Contemporary Security Policy, V. 15, No. 3, 1994, p. 30-57, by Jessica Eve Stern. The US supports the idea of other nations being subjected o these types of inspections, but not their own.)
The request to search buildings at Nyongbyon was illegal and a breach of the Safeguards Agreement by the IAEA for two reasons. The first related to the fact that information was submitted to the IAEA by a third party. Details on how information is to be submitted to the IAEA by signatory States is given throughout the safeguards agreement (especially paragraph 8), but nowhere in the safeguards agreement are there provisions for the gathering of information by the IAEA from third parties. The IAEA Statute does contain details on the submission of information by member states in Article VIII, but this information relates only “to the nature and peaceful uses of atomic energy,” and not to nuclear weapons programs. Accepting and acting on information supplied by a third party was illegal. The Director General first presented the idea of using third party intelligence to the BOG on November 12, 1991 (see GOV/2554) by proposing that a two person team be created in order to compile and verify this type of information. There was widespread opposition to the idea (for example, Mr Lavina of the Philippines said that the idea was “cynically encouraging espionage” and was “in danger of promoting transgressions against the sovereignty of states,” and as a result, “on the legal plane, [the idea] would not only violate the Statute but also international law.” (see paragraphs 16 and 18 of GOV/OR/770)). Because of the opposition, the “proposal was scrapped” (The Independent, “UN Agency Tightens Rules for Nuclear Inspection,” Feb.29, 1992 by Michael Wise). Even though his idea was rejected by the Board, the Director General used deceptive language to make it appear to the outside world that it actually had been accepted. At the BOG meeting, the “summing up” of the meeting said that the Board “further reaffirmed the Agency’s rights to obtain and to have access to additional information and locations in accordance with the Agency’s Statute and all comprehensive safeguards agreements.” (see paragraph 48 of GOV/OR/776, also referred to in paragraph 4 of GC(36)/1017, available here: iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC36/GC36Documents/English/gc36-1017_en.pdf). This part of the summing up was included in a press release issued by the Director General on
26 February 1992 (PR 92/12, 26 February 1992). In response to the press release, articles appeared saying that the Board approved the use of third party information (see, for example, AP, “UN Agency’s Board Agrees to Toughen Inspection Programs,” Feb, 27, 1992 by Mark J. Porubcansky). The Board, however, had not accepted the idea of using third party information, and had specifically rejected the only proposal made to do so. The reason for the confusion is in the wording of the statement, which said that the Board “reaffirmed the Agency’s rights to obtain and to have access to additional information and locations in accordance with the Agency’s Statute and all comprehensive safeguards agreements.” This statement basically says that the Board made no changes at all, because “reaffirming the Agency’s rights” means that the Agency’s rights remained unchanged. The key to understanding the situation is to know what the Agency’s rights were before they were “reaffirmed” by the Board, and by not detailing this, the statement makes it appear as though the Board agreed to the use of third party information. The reality, however, is that third party information was not allowed before the BOG meeting, and reaffirming the Agency as having “access to additional information…in accordance with the Agency’s Statute” simply means that third party information was not allowed after the meeting as well. The deception in this wording was pointed out by Mr. Villain XIIII of Belgium at the BOG meeting, who said that the summary did not “[reflect] the opinions expressed” in the meeting but instead “artificially [obliterated] their substance.” He said that the summing up “made no reference to a very important point, namely the Agency’s access to information which could indicate the need for a special inspection.” He was concerned that “the Agency might act upon doubtful, arbitrary or biased information and …that the State against which the information was directed might not have any opportunity to refute it or to justify itself.” He said that although “there was a reference [in the summing up] to the Agency’s right to have access to additional information…that wording [was] taken from paragraph 73 of document INFCIRC/153, [and] referred to the quite different situation when during an inspection, Agency officials felt that they needed additional information or access to additional information. What [the Director General] had in mind, however, was initial information which could trigger a special inspection, and failure to include a reference to that might create uncertainties about the future conduct of special inspections” (see GOV/OR/776, paragraphs 52, 52 and 55). The Belgian representative likely realized that the wording was specifically designed to “create uncertainties about the future conduct of special inspections.”
It was not until the BOG passed resolution GC(39)/RES/17 on September 18, 1995 that the use of third party information become legal (see the statement: “these so-called ‘Part 1’ measures, agreed in 1995, included…arrangements to give the Agency access to national intelligence information, ” in David Fischer, “Verifying Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament” in VERTIC Verification yearbook 2000, available here: vertic.org/assets/VY00_Fischer.pdf) In that 1995 resolution the BOG “[endorsed]…the first part of the measures it has proposed” and “[requested] the Director General to implement at an early date the measures outlined in Part 1 of document GOV/2807.”(see number 3 and 5 of the resolution, available here: iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC39/GC39Resolutions/English/gc39res-17_en.pdf). The Part 1 measures that were introduced under the 93+2 program for strengthening safeguards included “improved analysis of information,” which included access to third party information (see GOV/2807, paragraph 22, available here: iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC39/GC39Documents/English/gc39-17_en.pdf). Although these measures were passed, there were many reservations about the legality of several of the proposed Part 1 measures, including those relating to third party information. Mr. Ahmad from Pakistan expressed concern that “such third-party information could, for many reasons, be biased; the Agency should not be seen to adjust its response according to the perception of certain powerful States” and Mr. Saburido of Cuba said that “recourse to data from intelligence sources should be explicitly excluded.” In response to legality questions, the Director General stated that “acceptance of the recommendations…did not imply endorsement of the specific measures described in the document or the legal interpretation given.” (see reference containing GOV/2807 above for all above quotes.) Access to third party information was endorsed by the BOG, then, even though this measure was illegal with respect to 153-type safeguards. That it is incompatible is clear when the legal justification for it is considered. The IAEA justified access to third party information under paragraph 90 of the 153 safeguard agreement (see chart in Annex 1 of GOV/2863). This is a bad joke, since nothing in paragraph 90 can be construed as relating to third party information, unless you have brain damage.
When the IAEA used third party information in early 1993 against North Korea, it was 2 and a half years before the practice gained any form of legality. Therefore, even an international lawyer who felt that the DPRK should have agreed to the special inspection in spite of the use of third party information had to admit that the IAEA “breached its safeguards agreement with North Korea by using third party intelligence without Pyongyang’s prior agreement.” (Susan Carmody, “Balancing Collective Security and National Sovereignty: Does the United Nations Have the Right to Inspect North Korea’s Nuclear Facilities?” Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 18, 1994.)
