Seizing an embassy is not starting a war, imbecile.

Seizing an embassy is an attack on sovereign US soil, under international law.

Of course, Jimmy saw the goodness of their hearts…of course it didn’t start a war.

Imbecile, eh? At least I didn’t double post.

“And of course the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran was just a friendly invitation to a game of checkers.”

Seizing an embassy is not starting a war, imbecile. Do you know what group was responsible for seizing the embassy? The MEK. Ever watch FOX news? Ever see Aliriza Jafarzadeh on FOX news? He works for FOX news, and he is also a member for the MEK. Why are you watching FOX news if they employ members from the group responsible for the embassy bombing?

From the National Post:
“In 1979, the MEK announced that, ‘After the Shah, it’s America’s turn.’ And that same day, MEK members took part in the storming of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. U.S. hostages were held captive, with MEK help, for 444 days”

In a background paper for UN speech to be given by Bush:
“Iraq shelters terrorist groups including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), which has used terrorist violence against Iran and in the 1970s was responsible for killing several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians.”

From an FBI report on the MEK given to Congress at the request of John McCain [Go to thomas.gov/, click on Congressional Record, then on 103rd Congress, and search “MEK”. Results = “Supporting the Right Opposition Groups in Iran and Iraq”]:
“MEK perpetrated bombings and assassinations, after the aborted maiden effort in 1971, resumed in 1972. The organization’s targets included US military advisors stationed in Iran. For example, the MEK claimed responsibility for the assassination of US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hawkins in 1973, the assassination of US Air Force Colonel Paul Schaeffer in 1975, and the assassination of US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Jack Turner, also in 1975. The MEK also targeted US civilians associated with defense projects (five killed in 1976)…the MEK was also intimately involved in the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979. Eyewitnesses and MEK documents indicate that the MEK led the assault on the Embassy and then pleaded with Khomeini not to engage in dialogue with the United States government, nor release the American hostages seized during the action. In fact, Congressional testimony indicates that Rajavi insisted to Khomeini that there was much more to gain by holding the hostages than by releasing them.”

The US now supports the MEK. They shelter them in camp Ashraf as a base from which to launch attacks into Iran. You seem very upset about the embassy takeover. How do you feel about the US supporting those responsible?

“And of course the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran was just a friendly invitation to a game of checkers.”

Seizing an embassy is not starting a war, imbecile. Do you know what group was responsible for seizing the embassy? The MEK. Ever watch FOX news? Ever see Aliriza Jafarzadeh on FOX news? He works for FOX news, and he is also a member of the MEK. Why are you watching FOX news if they employ members from the group responsible for the embassy bombing?

From the National Post:
“In 1979, the MEK announced that, ‘After the Shah, it’s America’s turn.’ And that same day, MEK members took part in the storming of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. U.S. hostages were held captive, with MEK help, for 444 days”

In a background paper for UN speech to be given by Bush:
“Iraq shelters terrorist groups including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), which has used terrorist violence against Iran and in the 1970s was responsible for killing several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians.”

From an FBI report on the MEK given to Congress at the request of John McCain [Go to thomas.gov/, click on Congressional Record, then on 103rd Congress, and search “MEK”. Results = “Supporting the Right Opposition Groups in Iran and Iraq”]:
“MEK perpetrated bombings and assassinations, after the aborted maiden effort in 1971, resumed in 1972. The organization’s targets included US military advisors stationed in Iran. For example, the MEK claimed responsibility for the assassination of US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hawkins in 1973, the assassination of US Air Force Colonel Paul Schaeffer in 1975, and the assassination of US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Jack Turner, also in 1975. The MEK also targeted US civilians associated with defense projects (five killed in 1976)…the MEK was also intimately involved in the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979. Eyewitnesses and MEK documents indicate that the MEK led the assault on the Embassy and then pleaded with Khomeini not to engage in dialogue with the United States government, nor release the American hostages seized during the action. In fact, Congressional testimony indicates that Rajavi insisted to Khomeini that there was much more to gain by holding the hostages than by releasing them.”

The US now supports the MEK. They shelter them in camp Ashraf as a base from which to launch attacks into Iran. You seem very upset about the embassy takeover. How do you feel about the US supporting those responsible?

