Please, oh please, start the sorties soon. And lots of cruise missiles. PLEASE. NOW.

ParisParamus on June 17, 2008 at 12:21 PM

Did someone say appeasement?

Seixon on June 17, 2008 at 12:24 PM

This stance is nothing new… they have been saying this exact same thing for YEARS!

Why don’t we believe them? Why do we think that OUR words matter, but theirs do not? The arrogance of our Politicians is amazing…

Maybe its because in Washington no one has any principals at all, so they can’t imagine someone who would actualy stand by theirs and make their actions match their rhetoric?

Romeo13 on June 17, 2008 at 12:28 PM

Blasphemer! Racist!

Have you no faith in the Messiah? Don’t you know that once the Iranians meet with Obambi and realize that he is the Mahdi, they will will end their nuke program and their support for terrorism? Remember, he is the one we’ve been waiting for…

trubble on June 17, 2008 at 12:34 PM

Namely, what would Winnie the Pooh do?

Things like that make me think that Obama is a child who is surrounded by other children, standing on each other’s shoulders so they can play at the grown-up’s games.

The real question isn’t what Winnie the Pooh would do, but what would Menachem Begin do?

mjk on June 17, 2008 at 12:39 PM

Oops.
pubic=public

a capella on June 17, 2008 at 12:42 PM

That Iranian Maniac means it.
That Punk freshman Senator from Chicago is clearly not capable of dealing with the Iranian Maniac.

Enough on that.

old trooper on June 17, 2008 at 12:44 PM

How can you believe the Iranian madman when Dimocrats lie continuously. Take out Achmid with the first strike. Go ahead, show off a little bit. maybe a 16″ shell from a Navy destroyer … sweeeeeet!

trs on June 17, 2008 at 12:52 PM

I have a strong feeling they will have their uranium enriched just before the election,from 20,000ft….Ahmadinajacket will be able to give “Glowing” speeches immediately afterward…………

adamsmith on June 17, 2008 at 12:53 PM

It also offers trade and other benefits, including the possibility of Iran buying civil aircraft from the West.

Why oh why do we keep offering more stuff? In exchange for what? Meanwhile the clock is ticking, they’ll have what they want soon enough, then what?
And do we really want to sell these maniacs any sort of airplane? Holy crapoli Americans have short memories.

4shoes on June 17, 2008 at 12:55 PM

Under the NPT Iran has the right to enrich uranium for power.

Why exactly are we talking of bombing them?

offroadaz on June 17, 2008 at 12:52 PM

So, Allah/God gave them the RIGHT to enrich uranium? Cool, since its a RIGHT does that mean I have it to?

And if they have the RIGHT to it, why is the UN involved, and the IAEA involved? And why was there a laptop found with plans for a nuclear WEAPON found in IRAN?

And why, would they bother to develop technology when we are willing to essentialy GIVE them somthing as good, for free?

Romeo13 on June 17, 2008 at 12:58 PM

If dubya can neutralize or severely damage Iran’s dream of nuclear warfare and also erect Osama’s head on a stake on the WH lawn before Jan. 2009, I’ll take back everything bad I’ve said about him.

a capella on June 17, 2008 at 1:01 PM

Absolutely they have the right. They are signers of the treaty, the same one the US, China, Russia and others signed and agreed to. That treaty says they have the right to develop nuclear power.

But if the treaty causes me discomfort I don’t have to abide by it.

snaggletoothie on June 17, 2008 at 1:08 PM

Akzed on June 17, 2008 at 12:23 PM

I presume this is allegorical.

LimeyGeek on June 17, 2008 at 1:14 PM

Third question (as it should be): now that the Iranian centrifuge farms are smoking holes in the ground, how do you get them not to try that again?

michaelo on June 17, 2008 at 1:21 PM

Where is Dave742?

TheBigOldDog on June 17, 2008 at 1:26 PM

Well, I’m certain that Hussein Obama is making brownie points in the Middle East by wanting to talk with a country so hell-bent on the destruction of Israel as well as with the Israelis for the same.

Iran, for lack of a better description, should have a big red target painted on it with the words “Open for Business” to any takers.

madmonkphotog on June 17, 2008 at 2:00 PM

What would you do to improve upon this offer?