The second reason the IAEA action was a breach of the safeguards agreement relates to the fact that the IAEA wanted access to the buildings in Nyongbyon to search for evidence of an undeclared weapons program. There is absolutely nothing in 153-type safeguards agreements that allows for measures to detect undeclared programs. Paragraph 1 of the safeguards agreement states that safeguards will be applied to all “fissionable material” in all “peaceful activities,” for the purpose of verifying that “such material is not diverted.” That’s it. The “exclusive” purpose of safeguards is to ensure that nuclear material being used in peaceful activities is not diverted to nuclear weapons. There is no provision to look for undeclared activities in 153-type safeguards agreements. (See: “[INFCIRC/153 safeguards were] not designed to detect undeclared nuclear activities,” R. Hooper and J. Cooley, “An IAEA Development Programme for Strengthened and More Cost-Effective Safeguards,” in “European Safeguards Research and Development Association,” 17th Annual Symposium, Aachen 1995, page 31. See also: “The Agency cannot safeguard materials which have not been declared, or which cannot be found. It cannot become an espionage agency.” Lyn Parker, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, “International Safeguards Against the Diversion of Nuclear Materials to Non-Peaceful Uses,” Oct. 1978, p.722. See also: “A related problem is that the safeguards implemented pursuant to NPT are applied only to declared nuclear activities, as a consequence of which the inspections cannot detect that nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices are illegally imported from abroad or manufactured on the premises.” “The Utilization of Nuclear Energy and International Law,” Vanda Lamm, 1984, p.96, See also: “Without being subjected to the authority of the Security Council the Agency could not have agreed to conduct on-site inspections on undeclared facilities in Iraq without facing objections by its members.” Eric Chauvistre, “The Implications of IAEA Inspections under Security Council Resolution 687,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Research Paper No. 11. 1992)
Above, it was mentioned how deceptive language was used to make it appear to some that a new agreement had been reached regarding special inspections (“the Board…reaffirmed the Agency’s rights to undertake special inspections…”). Similar deceptive language was used in the DG press release of 26 February 1992 (see ref above) in respect to allowing access to undeclared sights during a special inspection, even though there was no decision by the Board to do so. That these Board statements reflected no change in Agency’s rights was recognized by some. A West European IAEA ambassador, for example, remarked that “we had expectations and now we are rolling back to something which amounts to very little,” and a different Western delegate said the statement was little more than “a gesture to demonstrate that the board is doing something.” (The Independent, “Atomic agency told to tighten controls,” 25 February 1992 by Micahel Wise). In reality, nothing was said at this meeting.
It was not until the additional protocol was approved by the BOG in May of 1997 that it became legal to search undeclared facilities. Lawyers state the fact repeatedly: “Until the adoption of the Additional Protocol in 1997, the IAEA did not have the authority to inspect undeclared facilities.” (Natasha Bajema and Mary Beth Nikitin, “The Future of International Regimes: Organizations and Practices: Assessing Nuclear Maturity: Determining Which States Should Have Access to What Nuclear Technology,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Volume 28, Summer, 2004). A similar statement: “[The Additional Protocol] expanded the IAEA’s authority to detect undeclared enrichment and reprocessing activities in a state.” (David S. Jonas, “The New US Approach to the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: Will Deletion of a Verification Regime Provide a Way Out of the Wilderness?” Florida Journal of International Law, Volume 18, August, 2006.) Also: “Under INFCIRC/153 the Agency was entitled only to control the proper (i.e., peaceful) use of officially declared nuclear material in non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Under the new safeguards document, called INFCIRC/540, the IAEA has the authority to assure itself that no undeclared nuclear activities go undetected and safeguarded in NNWS.” (Erwin Hackel and Gotthard Stein, “Tightening the Reins: Towards a Strengthened International Nuclear Safeguards System,”2000. Page 1.) Nevertheless, the IAEA tried to claim in the DPRK case that it did have the right to inspect these two undeclared facilities. According to the Vienna Convention on Treaties, any ambiguities in a treaty can be resolved by looking at the negotiating history of the treaty, so let’s do that. Mohammed Shaker was a member of the Egyptian delegation to the Eighteen Member Disarmament Committee during the NPT negotiations. He states very clearly in his 3-volume treatise on the NPT negotiating history that “the NPT safeguards are not intended to detect hidden nuclear weapons or clandestine production of such weapons.” (Shaker, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959 to 1979,” Volume 2, p.710.) William C. Foster was the principal negotiator for the US. In a hearing before the Senate, Foster was asked to explain the NPT. In that hearing, Senator Claiborne Pell asked Foster: “will the [IAEA] inspection be restricted only to the declared peaceful nuclear facilities or will they also apply to the undeclared or clandestine facilities?” Mr. Foster replied: “The IAEA inspection would only be as to declared.” (Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 2nd session, “Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons”.) This issue simply cannot be more clear. The IAEA breached the safeguards treaty by asking to inspect these buildings over 4 years before it was legal to do anything remotely close to this. Actually, even under the additional protocol, searching undeclared facilities is limited to performing “location-specific environmental sampling” (see article 5.c of INFCIRC/540), which involves taking air, water, vegetation, soil or smear samples and analyzing them for radioactivity. Even if the DPRK had travelled forward in time and signed the Additional Protocol, the demand to search buildings in an undeclared location would still be illegal. This type of search can only be performed if the state voluntarily agrees to it.
The IAEA, then, breached the safeguards agreement with the DPRK in at least two ways.
2) David Sloss, “I’s Not Broken, So Don’t Fix It: The International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” Virginia Journal of International Law, Summer, 1995, 35 Va. J. Int’l L.
3) A summary of events is included in INFCIRC/419: fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html
4) GOV/2636: fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex3
5) fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex7
6) GOV/2639: fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex10
7) GOV/2643, March 30, 1993, Paragraph 11
8) GOV/2643, paragraph 12
9) GOV/2645: securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Iran%20GOV2645.pdf
10) The Washington Times, “N. Korean Retaliation Feared Over Sanctions,” November 2, 1993 by Michael Breen
11) A/RES/48/14, November 1, 1993: un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r014.htm
12) GOV/2003/40: iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf
13) GOV/2003/63: iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf
14) GOV/2003/69: iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf
15) GOV/2636: fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex3
16) Paragraph 50 of GOV/2003/75:
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf
For more detail of the positive actions taken by Iran, see section b(4) of Annex 2 (page 34) titled “Statements of Non-Aligned Movements” in INFCIRC/657: iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc657.pdf
And see also the Chronology in Section B of GOV/2003/75
17) GOV/2003/81: iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf
18) “Aghazadeh [Iran's vice president and president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran] outlined that, in Iran’s view, the Security Council can be brought to bear in a case of noncompliance ‘only if the IAEA has established its inability to verify that no diversion (of nuclear material) to military purposes has occurred,’ under Article 19 of Infcirc-153, the model protocol for Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement. Some Vienna officials close to ElBaradei told Nucleonics Week they looked with favor at that interpretation. They pointed out that, in ElBaradei’s opening statement to the governors on Sept. 19, he said that, as a report from the IAEA on Sept. 3 to the board ‘makes clear, Iran continues to fulfill its obligations under the safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol by providing timely access to nuclear material, facilities, and other locations.’ These officials also said that statements by EU delegations during the board meeting, which attacked Iran for having threatened to terminate implementation of the Additional Protocol should the Iran nuclear dossier be sent to the Security Council, were ‘nothing less than hypocritical.’ For six years after the EU signed the protocol, and before ratification, EU states did not implement the protocol, they said. Japan, another supporter of the EU resolution on Sept. 24, took five years before it implemented the protocol after Japan had signed it, the officials said.”
Nucleonics Week, “Iran faces decision whether to enrich U, escalating conflict,” September 29, 2005, by Mark Hibbs