Mike H on June 17, 2008 at 5:49 PM

I wouldn’t even give consideration to the first look.

There, I feel better now.

The Persians have not started a war in over 1,000 years.

And of course the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran was just a friendly invitation to a game of checkers.

And next your going to tell us that the WTC atrocities were somehow justified by the bad ol’ USA and Bin Laden is your hero.

You are truly lost.

“I guess that means we have the right to shoot illegal combantants on the battlefield. That’s in a treaty too.”

I never looked this up. If it is legal, sure. Can you tell me where this is from? Maybe I can look it up for you.

Romeo13:

“Iran has not started a war in 1,000 years.” -Dave
“Iran has not been a country for 1000 years..” -Romeo13

Why is it that the only things you people are able to debate are these ridiculous trivialities? Ok, genius, I will rephrase:

The Persians have not started a war in over 1,000 years.

Here is the original quote:
“Zum einen die Geschichte – der letzte iranische Angriffskrieg liegt über 1000 Jahre zurück.”
Michael Luders, “Kalkulierte Provokationen; Die gewagte Strategie des Iran / Ein Essay,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 August 2007

dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 5:31 PM

Sigh, talking points… Iran has not been a country for 1000 years..

Was gonna post a long diatribe, but it wouldn’t do any good… your positions are clear, and no matter what evidence there was to support an opposing position, you’d stick to them.

Not worth the time, or effort….

Iran has not started a war in 1,000 years.
dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 5:31 PM

It appears that in dave’s world 1979 didn’t happen.

dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 5:31 PM

So dave742….what you are saying is that Iran has the right to enrich uranium because it is in the treaty….correct?

I guess that means we have the right to shoot illegal combantants on the battlefield. That’s in a treaty too.

Yeah, the whole “death to America” chants kinda makes the whole thing moot

You guys chant “death to Iran” (in so many words) continually on this blog, as I pointed out here on “April 8, 2008 at 5:27 PM”.
So citizens of both countries make comments about bringing death to the other nation. The relevant point is who actually does it? Iran has not started a war in 1,000 years. How long has it been for the US? Their latest war has resulted in over 1 million deaths. Who is actually bringing death to other countries?

rockhauler on June 17, 2008 at 3:54 PM

Yeah, the whole “death to America” chants kinda makes the whole thing moot as far as I’m concerned.

That might stick.

RE:dave742 (4:03) now that’s audacious.

the threats Iran makes against western civilization

These threats are fabrications. See my post “dave742 on April 8, 2008 at 7:31 PM” here.

You’re entire worldview is based on lies.

By twisting the debate to whether or not Iran has a legal right to develop nuclear technology, Dave742 has successfully obscured the real problems which are the threats Iran makes against western civilization, and the leverage Iran would gain by having nuclear weapons which magnify those threats.

I’m sure wading through the intricacies of the NPT and the IAEA statute is good fun

Fine. Let’s not talk about the law. Let’s talk about what actually happened. Let’s talk about Iran’s safeguards violations, and compare those violations to that of South Korea in 2004.

Iran was referred to the Security Council for safeguards violations going back 18 years, (1) South Korea also committed safeguards violations for two decades, including the omission or falsification of reports and refusing access to buildings to inspectors, (2) but no referral was made. When Iran violated its safeguards agreement, they were found non-compliant and referred to the Security Council where they received three rounds of sanctions. Iran’s violations are also likely to lead to a military attack on their nation. What was the IAEA’s response to South Korea’s violations? South Korea was “chided” by the IAEA, and the issue was dropped completely only 2 months later. (3) Quite a different response.

When it was discovered that Iran separated 200 milligrams (4) of plutonium for use in research experiments, it was a major issue worldwide. There were breathless reports of how the tests indicated that Iran was developing nuclear weapons, (5) and the issue was investigated by the IAEA intensively for 4 years before they finally determined that the issued had been resolved. (6) However, when it was discovered that South Korea separated 700 milligrams of plutonium back in 1982, (7) the reaction was quite different. In the South Korea case, the IAEA made a “casual inquiry” about the issue to South Korea by fax, and did not start an official investigation until 5 years later. (8) This investigation lasted 2 months, as stated above, and the issue was dropped. This unequal treatment is heightened by the fact that, unlike Iran, South Korea’s plutonium experiments were conducted in IAEA safeguarded facilities. (9) In addition, although there was never any evidence that Iran’s experiments were related to nuclear weapons, there were reports that South Korea’s experiments were run specifically to give the option for South Korea to make nuclear weapons if they chose to. (10) The South Korean government claimed that it did not know about these experiments, which was highly implausible given the fact that they were conducted by government workers in a government facility. (11)

