The Russian Air Force has gone from a flight capable inventory of over 5000 combat aircraft of all types in 1990 to just about 2000 combat aircraft of all types today. It has less than half the interceptors it had in 1990. Most of its inventory is about 30+ years old. Its military infrastructure is antique by the best estimates.

About one-quarter of Russia’s fighters are MiG-29’s and Su-27’s. Impressive at air shows, but combat experience is lacking. From the videos of action over Georgia, most of the aircraft utilized were not Su-27’s and MiG-29’s. Logistics and maintenance continue to hamper keeping these aircraft air-worthy. Losing them over Georgia is not something the Russians would consider lightly. The Russians are faced with a decline in R&D funding across the board, and this impacts aircraft design as well. Getting a design into production, and testing and evaluating it takes time, and money, and then, you have to train pilots to utilize the aircraft…gain experience. There isn’t a very large pool of pilots in the Russian Air Force to allow for rotation and upgrading training, and that pool has very very few combat experienced pilots.

The Russians are working on fifth-generation aircraft…but are farming out a huge segment of their program to India, because at home resources are scant and cumbersome. This program has had delay after delay since the initial deals were signed. Most of the former Soviet heavy-lift aircraft now belong to Ukraine, which has made a good bit of money renting out or wet leasing Il-76’s and larger Condors commericially across the globe, even here within the United States. Most of Russia’s air heavy lift is still performed with old Antonov’s.

Lack of flight time for pilots, a few hours every few months, if that, is pretty much the norm, and lack of coodination in air-ground mode, diminishes the Russian Air Force’s ability to provide timely ground support, still relying on GCI and local air command relay of targetting information.

So, no, the Russians are in no way comparable to the US Air Force when it comes to emplying aircraft in a combat or even airlift mode.

But, what the Russians depend on is mass. Economy of force was never one of their favored military principles. In that, they have an advantage. But relying on mass clouds other essentials. Coordination is one. Turning loose a few divisions in a confined battle area, with poor communications, little or no coordination between adjacent units, all command being sent through a very narrow funnel…if you want to attack someone and casualties on your own side don’t mean much, and if colatteral damage and massive civilian deaths, non-combatant deaths, are no biggie, then the current Russian tactics in the employment of combat units is something you may wish to emulate. And, the Russian army? Large groups of armed thugs, led by armed thugs. Discipline is still enforced at the battlion level by brutality. At the upper levels by bribes. Military training? Perfunctory at best. They are not a 24/7 all-weather capable armed force.

But all of this is moot in the present circumstance.

Putin has set the stage for a sea change in how the world views Russia. In exchange for destroying Georgia (and potentially Azerbaijan and Armenia, among others) how the rest of the world reacts to Russia is what will be gained or lost as a result of this past week’s Russian-sponsored destruction.

Instead of arguing over whether or not the Su-27 is more or less capable than the F-18, perhaps we should look at the overall picture. Tactics are for amateurs. Bean-counting is for voyeurs. Strategic thinking involves a higher plane of thought.

Kissinger being in Beijing this past week may not have been happenstance.

The idea of tying everything Russia does with everything Russia does or wants to do makes good sense. Russia needs investment and markets, among other things. If Russia wants to play bully in one vein, then it would be perfectly appropriate for us to deny Russia what is wants in another vein. [Hopefully, the old Euros are listening. The new Euros have been speaking quite loudly on this matter.] Hitting on Russian weaknesses to deter their strengths in other areas is of strategic value. It works. Kissinger, among others, was an author of this line of thought.

Not all of Mother Russia is willingly falling in line behind Putin. He holds power. The moment that power is shown to be nothing but a tattered facade, he’s gone. He understands this. So do all the “siloviki.” The old apparatchiks and nomeclatura will sell their daughters to Putin to remain on his loyal list. But the rest of Russia? They have seen the limited gains of the early ’90’s taken away from them under Putin…and it is a safe bet to believe that they’d like to get some of those gains back. Thus, the Russian economy is a key to bringing down Putin.

The power elites ["siloviki"] are marshalled under the thumb of Putin and his methodical emplacement of KGB loyalists at every Ministry, every district, every autonomous republic, every industrial concern, every center of power throughout Russia. “A Tsar is Born!” is one of those bumper-sticker slogans that has great depth and lethality behind it.

Our question to ourselves should be, what are we going to do about it?

coldwarrior on August 12, 2008 at 1:55 PM