The US could improve on the offer by following the treaty that they signed and ratified. This, I know, would be a first for the US. In order for the US to be in compliance with the NPT, the US would need to do the following:

1) Comply with Article IV.1 and allow Iran to develop their nuclear energy program instead of continually asking Iran to give up their inalienable right.
2) Comply with Article IV.2 and cease from hindering Iran’s cooperation with other states in an effort to further their nuclea energy program.
3) Comply with Article VI and disarm their nuclear weapons
4) Comply with assurances made before the signing of the NPT that no nuclear weapon state will ever use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state. (Presently this option is “on the table”).

If the US were to comply with the NPT, the impasse would be over. Of course, you will bring up the fact that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement. Violating a safeguards agreement (which is what Iran did), is a completely different issue than violating the NPT itself (which is what the US does, as well as the IAEA). In addition, the reason that Iran was forced into violating its safeguards agreement relates to issue 2 above. Iran attempted to develop its nuclear energy program openly for years, and was continually impeded by the US, which forced them to develop their program in secret.

dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 2:08 PM

dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 2:08 PM

I’ve got a bridge I want to sell you.

WisCon on June 17, 2008 at 2:17 PM

Is Iran our enemy?

JiangxiDad on June 17, 2008 at 2:16 PM

Nope… Dave’s enemy is the US… as you can tell by his arguements.

Romeo13 on June 17, 2008 at 2:21 PM

Romeo:

do you really expect us to believe that Iran, who has been offered FREE advanced light water technology, and guarentees of fuel, is developing this technology for peaceful purposes?

It does not matter what you offer Iran as long as you simultaneously take away their inalienable rights. If Russia offered to supply the US with nuclear fuel for power plants if we agreed to stop out own production of it, do you think the US would agree to that? Of course not. No country in the world would. And they shouldn’t. This includes Iran.

Especialy when weapon designs were FOUND in Iran?

Give me a break. The uranium metal document was a piece of paper of some crude design that sat in a filing cabinet. You can find the same material on the internet. Even if Iran had the most sophisticated design available, it still means nothing in terms of Article II. Article II prohibits manufacture, not pieces of paper.

Under the NPT, the IAEA can monitor facilites… somthing which Iran has refused.

Untrue.

Under the IAEA non compiance is sent to the UN Security Council, which is what happened…

And that referral was illegal.

Sounds to me like the US is following the treaty that Iran signed.

You are wrong. read the four point above.

Under the treaty they DO have the “right” to peacefull Nuclear Power, but the UN has the “right” to monitor it… and has found Iran to NOT be in compliance.

Iran was found violating its safeguards agreement, which relates to Article III. Article IV relates to Iran’s inalienable right to develop nuclear power. Article IV rights are only dependent on Article I and II, not Article III. Violation of safeguards does not forefit Article IV rights. At least 15 countries have violated their safeguards agreements. Why is Iran the only one required to forefit their rights as a result?

dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 2:32 PM

offroadaz on June 17, 2008 at 2:40 PM

You’re mean. Why don’t you say the same for N. Korea or Cuba, or Zimbabwe, or Libya. Because you’re a racist, who only thinks Iranians are good.

Who else don’t you like??

Doesn’t everyone deserve weapons of mass destruction, especially if we have them? I mean what makes one country or one people any better than any other.

There is something wrong with you if you can’t see that.

JiangxiDad on June 17, 2008 at 2:44 PM

Dr.Cwac.Cwac:

The United States and some members of the European Union have accused Iran of using this program to help covertly develop nuclear weapons, which would be in violation of article II of the NPT.