At the same time that South Korea was isolating plutonium, they also isolated 153 kilograms of uranium metal at three nuclear facilities that were kept secret from the IAEA. (12) South Korea claimed that the metal was isolated to use in nuclear power related experiments, but the amount that was isolated made this explanation implausible. (13) When this activity was discovered by the IAEA, South Korea claimed that most of the uranium metal was isolated from imported phosphate fertilizer, and also from an indigenous mine of uranium-rich coal. The easiest way to isolate uranium is from readily available yellowcake, and using such obscure sources raised questions as to why such secrecy was required. (14) Also, the explanation as to the source of the uranium was not feasible, (15) and the issue was still being questioned months after the IAEA had already decided not to refer South Korea to the Security Council.

When Iran isolated uranium metal to use in experiments, (16) the issue was used as proof that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons. (17) John Bolton said in relation to Iran that “the only real use for uranium metal is a nuclear weapon.” (18) But when South Korea isolated 153 kilograms of uranium, the issue was dropped. On top of isolating such a large amount of uranium, South Korea could not account for all of it, and claimed that 15 kilograms of the material had been “lost.” (19) If it was discovered that Iran “lost” 15 kilograms of uranium, they would have been bombed by the US the next day. In addition, Iran has a legitimate reason for isolating uranium metal for use in enrichment experiments, because its Bushehr reactor will use enriched uranium as fuel. South Korea has no similar excuse, because its CANDU heavy water reactors use uranium dioxide as fuel, and not uranium metal. (20)

In addition to the plutonium and uranium metal isolation in the early 1980’s and reports of their links to a possible nuclear weapons program, there were also reports of a nuclear weapons program in the early 1990’s, (21) These reports were also ignored.

The revelation that prompted the release of the above nuclear activities was the uranium enrichment experiments that were run by South Korea in 2002. When Iran enriched uranium to a level of 15%, this was taken by the Bush administration as clear evidence of a nuclear weapons program. (22) South Korea enriched Uranium to 77%, (23) but this was not an issue, even though 77% is easily considered weapons grade. (24) South Korea claimed these experiments were run without knowledge of the government, but as above, these experiments were run by government officials at government facilities. (25) The IAEA also negated this excuse, saying that the enrichment experiment was the culmination of at least 10 experiments by a team of 14 scientists over 8 years, and was authorized by the director of South Korea’s atomic research institute. (26)
These experiments were deliberately kept secret from the IAEA (27) by denying inspections on two separate occasions, (28) only letting the inspectors in over 2 years later, (29) after the facility had been “scrapped”. (30) When the inspectors were finally let in, they were not allowed to take environmental samples. (31) In addition to scrapping the facility, documents relating to the laser research equipment that was used was also “scrapped”, along with documents relating to the lost uranium mentioned above. (32)
As already mentioned, the IAEA decided not to refer South Korea to the Security Council only two months after these revelations occurred, even though their investigation was still ongoing. References to this investigation were removed prior to the release of the report, (33) and the results of the investigation were never released.
All of these revelations were revealed from September to November, 2004, and the IAEA Board of Governors decided not to report South Korea to the Security Council on November 27. (34) Ten days before this decision was made, the Board was presumably making their decision about what to do about South Korea’s clandestine nuclear weapons program being run over two decades. Actually, at that time the Board was concerned about uranium metal and laser enrichment experiments. These concerns, however, only related to Iran, not South Korea. (35)
Similar revelations have occurred recently in at least 15 countries, and none have resulted in a referral to the Security Council. (36)

Can you explain this?