Furthermore, the treaty is about nonproliferation first and foremost, nonproliferation, meaning not the development of new weapons or acquisition of additional ones by states that already are recognized as nuclear powers but by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states that are not.

You know absolutely nothing abou the history of the NPT. The issue of nonproliferation is no more important than disarming. The reason that the NPT exists is the result of a “grand bargain”. Before the NPT existed, every country in the world had the legal right to manufacture nuclear weapons. Did you think that nearly every non-nuclear weapon state in the world signed the NPT and gave up their right to manufacture nuclear weapons just to be nice? Well, that’s not the reason. The reason they signed it relates to the “grand bargain” of the NPT. The non-nuclear states agreed not to pursue nuclear weapons in return for certain things, including:

1) Guarantees not to be attacked by nuclear weapons states
2) Assistance be given to them in developing their nuclear power capability
3) Retaining the right to the full nuclear fuel cycle
4) The agreement that nuclear weapons states will disarm their nuclear weapons

Here is the result of the NPT from Iran’s point of view:
1) The US threatens to attack Iran using nuclear weapons
2) The US does everything possible to hinder Iran’s capability to develop nuclear power
3) The US wants Iran to give up it’s right to the full nuclear fuel cycle
4) The US does nothing for 30 years regarding disarming their nuclear weapons, and works in the opposite direction and develops new nuclear weapons (a clear violation of Article VI on the NPT. I am sure sanctions against the US will begin soon).