As I said to Romeo, a violation of Article II would result in a forfeit of Article IV rights. A violation of safeguards agreements, however, does not. Being accused of violating Article II is not the same as violating Article II, something Americans seem to have trouble with.

the IAEA Board of Governors, acting under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, found that these failures constituted non-compliance

This referral under Article XII.C was illegal. The referral was made in the IAEA BOG Resolution of Sept. 24, 2005, where the Board “finds that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute.” (1)
There is a fundamental error in this finding made by the Board with respect to Iran. To understand this it is necessary to know the basics about safeguards agreements.
There are two types of safeguards agreements. There are those that relate to and grew out of the IAEA Statute, such as INFCIRC/66 safeguards, (2) and there are those that relate to the Non-proliferation treaty (NPT), which are the INFCIRC/153 safeguards. (3)
The first types of safeguards, INFCIRC/66 safeguards, are provided for in Article III.A.5 of the IAEA Statute. These safeguards are applied “with respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement where the Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards.” (4) Article XII.C of the Statute defines non-compliance as diverting nuclear material, violating health and safety regulations, or violating any other conditions, of a “project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned.” Agency safeguards, then, relate only to established Agency projects, and they do not contain provisions for stopping nuclear proliferation if it is done without Agency assistance. (5)
The second types of safeguards are NPT safeguards, or INFCIRC/153 safeguards, which are provided for in Article III of the NPT. (6) These safeguards are fundamentally different than INFCIRC/66 safeguards (7), because they relate to “all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities” of a State, (NPT, Article III) these safeguards are designed to detect nonproliferation under all circumstances, even if it is outside of an Agency project. For this reason NPT safeguards are also known as “full scope” safeguards. The triggering mechanism for non-compliance with NPT safeguards can be found in Article 19, which states that referral to the Security Council will occur if the Board “is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” (8)

The IAEA found Iran in non-compliance under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. The IAEA Statute, however, relates to INFCIRC/66 safeguards, which only relate to Agency projects.
The error made by the IAEA is that Iran has not been accused of any violations in relation to any IAEA project, and any claims of Iranian non-compliance under Article XII.C of the Statute have absolutely no legal basis. (9) In fact, only India, Israel, and Pakistan are currently operating under INFCIRC/66 safeguards under the IAEA Statute, and a finding of non-compliance under Article XII.C of the Statute would only be legal for these three states. (10) For any States that are a party to the NPT, a finding of non-compliance can only legally be made under INFCIRC/153 safeguards.

So why didn’t the IAEA find Iran non-compliant legally by declaring them to be non-compliant with Article 19 of INFCIRC/153? The reason the IAEA did not find Iran non-complaint with respect to their INFCIRC/153 safeguards is that the IAEA was able to verify that Iran did not divert nuclear material, and they have made this finding repeatedly. (11) Therefore, Iran was not non-compliant under their INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement. The IAEA knew that a finding of non-compliance under INFCIRC/153 safeguards would have been grossly illegal, so instead they found Iran non-compliant with Article XII.C of the Statute. Although this is still illegal, it is less obvious to those unfamiliar with safeguards.

It is clear that the IAEA realizes that finding Iran non-compliant under Article XII.C of the Statute is illegal as well. If it were legal, the IAEA would simply have found Iran “non compliant under Article XII.C of the Statute.” Instead they stated that Iran’s actions “constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute.” Adding the phrase “in the context” shows that they do not believe their finding is truly valid. Iranian non-compliance “in the context” of Article XII.C means that Iran is in non-compliance with that Article only if it is “reinterpreted” to mean something that it does not actually say. (12)