1) “We need to reconstruct the undeclared programme that has taken place for 18 years.” Press statement given by Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, one month after Iran was referred to the Security Council, 6 March 2006. Copy here:
iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2006/transcr06032006.html
2) “For two decades, South Korea covered up a series of sensitive nuclear laboratory experiments by omitting reports, falsifying reports or closing buildings to international inspectors, according to a report by the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.” The International Herald Tribune (citing the New York Times), “Nuclear agency’s headaches proliferate; Report details South Korean cover-up,” 25 Nov. 2004, by James Brooke.
3) “Following a meeting of the 35-nation board of governors, the IAEA chided South Korea for breaching nuclear safeguards with the experiments, but allowed it to escape referral to the UN Security Council.” Agence France Presse, “South Korea breathes sigh of relief over IAEA decision on nuclear tests,” 27 Nov. 2004
4) “Total amount of plutonium separated in the research activities is estimated by the
agency to be about 200 milligrams.” A.A. Soltanieh, “Iranian nuclear activities and interaction with the IAEA,” Atoms for Peace: An International Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, copy can be found here:
ucm.es/BUCM/revistas/cps/16962206/articulos/UNIS0606130141A.PDF
Also, see:
“The Agency has been following up with Iran information provided by Iran concerning experiments involving the separation of small (milligram) quantities of plutonium”:
GOV/2006/27, paragraph 27:
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf
5) “Iran has been caught secretly developing the technology to produce a nuclear bomb, The Independent can reveal. It has been forced to admit producing plutonium – the material associated with nuclear arms – after concealing its nuclear weapons programme from UN inspectors until last month, according to a confidential report by the International Atomic Energy Agency” The Independent, “Iran Developing Nuclear Bomb Technology,” 12 Nov. 2003 by Leonard Doyle and Andrew Buncombe
6) “On 20 August 2007 the Agency stated that earlier statements made by Iran are consistent with the Agency’s findings, and thus this matter is resolved.”
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-48.pdf
7) “According to the international media, the IAEA report says South Korean scientists produced a total of 0.7 grams of plutonium comprising 98 per cent of fissile PU-239 in its 1982 test.” BBC Worldwide Monitoring quoting Chungang Ilbo, “South Korea downplays UN nuclear report,” 13 Nov. 2004
8) “The first indication of a plutonium experiment came to light in 1998 after international inspectors detected traces of the substance at a government-run nuclear research center in Seoul, according to the South Korean science ministry. IAEA sources said the samples were inconclusive, and inspectors began additional testing in other areas of the country. The South Korean government said the IAEA made only a “casual inquiry” by fax in 1998 and submitted an official request about the incident in 2003. During that work, the South Koreans allegedly dismantled a test site, moved equipment and failed to notify the IAEA about the experiments while they knew the agency was trying to determine whether such tests had been conducted, according to the diplomats. By 2003, inspectors had collected irrefutable evidence of plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment, and they confronted the South Koreans with it last December.”
Washington Post, “S. Korea Admits Extracting Plutonium; Acknowledgment of ‘82 Test Follows Disclosure on Uranium,” 10 September 2004 by Anthony Faiola and Dafna Linzer
9) “The inspectors also uncovered a plutonium separation experiment in 1982 that was carried out ‘in a safeguarded facility and was not declared to the agency.’” (inside quote from IAEA report)
The International Herald Tribune, “Nuclear agency’s headaches proliferate; Report details South Korean cover-up,” 25 Nov. 2004 by James Brooke
10) “A former senior U.S. official responsible for conducting U.S.-Asian nuclear diplomacy said in September that, when Korean scientists conducted reprocessing experiments in 1982, South Korea ‘wanted to be ready’ to separate plutonium to produce nuclear weapons should the country’s leadership deem that necessary for national security reasons.”
Nucleonics Week, “ROK military said to have begun nuclear weapons plan in 1980s,” 18 Nov. 2004 by Mark Hibbs
11) “A week after admitting that government scientists enriched tiny amounts of uranium four years ago, the South Korean government disclosed on Thursday that scientists in 1982 conducted an experiment in plutonium extraction at a state-run research facility.” International Herald Tribune, “Seoul tells of 1982 test to extract plutonium; Admission follows revelation of uranium experiments in 2000,” 10 Sept. 2004 by Andrew Salmon