Iran is certainly not getting it’s share of the grand bargain.

On the matter of disarmament it talks about the desirability of disarmament, but does not bind its signatories to disarm.

Article VI says:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Do you believe that after 40 years the NWS have lived up to this? If you do, you do not have a shred of objectivity.
Read:
David Koplow, Parsing Good Faith: Has the United States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 301, 393 (1993)

dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 5:51 PM

Do you believe that after 40 years the NWS have lived up to this? If you do, you do not have a shred of objectivity.

Coming from the man who believes Iran has the right to build uranium plants and not declare them to the IAEA, that’s a laugher.

Chuck Schick on September 25, 2009 at 5:56 PM

Chuck Schick:

forced to by Western intelligence.

This is BS.

dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 5:58 PM

This is BS.

dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 5:58 PM

Prove it.

Chuck Schick on September 25, 2009 at 6:00 PM

dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 12:52 PM

As usual dave, you don’t know what you are talking about.

This evidence was brought forward by a democratic Congress that found many components in this evidence used for nuclear armament.

such as this:

1,700 kilograms of graphite cylinders used for banned electrical discharge machines which are used in converting uranium

Converting uranium dave, that is for making a bomb.

This is why even dove’s like John Kerry state that Iran is making a bomb.

Democrat John Kerry, which notes that Iran is making nuclear progress on all fronts, and that it “could produce enough weapons-grade material for a bomb within six months.” The committee also notes that “Iran is operating a broad network of front organizations,” and that authorities suspect “some purchases for Iran’s nuclear and missile programs may have come through an elab

Many of these components are banned items as the articles states.

The article is also clear that some of these items are for nuclear use.

Get back to us when you can read liberal.

Baxter Greene on September 25, 2009 at 8:13 PM

The only one left that might do anything about this is Israel, and that would mean suicide since our elected leaders have no interest in Israel existing.

Hening on September 25, 2009 at 9:42 AM
Our current elected demmih leaders don’t want our continued existance!!!!

huckelberry on September 25, 2009 at 8:41 PM

He warned that if Obama brings up the uranium facility, it “simply adds to the list of issues to which the United States owes the Iranian nation an apology over.

Given Obama’s eagerness to apologize, though, he probably considers that to be a good thing.

malclave on September 25, 2009 at 8:57 PM

This may have been said…I just surfed a few of the comments.
Ahmadinjad believes that he and the present regime of imams and ayatoilets are the ones to bring about the coming of the 12th imam. Apocalypse will usher him in. It is necessary for his coming. They want it.
What better way to get the party goin’ than poppin’ off a few nukes? This life holds nothing for a good muslim. For them it’s all about what comes after, not what’s here and now.
And these nuts are super muslims. The kind that blow themselves up by the hundreds to kill infidels and spread islam by the sword.
Only difference is the size of the suicide vest, so to speak. I’m not new to the threat that is islam. None of us are like it or not. That bell rang back before 9/11, before the Cole. It started about 1400 years ago when mo invented his religion of Blood and Death.
If you want a better view of the sickness in islam, search Khomeini’s little green book. Read about the limitations placed on men when it comes to sex with infants and animals under islamic law. Consult Father Botros regarding the sexual perversions of the false prophet. Eye openin’ stuff. Suddenly you’ll understand marriages of 50 year old men to 10 year old girls in islamic lands. No big deal under islam.

islam is a lie and
Truth is killing it.

Army Brat on September 25, 2009 at 9:01 PM

In this regard, I have a classic book recommend for those of you interested:
Once an Eagle by Anton Myrer.
Sherman1864 on September 25, 2009 at 4:44 PM

Seconded. A great saga with many parallels to current (and future) events.

Fletch54 on September 25, 2009 at 9:04 PM

Our only hope is that the regime falls.
Or that they are still years away from making a bomb, which I don’t believe.

B Man on September 25, 2009 at 9:10 PM

It can take forever for the regime to fall. Much quicker if Obama orders the facilities bombed but don’t hold your breadth for that because it will upset his fellow Muslims.

He came to office with zero experience in the real world and promptly behaves as if he knows everything, from business to running a war. So he promptly ordered more troops into Afghanistan. Now that even more troops are needed, Obama has turned into a chicken!

Birdseye on September 25, 2009 at 9:29 PM

I laughed when you typed “if Obama orders the facilities bombed” couldn’t help it.

The guy should just resign, I mean, seriously. He’s a community organizer with delusions of grandeur. That’s basically all he is.
Why the hell anyone would believe or expect him to know what he’s doing, or to be able to handle these problems, I don’t get that.
Is the kool-aid that strong?

I saw Obama talk about it this morning. The world just has to be laughing at him. How could they not be?
Brown and Sarcozy at least sound semi serious and like they understand this; Obama just blatantly looks out of his league. I heard a few “uhs” too. It would be comical if it weren’t so serious.