12) “IAEA Chief Mohamed ElBaradei said Monday that South Korea produced 153 kilograms of uranium metal in 1982 at one of three nuclear facilities undeclared to the watchdog.”
Xinhua, “IAEA to send second inspection team to South Korea,” 15 Sept. 2004
13) “Likewise, said one former IAEA safeguards official, the conversion by the ROK of 150 kilograms of U metal outside of safeguards at Kaeri ‘raises major questions about why they did it,’ especially since the ROK carried out plutonium separation experiments at the same time. ‘If they had 150 kg it’s a lot of uranium metal, you don’t need anywhere near that much to do lab experiments,’ the former IAEA official said.”
Nucleonics Week, “ROK secretly converted uranium used in U-235 laser separation,” 16 Sept. 2004 by Mark Hibbs
14) “The inspectors reported that they also uncovered a secret program in the early 1980s to produce natural uranium from imported phosphate fertilizer and from a South Korean mine of uranium-rich coal. The goal of this effort, reportedly, was to have available for secret experiments a uranium supply unlisted on the nation’s internationally controlled inventory. ‘We knew the deposits existed, but did not know they were actually mining it, separating it and processing it into pure uranium,’ said Peter Hayes, director of Nautilus Institute, a California group working for nuclear nonproliferation on the Korean Peninsula. Referring in a telephone interview to uranium ore, he added: ‘There is a lot of very cheap yellowcake on the market, so why would they be doing this? And why would they be trying to keep it relatively quiet?’”
The International Herald Tribune (citing the New York Times), “Nuclear agency’s headaches proliferate; Report details South Korean cover-up,” 25 Nov. 2004, by James Brooke.
15) “But 125 kilograms would have been insufficient to produce 150 kilograms of
uranium metal. Moreover, the IAEA has found that samples of uranium said to
be from the Goesan mine are depleted relative to the amount of uranium 235
expected in natural uranium–yet another anomaly for South Korea to explain.
The depleted uranium could only have come from imported uranium from
which the uranium 235 had been removed. Reconciling these disparities will be
complicated further because two laboratories (and a third that produced
depleted uranium) were dismantled in 1994.”
Jungmin Kang, Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February 2005) pp. 40-49 (vol. 61, no.
01), copy available here:
gees.org/documentos/Documen-274.pdf
16) “358.7 kg UF4 (mainly imported) used to produce 126.4 kg uranium metal”
GOV/2004/60, page 2 of Annex:
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-60.pdf
17) For example: “Iran has acknowledged the production of uranium metal (which bears little relationship to an energy program which is what the Iranian government asserts to be its only purpose)”
Jean du Preez and Lawrence Scheinman, “Iran Rebuked for Failing to Comply with IAEA Safeguards,” James Martine Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 18 June 2003:
cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030618.htm
18) “’The only real use for uranium metal is a nuclear weapon,’ [Bolton] said. ‘Why is Iran experimenting with small quantities of uranium metal? Why are they reluctant to allow the IAEA to make copies of documents?’”
Judy Aita, “Iran Should Be Sanctioned, U.S. Envoy Bolton Says,” America.gov, 31 Aug. 2006:
america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/August/20060831175737jatia0.2994043.html
19) Cho Chung-won, director-general of the Science and Technology Ministry: “Some 15 kilograms of uranium metal were lost in the course of experiments.”
Xinhua, “IAEA to send second inspection team to South Korea,” 15 Sept. 2004
20) “It should be noted, however, that the fuel used in South Korean nuclear power stations is uranium oxide. There is no plausible peaceful use for uranium metal in South Korea.”
The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), “Shame on S. Korea for covert N-program,” 15 Sept. 2004
See also this history of the CANDU reactor:
Gord L Brooks, “A Short History of the CANDU Nuclear Power System,” Paper prepared for the Ontario Hydro Demand/Supply Plan Hearing, Jan. 1993:
canteach.candu.org/library/19930101.pdf
Page 10: “By October, 1955, a further key technical decision had been taken. This involved the switch from uranium metal as the fuel material to uranium dioxide”
21) “In September, Japanese media reacted to revelations of Korea’s previously unreported nuclear activities by raising suspicions that the ROK had tried to make nuclear weapons since the 1980s. In Korea, however, the media did not investigate the issue, with the exception of the Chosun Ilbo newspaper’s monthly edition, which in late September concluded that a nuclear weapons development program called ‘Project 88’ had gotten started during the early 1990s on orders from the ROK military… The Chosun Ilbo research which was not published in September suggested that former ROK president Kim Young-sam personally intervened around 1994 to prevent the Korean military from developing nuclear weapons. In at least one interview held with other reporters since then, Kim has corroborated that version of events, interviewers said…Last month, a lawmaker in the ROK National Assembly close to the defense establishment told Nucleonics Week that, beginning around 1988, the Joint Chiefs of Staff secretly began outlining contingency plans to develop nuclear weapons. This, the source said, was in response to moves in the U.S. Congress to pull U.S. troops out of South Korea. The Nunn-Warner amendment to the 1989 defense appropriations bill mandated a withdraw of 7,000 U.S. troops from ROK territory; that was done in 1991. But two more withdrawals foreseen under Nunn-Warner were shelved, in response to White House concerns about North Korean nuclear behavior. The legislator said that when U.S. President George H.W. Bush assured the ROK military that troops would stay, the Joint Chiefs suspended further consideration of nuclear weapons development.”
Nucleonics Week, “ROK military said to have begun nuclear weapons plan in 1980s,” 18 Nov. 2004 by Mark Hibbs
22) “That disclosure took place Aug. 23. While the amount of uranium that South Korea has admitted to enriching was small, about two-tenths of a milligram, it was enriched to nearly 80 percent, a level so high that is useful only for making nuclear weapons, not electric power. When it was disclosed last year that Iran used a similar method to attempt to enrich uranium, a process called laser enrichment, the Bush administration said that effort was clear evidence that Tehran was seeking to build a nuclear weapon.”
The International Herald Tribune quoting the New York Times, “Seoul says scientists enriched uranium; Government tells of rogue program; a U.S. policy setback,” 3 Sept. 2004 by David Sanger
23) “In interviews late last week, diplomats with knowledge of both covert programs disclosed that South Korean scientists enriched uranium to levels four times higher than did their counterparts in Iran. Seoul conducted those experiments, in violation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, two years before Iran did and kept them secret for nearly two years after Iran’s came to light, said the diplomats, who would discuss the investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency only on the condition of anonymity…Iran was far less successful than South Korea at laser enrichment, according to diplomats and IAEA reports. In 2002, Iranian scientists enriched uranium to about 15 percent while the South Koreans, working two years earlier, enriched uranium to 77 percent, well within the range necessary for a nuclear explosive.”
The Washington Post, “S. Korea Nuclear Project Detailed; Work Called Near Weapons Grade,” 12 Sept. 2004 by Dafna Linzer
24) “’Not only did they have an undeclared uranium-enrichment program, but they were actually making something close to bomb-grade, so you have to conclude someone wanted to develop a capability to make nuclear weapons,’ said David Albright, a former IAEA inspector and head of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security.”
The Washington Post, “S. Korea Acknowledges Secret Nuclear Experiments; IAEA Announces Probe of Activities,” 3 Sept 2004 by Dafna Linzer and Joohee Cho:
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56258-2004Sep2.html
25) “Seeking to explain the enrichment of uranium four years ago in his South Korean atomic research institute – an action that was covert until admitted last month to the International Atomic Energy Agency – the institute’s director, Dr. Chang In Soon, cast all blame for the treaty-breaking experiment on ‘the crude curiosity of the research scientists.’ Dr. Chang’s faulting of the scientists strains credulity because the researchers he sought to blame were government scientists working at a government institute.”
The Boston Globe, “Korean Chain Reactions,” 8 Sept 2004
26) “The agency’s report described the test as the culmination of an eight-year sequence of ‘at least 10’ experiments by a 14-member team of scientists working with [director of South Korea’s atomic research institute]Chang’s authorization.”
The International Herald Tribune (citing the New York Times), “Nuclear agency’s headaches proliferate; Report details South Korean cover-up,” 25 Nov. 2004, by James Brooke.
27) “Diplomats at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna said the agency had begun to suspect that South Korea was conducting nuclear experiments more than six years ago and said South Korean officials had worked hard to hide the experiments from inspectors. ‘They had a fairly elaborate plan involving denial and deception in order to evade detection by inspectors,’ said one diplomat who would discuss the agency’s investigation only on condition of anonymity.”