B Man on September 25, 2009 at 9:40 PM

Suggestion – It would be easier to navigate the threads with updates if a time stamp was placed on the updates.

rjl1999 on September 25, 2009 at 9:50 PM

Help us David Petraeus youre our only hope..

Viper1 on September 25, 2009 at 9:58 PM

Petraeus might not be our only hope.

This situation could be helped by the people inside the Iraninan regime. I’m not talking about the people in the country, I mean the other members of the regime.
If there are some people working near dinner-jacket who do have some sense, MAYBE this could turn into a Nazi type situation.
Hitler’s generals turned against him later in the war when they realized he had gone insane.
Maybe (I’m just being hopeful here) that could happen in Iran too.

The people there must know that if Iran strikes Tel-Aviv and kills 50,000 people somehow, that Iran will be struck back.
Maybe by us, maybe by the U.K.
Dinner jacket is the Hitler-insane type who doesn’t care about any of that, but his subordinates might care about being retaliated against.
I’m talking about a mutiny.

Are all the people in the Iraninan regime as insane as dinner-jacket? I don’t know, but I hope not.

The other hope is that it will take long enough for Iran to develop a bomb that by the time they have one, Obama is gone.

What else is there?

B Man on September 25, 2009 at 10:20 PM

And King actually gave that drainnuts time on his show?!

Oh my God, the world really is coming to an end.

Ryan Gandy on September 25, 2009 at 10:39 PM

Hmmm. So Iran is not just trying to harness nuclear energy for power? I’m so surprised.
sarc/

Achilles on September 26, 2009 at 2:52 AM

(Power as in electricity, etc. Not power as in “Heil Ahmadinejad.” Otherwise, my comment wouldn’t be sarcasm.)

Achilles on September 26, 2009 at 2:54 AM

Baxter Greene:

1,700 kilograms of graphite cylinders used for banned electrical discharge machines which are used in converting uranium

Electrical discharge machining (EDM) is simply a metal removal process that is used to machine difficult to cut metals:

books.google.com/books?id=FJbdIKGmfSgC&dq=electric+discharge+machining&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s

To say that EDM is “used for converting uranium” is asinine, and is meant only for consumption by imbeciles. R. Mahdavinejad of the University of Tehran recently wrote a paper (1) highlighting a use for EDM that might be relevant for the topic of this thread. Mahdavinejad was using EDM to cut silicon carbide, which is used as a neutron moderator in NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. Silicon carbide can also be used for nuclear cladding:

“Cladding is used as a separator between fuel and coolant and as a container of fuel in nuclear reactors.” (2)

1)Mahdavinejad, R., et al, “The behaviour of REFEL SiC under electrodischarge machining,” Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part B: Journal of Engineering Manufacture, Vol. 220, No. 10 (2006), pp. 1635-1646
2)Seok, Chang-Sung, “The properties of the ring and burst creep of ZIRLO cladding,” Engineering Failure Analysis, Vol. 13 (2006), pp. 389-397

EDM is not used “for converting uranium,” whatever that means. It is used for machining anything, and has specific uses for NUCLEAR POWER. The US prohibiting Iran from getting these graphite cores is a breach of the NPT by the US, since, according to the “grand bargain,” the US should actually be AIDING Iran in obtaining equipment for nuclear power, not hindering it.

dave742 on September 26, 2009 at 3:00 AM

This Iranian thing is “news”?

What constitutes “news” anymore?

Pretty sure that 99% of us here are not surprised by any of this.

Dr. ZhivBlago on September 26, 2009 at 7:30 AM

Baxter Greene:
From one of your sources:

Iran does not have enough indigenous uranium resources to fuel even one power-generating reactor over its lifetime — though it has quite enough uranium to make several nuclear bombs. We are being asked to believe that Iran is building uranium enrichment capacity to make fuel for reactors that do not exist from uranium Iran does not have.

ANWR contains about 11 million barrels of oil:

“estimated to be between 5.7 and 16.0 billion barrels”:

pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-0028-01/fs-0028-01.htm

Conservatives freak out when someone suggests not using that oil.

Although your source says that Iran does not have uranium, they do:

Iran’s identified uranium ore reserves could produce as much electricity as that from some 45 billion barrels of oil – about one-third of Iran’s proven oil reserves – with almost zero emissions and atmospheric pollution.

energytribune.com/articles.cfm?aid=299&idli=1

The uranium that Iran has is 4 times as big as ANWR. This is proven reserves, and there is certainly more. The US is asking that Iran not use their uranium.

Let’s say that the US finds an oil field 4 times as big as ANWR, and Iran tells the US that they cannot use it. What do you think the US response would be?

dave742 on September 26, 2009 at 8:40 AM

Let’s say that the US finds an oil field 4 times as big as ANWR, and Iran tells the US that they cannot use it. What do you think the US response would be?

Let me rephrase that. The US population is 4 times that of Iran. Relative to population, Iran’s uranium reserves are equivalent to 16 ANWR’s.
Let’s say that the US finds an oil field 16 times as big as ANWR, and Iran tells the US that they cannot use it. What do you think the US response would be?

dave742 on September 26, 2009 at 8:42 AM

From: Jihad Watch – India: 1,000 Muslims shouted, “set the train on fire and kill the Hindus”
dave742 | September 27, 2008 8:55 AM

The US is eliminating Muslims! They are doing a better job than the Muslims are at eliminating Christians.
“Are you willing to co-exist on an equal basis with Christians”
I was brought up Catholic, and many of my family members are still Catholic. Yes, I am willing to coexist with my family. My mother in law is Jewish. She is one of the coolest people I ever met. I am willing to coexist with her. Psycho.

I’ve been reading your posts. It’s very evident where your sentiments lie. Just curious. When and why did you convert to Islam from Catholicism?

kingsjester on September 26, 2009 at 9:06 AM

Let’s say that the US finds an oil field 4 times as big as ANWR, and Iran tells the US that they cannot use it. What do you think the US response would be?

dave742 on September 26, 2009 at 8:40 AM

hopefully you live in NYC or DC and will get to experience the iranian ‘peaceful’ program of nuclear ‘energy’ firsthand….

right4life on September 26, 2009 at 9:42 AM

kingjester:

I’ve been reading your posts.

I have not been reading yours

dave742 on September 26, 2009 at 9:52 AM

dave742 on September 26, 2009 at 9:52 AM

Oooooh, I’m sooooo hurt.

kingsjester on September 26, 2009 at 9:56 AM

EDM is not used “for converting uranium,” whatever that means. It is used for machining anything, and has specific uses for NUCLEAR POWER.

dave742 on September 26, 2009 at 3:00 AM

Per your own source.
This material is used specifically for anything that uses nuclear power.

It is part of the components for missiles.

Only an imbecile could not see that they would need these for a NUCLEAR WARHEAD.

MIT sees this,the UN sees this,almost every leader in the free world sees this,and all the intelligence agencies in the free world sees this.

But super smart dave does not.

Speaks more to your incompetence than it does to any rational thought regarding this issue.

Every bit of what a DA presented in court backed up by facts (unlike what you have been able to do on this thread)was for weapons use.

If you are too stupid to see that these components combined with Iran’s already stated ability to convert weapons grade uranium (proof provided by the many links in this post that you still have not been able to refute),it is obvious that Iran is pursuing and close to having a bomb.

The fact that Iran is breaking sanctions and acquiring these material illegally seems to not bother super smart dave either:

The committee also notes that “Iran is operating a broad network of front organizations,” and that authorities suspect “some purchases for Iran’s nuclear and missile programs may have come through an elaborate ruse to avoid U.S. financial sanctions on dealing with Iranian banks.”

As we’ve reported, Lloyds bank entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in January with Mr. Morgenthau’s office in which it admitted to a $300 million “stripping” scheme designed to hide the Iranian origin of banking transfers from 2001 to 2004. Several other banks are also in the crosshairs of Mr. Morgenthau and the Justice Department.

But keep on telling everybody that you know more than:

NY Times, Washington post,Democtatic senators,Republican senators, Intelligence agencies of the US,Germany,France,Israel,the UN,Der Speigel,Ali Khamenei ,
Hashemi Rafsanjani, president of Iran,Wall Street Journal,President Obama,CIA head Leon Panetta,Weekly Standard,Freedomhouse,Mossaud,Times of London,LA Times,International Institute for strategic studies,MIT,Facts provided in a NY court of law.

Absolute moron.

Let’s put the whole article up and let everyone read what was presented in a court of law and how all of this means nothing as far as Iran’s nuclear ambitions according to super smart dave.


Iran’s Nuclear Shopping List

Morgenthau: ‘It’s late in the game.’
Wall St. Journal
May 21, 2009

Back when the Bush Administration was warning about Iran’s nuclear progress, or its deadly meddling in Iraq, the typical Democratic and media response was to treat the Islamic Republic as innocent until proven guilty. This month, Democrat Robert Morgenthau supplied the proof.

In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that was largely ignored by the media, the legendary Manhattan District Attorney opened a window on how Iran is secretly obtaining the ingredients for an arsenal of mass destruction. Mr. Morgenthau, whose recent cases have exposed illicit Iranian finance and procurement networks, has discovered what he calls “Iran’s shopping list for materials related to weapons of mass destruction.” They add up to “literally thousands of records.”

Missile accuracy appears to be a key Iranian goal. In one of Mr. Morgenthau’s cases — the prosecution of Chinese citizen Li Fang Wei and his LIMMT company for allegedly scamming Manhattan banks to slip past sanctions on Iran — the DA uncovered a list that included 400 sophisticated gyroscopes and 600 accelerometers. These are critical for developing accurate long-range missiles. He also found that Iran was acquiring a rare metal called tantalum, “used in those roadside bombs that are being used against our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.” So much for the media notion that Iran has played no part in killing American GIs.

Mr. Morgenthau also noted that the material shipped by LIMMT “included 15,000 kilograms of a specialized aluminum alloy used almost exclusively in long-range missile production; 1,700 kilograms of graphite cylinders used for banned electrical discharge machines which are used in converting uranium; more than 30,000 kilograms of tungsten-copper plates; 200 pieces of tungsten-copper alloy hollow cylinders, all used for missiles; 19,000 kilograms of tungsten metal powder, and 24,500 kilograms of maraging steel rods . . . especially hardened steel suitable for long-range missiles.”