Washington Post, “S. Korea Admits Extracting Plutonium; Acknowledgment of ‘82 Test Follows Disclosure on Uranium,” 10 September 2004 by Anthony Faiola and Dafna Linzer
28) “On 10 December 2002 and again on 1 April 2003, the Agency requested permission from the ROK as a transparency measure to visit KAERI’s Laser Technology R&D Centre in Daejeon, in order to confirm the nature of activities undertaken at the Centre. Both requests were refused by the ROK. Following the entry into force of the ROK’s Additional Protocol, the Agency was allowed to visit the Centre in March 2004, but the ROK did not permit the Agency to take environmental samples.”
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-84.pdf
29) “’In 2001, the IAEA asked to conduct a regular inspection and was denied. That happened at least twice before the South Koreans, under some protest, allowed the inspectors in two years later,’ a diplomat said.”
The Washington Post, “S. Korea Nuclear Project Detailed; Work Called Near Weapons Grade,” 12 Sept. 2004 by Dafna Linzer
30) “We enriched 0.2 gram of uranium through a series of the experiments and then immediately scrapped the facility.”
The Korea Herald, “Uranium test stemmed from curiosity,” 11 Sept. 2004, by Chang In-soon, president of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute in Daejeon, who approved the uranium enrichment experiments in 2000.
31) “the Agency was allowed to visit the Centre in March 2004, but the ROK did not permit the Agency to take environmental samples.”
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-84.pdf
32) “’We understand the IAEA team does not care much about the scrapping of the documents on operation of the laser research equipment and lost metal uranium,’ an official said” Yonhap News Agency, “UN inspectors leave South Korea after nuclear tests probe,” 7 Nov. 2004
33) “An IAEA report to the Board of Governors this month on past undeclared activities in the Republic of Korea (ROK) did not include information from an ongoing inquiry by the Department of Safeguards into the reasons for the hidden work. Some IAEA officials suggested that an assessment was not called for, and would not be reported to the board in the future. The IAEA secretariat in early November deleted substantial language from an initial draft of the ROK report, according to sources. The expunged passages in part reflected an ongoing internal evaluation, being conducted in parallel with materials accounting verification, into the background and purpose of the hidden activities, they said.”
Nucleonics Week, “IAEA report on ROK activities didn’t include assessment,” 2 Dec 2004 by Mark Hibbs
34) “Following a meeting of the 35-nation board of governors, the IAEA chided South Korea for breaching nuclear safeguards with the experiments, but allowed it to escape referral to the UN Security Council.” Agence France Presse, “South Korea breathes sigh of relief over IAEA decision on nuclear tests,” 27 Nov. 2004
35) “’There’s no reason why these guys should be playing around with uranium metal, and you don’t do laser enrichment to put electricity in a light bulb,’ said a Western diplomat on the IAEA Board of Governors.”
Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Dissidents Claim Iran Obtained Weapon-Grade Uranium, Bomb Design From Khan,” 17 Nov 2004:
nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004/11/17/28119636-950b-4e67-9b4a-b2a2102183ec.html
36) “What Iran has yet to do is provide the IAEA sufficient information on the history of its centrifuge programme for it to satisfy itself that there are no ‘undeclared nuclear materials or activities.’ However, this alone can hardly constitute grounds for referring the country to the Security Council under Article III.B.4 of the Agency’s Statute since the IAEA, in the past two years, has found discrepancies in the utilisation of nuclear material in as many as 15 countries. Among these are South Korea, Taiwan, and Egypt. In 2002 and 2003, for example, South Korea refused to let the IAEA visit facilities connected to its laser enrichment programme. Subsequently, though Seoul confessed to having secretly enriched uranium to a 77 per cent concentration of U-235 — a grade sufficient for fissile material — neither the U.S. nor EU suggested referring the matter to the UNSC.”
The Hindu, “Iran and the invention of a nuclear crisis,” 21 Sept 2005, by Siddharth Varadarajan:
hinduonnet.com/2005/09/21/stories/2005092105231000.htm

I’m sure wading through the intricacies of the NPT and the IAEA statute is good fun

So instead of following the law, the world should simply listen to the baseless accusations of the world’s largest power and trust them to bomb whomever they think is appropriate. Hitler would have loved that mandate.