Lest anyone think that these materials may have innocent uses, Mr. Morgenthau added that “we have consulted with top experts in the field from MIT and from private industry and from the CIA. . . . Frankly, some of the people we’ve consulted are shocked by the sophistication of the equipment they’re buying.”

Mr. Morgenthau’s information is corroborated by a staff report for the Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Democrat John Kerry, which notes that Iran is making nuclear progress on all fronts, and that it “could produce enough weapons-grade material for a bomb within six months.” The committee also notes that “Iran is operating a broad network of front organizations,” and that authorities suspect “some purchases for Iran’s nuclear and missile programs may have come through an elaborate ruse to avoid U.S. financial sanctions on dealing with Iranian banks.”

As we’ve reported, Lloyds bank entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in January with Mr. Morgenthau’s office in which it admitted to a $300 million “stripping” scheme designed to hide the Iranian origin of banking transfers from 2001 to 2004. Several other banks are also in the crosshairs of Mr. Morgenthau and the Justice Department.

All this should put to rest any doubts about the Iranian regime’s purposes and determination. As for what the U.S. should do about it, the committee report insists that “direct engagement” must be a part of American strategy, and so it seems fated to be under the Obama Administration. The least it can do is heed Mr. Morgenthau’s central point about everything he’s learned about Iran’s nuclear progress: “It’s late in the game, and we don’t have a lot of time.”

Yea ,dave, illegal wire transfers,massive amounts of missile parts and technology with components specifically for use with uranium.

Yep, nothing to see here.

Baxter Greene on September 26, 2009 at 11:59 AM

But since dave can’t read, I will repost what is obvious to the rest of the world but super smart dave is oblivious to:

Iranian Official Admits Nuclear Program Is Not Peaceful
http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/06/iranian_official_admits_nuclea.asp

Remember when the Iranians left blueprints for a nuclear warhead lying around, and then told the IAEA inspectors that the regime “received them inadvertently while purchasing its nuclear equipment on the black market decades ago”? Well, accidents will happen:

Iran’s envoy to the UN atomic watchdog caused a buzz among journalists on Wednesday when he apparently misspoke and said his country had the right to a nuclear weapon.

After saying as usual that Iran was only pursuing nuclear energy for civilian purposes, Ali Asghar Soltanieh strayed alarmingly from the Islamic republic’s usual line.


“The whole Iranian nation are united… on (the) inalienable right of (having a) nuclear weapon,” the envoy to the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency said.

The Iranians are caught with blue prints for a nuclear warhead.
The Iranian Envoy states that the regime is united in the right to have a nuclear weapon.

Super smart dave puts his fingers in his ears,jumps up and down in the middle of the room whining “there’s no proof…there’s no proof” like some 5 year old.

The UN who has done everything it can to cover for Iran,knows there is so much proof that they can’t deny Iran’s intent to have a nuclear weapon:

Iran holds enough uranium for bomb

By Daniel Dombey in Washington
Published: February 19 2009 21:18 | Last updated: February 20 2009 00:51

Iran has built up a stockpile of enough enriched uranium for one nuclear bomb, United Nations officials acknowledged on Thursday.

In a development that comes as the Obama administration is drawing up its policy on negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear programme, UN officials said Iran had produced more nuclear material than previously thought.


Good news: Iran to be nuke-capable this year, says think tank

How slow has this slow-motion trainwreck been? May 2006: IISS pronounces Iranian nukes “inevitable.” January 2007: IISS warns that Iran could have the bomb in two years. May 2007: IISS describes how Iran’s built its own nuclear black market, one which, if the Times of London is to be believed, is now suddenly running low on yellowcake. Too late, alas:


Iran will have enough enriched uranium to make a single nuclear weapon later this year, the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) predicts…

But super smart dave says they can’t have enough and that there still is no proof they want a bomb.

Iran’s own religious leaders state that they want and have a right to a nuclear bomb.
Not only a right, but have already worked out a risk scenario that concludes that Islam will only be hurt using a bomb but Israel will be destroyed.

President Ali Khamenei stated: “Regarding atomic energy, we need it now… Our nation has always been threatened from outside. The least we can do to face this danger is to let our enemies know that we can defend ourselves. Therefore, every step you take here is in defense of your country and your evolution. With this in mind, you should work hard and at great speed.”

This quote is authentic and real,dave even found it on lexus nexus.But super smart dave’s “opinion” is that it is not authentic.He can’t prove it, has no facts to back up his baseless allegation,but it is not valid in dave’s world because he “feels” that it is not right.

Some scientist.

So tell us super smart dave.When Khamenei states that they need atomic energy to “defend” themselves,in your world does this mean they will beat their enemies back by producing more efficient energy.
Because the Intelligence agencies, leaders of the free world,and people based in reality take that to mean they want a nuclear weapon.

Hashemi Rafsanjani, president of Iran from 1989 to 1997, gave a speech on 14 December 2001 that was widely interpreted as indicating that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Israel

.

Calling the establishment of Israel among the worst periods of our contemporary history, Rafsanjani stated that, “If one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world.

Pretty straight forward for anyone based in reality.
Iran wants,now has the means,for a nuclear weapon.

They have admitted it themselves.

Super smart dave still has his fingers in his ears yelling like a 5 year old kid”there’s no proof…there’s no proof”.


The Russians see the threat:


Russian Military Expert Warns Of Iranian Threat

While the Obama administration considers pulling back on continuing to develop technology to provide a missile shield for Europe and beyond, the Iranians have made important developments in missile technology. This is not coming from Chas Freeman’s dreaded Israel lobby, but from a Russian military expert during a March 12, 2009 press conference which has not been widely reported in the European or American press:


He states here what is may be holding them back is “weapons grade uranium”.
We already know now that they have that.
So according to the Russians, nothing is holding them back now.

“In the technical sense, what may be holding them back is the lack of enough weapons-grade uranium,” said Dvorkin, who today heads a strategic arms research
centre at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow.


“I consider this a significant threat,” said Dvorkin, who stressed that he was voicing his personal views and not those of the Russian government.


The US knows that Iran is seeking the bomb

U.S. now sees Iran as pursuing nuclear bomb

In a reversal since a 2007 report, U.S. officials expect the Islamic Republic to reach development milestones this year.
By Greg Miller
February 12, 2009

Reporting from Washington — Little more than a year after U.S. spy agencies concluded that Iran had halted work on a nuclear weapon, the Obama administration has made it clear that it believes there is no question that Tehran is seeking the bomb.


The French know that Iran is making a nuclear weapon:

Sarkozy: Iran working on nukes today

“It is a certainty to all of our secret services. Iran is working today on a nuclear [weapons] program,” Sarkozy told lawmakers from his UMP party on Tuesday, according to Press TV.

The Germans know the Iranians are making a bomb:


Germans: Of course Iran kept working on nuclear weapons

The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, has amassed evidence of a sophisticated Iranian nuclear weapons program that continued beyond 2003. This usually classified information comes courtesy of Germany’s highest state-security court. In a 30-page legal opinion on March 26 and a May 27 press release in a case about possible illegal trading with Iran, a special national security panel of the Federal Supreme Court in Karlsruhe cites from a May 2008 BND report, saying the agency “showed comprehensively” that “development work on nuclear weapons can be observed in Iran even after 2003.

But none of this matters…why….because super smart dave says so.

Baxter Greene on September 26, 2009 at 12:29 PM

NEWS OF THE FUTURE

FLASH: Israeli jets turn Iranian underground radium watch dial facility into new theme park!

Members of the Israeli Defense Force (Urban Renewal Division) made good on their promise to help with the Iranian economy by creating a shiny new glass-covered recreation area just a short drive from the Holy City of Qom. In a possibly related story, the Iranian government announced a pending sale of used centrifuges at low low prices.

gordo on September 26, 2009 at 12:29 PM

Baxter Greene:
Making long posts does not mean you are saying anything substantive, you know.

This material is used specifically for anything that uses nuclear power.

EDM is not a material, it is a maching tool. Did I not explain this?

This quote is authentic and real,dave even found it on lexus nexus

Yes. The only group in the world who had this quote is a communist group in Stockholm. You still have not explained to me how a communist group in Stockholm were the only people in the world who heard Khamenei say this. You have also not explained why a conservative thinks it OK to quote communist groups.

dave742 on September 26, 2009 at 2:11 PM

Making long posts does not mean you are saying anything substantive, you know.
dave742 on September 26, 2009 at 2:11 PM

You should know. Refer to your own post: dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 5:51 PM

kingsjester on September 26, 2009 at 2:22 PM

It’s only a matter of when, not if, there is a city with a mushroom cloud over it. It’s only a matter of which one. I hope Israel has the leadership to do what is needed because our “leadership”… well, I need not elaborate on that.

Yakko77 on September 26, 2009 at 8:21 PM

No no no…they just want it for nuclear power.

No no no…they just deserve to be on equal footing with us through … uh, green energy!

No no no…nuclear energy is clean in the middle east, but not for the rest of the world. Well, France can have it because they have the world’s best healthcare system.

These are all the things leftsts say to me about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Black Adam on September 27, 2009 at 3:56 AM

dave742 on September 26, 2009 at 2:11 PM

Well dave if you can’t handle quotes coming from communitst,than you are going to have a problem with anything said by China,Russia,and several members of the democratic party.

The fact that “you” can only find this quote from this source does not invalidate it.

Instead of worrying about whether communist sources are valid, maybe you could actually refute the overwhelming evidence that Iran is building a nuclear bomb instead of posting about how great of a scientist you are but not being able to back up your pathetic left wing rhetoric.

Baxter Greene on September 27, 2009 at 8:38 AM

You should know. Refer to your own post: dave742 on September 25, 2009 at 5:51 PM

kingsjester on September 26, 2009 at 2:22 PM

Heh!!

Pathetic is it not.

Baxter Greene on September 27, 2009 at 8:39 AM

There is a former Lady Governor who knows how to shoot!!!!!!

And her eyes is fixed to radical Islam.

TheAlamos on September 27, 2009 at 4:34 PM

And us with the vast majority of our armed forces tied up in Vietnam 2.0 and 3.0. What perfect timing.

Dark-Star on September 27, 2009 at 10:31 PM

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