1) Paragraph 1 of GOV/2005/77: iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf
2) The text of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 can be found here:
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf66r2.shtml
3) Nearly all safeguards agreements under the NPT between individual nations and the IAEA follow INFCIRC/153. All references to safeguards will refer to this standard:
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf
See this link in relation to all quotes of NPT-type safeguards agreements.
4) See Aticle XII.A the IAEA Statute:
iaea.org/About/statute_text.html
See article XI for a description of what an “Agency Project” is.
See this link in relation to all quotes of the IAEA Statute.
5) “The IAEA Statute does not contain provisions to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons if those weapons are being built without Agency assistance.”
Susan Carmody, “Fifth Annual Philip D. Reed Memorial Issue: Notes: Balancing Collective Security and National Sovereignty: Does the United Nations Have the Right to Inspect North Korea’s Nuclear Facilities?” Fordham International Law Journal, 18 Fordham Int’l L.J. 229, 1994. Also see Documents on Disarmament, Volume 1, 1945-1959, pages ix-x, as cited in above.
Also, see the statement:
“Indigeneously-developed nuclear technology & activities are not subjected to international are surveillance or control [under INFCIRC/66 safeguards]”
Jamal Khaer Ibrahim, (Director, Planning & International Relations Division, Malayian Nuclear Agency), “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”: presentation given at the National Convention on Nuclear & Radioactive Safety, Security & Safeguards, 10 Dec. 2007, page 34, available here:
aelb.gov.my/events/nc2007dok/pdf/S4/Topic1.pdf
6) See this link for a copy of the NPT:
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf
7) For statements regarding this difference, see:
“Since INFCIRC 66 safeguards are intended to verify obligations that particular facilities and material are not used for military purposes, not comprehensive nonproliferation obligations such as those in the NPT, its safeguards are focused on the particular facilities and material in question, rather than applying to all nuclear material in peaceful activities, as in the case of INFCIRC 153.”
Matthew Bunn, “International Safeguards: Summarizing ‘Traditional’ and ‘New’ Measures,” Lecture Notes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Open Course Ware (ocw.mit.edu). Article here:
ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Nuclear-Engineering/22-812JSpring2004/A88D2643-5744-4760-961C-D2859A1457A1/0/lec16notes.pdf
Also, see:
“The fundamental difference between the INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 & INFCIRC/153 systems is that the INFCIRC/153 system, as provided for under Article III.1 of the NPT, requires the application of IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory or under the jurisdiction and control of NPT NNWS Parties. Thus, the INFCIRC/153 system is also known as a Full-Scope or Comprehensive Safeguards System and differs from the INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 safeguards, where indigeneously-developed nuclear technology & activities are not subjected to international are surveillance or control.”
Jamal Khaer Ibrahim, (Director, Planning & International Relations Division, Malayian Nuclear Agency), “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”: presentation given at the National Convention on Nuclear & Radioactive Safety, Security & Safeguards, 10 Dec. 2007, page 34, available here:
aelb.gov.my/events/nc2007dok/pdf/S4/Topic1.pdf
Also, see:
“The first such agreement was concluded between the IAEA and Japan in 1959, but the agency did not adopt a comprehensive safeguards system until 1965. Now set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2, this system of safeguards was to be applied, upon request, to individual nuclear activities within a state and to all activities receiving IAEA assistance. INFCIRC/66 safeguards apply to individual plants, shipments of nuclear fuel, or supply agreements between states supplying nuclear fuel or technology and states importing it, and they are the basis for nearly all agreements between the IAEA and states that are not party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered into force in 1970, extended the scope of the IAEA’s safeguards activities. By joining the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states (e.g., all those except the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China) commit themselves to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or explosive devices, and to submit to IAEA safeguards. Instead of applying only to selected nuclear activities on request, however, safeguards under the NPT—known as full-scope safeguards—are required of non-nuclear-weapon states on all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within their territory or under their control. To accommodate this new mission, the IAEA developed INFCIRC/153, a more comprehensive model safeguards agreement encompassing every aspect of a state’s nuclear fuel cycle except the initial mining and milling of uranium ore.”
US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency”, OTA-ISS-615, April 1995, page 27, available here:
princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1995/9530/953004.PDF
Also, see:
“In the case of NNWS parties to the NPT, ‘comprehensive’ (sometimes referred to as ‘full-scope’) safeguards agreements based on the model agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) cover all of a State’s nuclear material and activities…Another type of safeguards agreement, modeled on Agency document INFCIRC/66 Rev.2, is ‘item specific’ and covers individual nuclear facilities, specific items of equipment, or specific nuclear material.”
disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/nptbi.html
8) “The NPT Safeguards compliance assessment mechanism is comprised of two components. The triggering clause, contained in Article 19 of the Safeguards Agreement, contains the criteria for findings of non-compliance. The reporting clause, contained in Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, contains the procedures for handling cases of non-compliance and the authority for reporting cases to the U.N. Security Council.
As the triggering mechanism, Article 19 of the Safeguards Agreement grants the Agency authority to judge and enforce compliance with its provisions:
‘If the Board upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the [IAEA] Statute…’
Per its authority under the Safeguards Agreement, the Board may only report a state to the Security Council if it finds that, based on the report from the Director General, the Board cannot be assured that the state has not diverted nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes. These provisions make clear that the only relevant consideration behind a finding of non-compliance in the context of safeguards is the diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes. Any other breach of the Safeguards Agreement can only amount to non-compliance as far as it affects the Board’s ability to verify that there has been no diversion.”
Michael Spies, American University International Law Review, “Symposium: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Legal Framework in Crisis? Essay: Iran and the Limits of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” 2007
9) “The language of the Board’s finding is not consistent with the relevant provision of the IAEA Statute. Operative paragraph 1 of the resolution finds Iran’s past breaches of its NPT Safeguards, as detailed in a two-year old Agency report, to “constitute non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute.” Noted above, a finding of non-compliance, as the term is used in Article XII.C, pertains to circumstances when nuclear material provided in an Agency project has been diverted for military purposes, health and safety violations, or any other condition of an Agency project proscribed by agreement. Although Iran has several ongoing projects of the IAEA, including assistance in preparations for the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, the IAEA has not accused Iran of diverting nuclear material from any project. Nor has Iran been accused of any safety and health violations or of any other infraction of any condition stipulated in any agreement pertaining to an IAEA project. Therefore, the finding of non-compliance made by the Board is vague and has no basis in the IAEA Statute.”
Michael Spies, American University International Law Review, “Symposium: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Legal Framework in Crisis? Essay: Iran and the Limits of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” 2007
10) “As of 31 December 2006, safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 were
implemented at a number of facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan.”
IAEA Safeguards Statement for 2006
iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2006.pdf
11) See paragraph 112 of GOV/2004/67:
“All the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.”
fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/iaea1104.pdf
Also see paragraph 51 of GOV/2005/67:
“As indicated to the Board in November 2004, all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.”
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf
12) When a treaty says something other than what a party wants it to say, the party will often “reinterpret” the treaty and twist its language in order to construct a new meaning. This is illegal. The US has a history of doing this, the most famous example of which is Judge Abraham Sofaer’s reinterpretation of the ABM treaty during the Reagan administration. See:
Emily K. Penney, “COMMENT: Is that Legal?: The United States’ Unilateral Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,” Catholic University Law Review, 51 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1287, Summer 2002
See also:
David A. Koplow. “Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation: Article: Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties,” University of Pennsylavania Law Review, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1353, May 1989
See also:
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “Commentary: Testing and Development of ‘Exotic’ Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper,” Harvard Law Review, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1956, June 1986

dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 2:52 PM

Wiscon:
Do you need more details?

dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 3:05 PM

dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 3:05 PM

I’m sure wading through the intricacies of the NPT and the IAEA statute is good fun until you find out you’ve been lied to and that the world’s #1 sponser of terrorism has nuclear weapons.

Then your options shrink quite a bit and pretty much everyone (except our sworn enemies) in the world is worse off.

WisCon on June 17, 2008 at 3:17 PM

Iran is not helping Michelle’s children here.

rbj on June 17, 2008 at 3:23 PM

Wiscon:

I’m sure wading through the intricacies of the NPT and the IAEA statute is good fun

Fine. Let’s not talk about the law. Let’s talk about what actually happened. Let’s talk about Iran’s safeguards violations, and compare those violations to that of South Korea in 2004.

Iran was referred to the Security Council for safeguards violations going back 18 years, (1) South Korea also committed safeguards violations for two decades, including the omission or falsification of reports and refusing access to buildings to inspectors, (2) but no referral was made. When Iran violated its safeguards agreement, they were found non-compliant and referred to the Security Council where they received three rounds of sanctions. Iran’s violations are also likely to lead to a military attack on their nation. What was the IAEA’s response to South Korea’s violations? South Korea was “chided” by the IAEA, and the issue was dropped completely only 2 months later. (3) Quite a different response.

When it was discovered that Iran separated 200 milligrams (4) of plutonium for use in research experiments, it was a major issue worldwide. There were breathless reports of how the tests indicated that Iran was developing nuclear weapons, (5) and the issue was investigated by the IAEA intensively for 4 years before they finally determined that the issued had been resolved. (6) However, when it was discovered that South Korea separated 700 milligrams of plutonium back in 1982, (7) the reaction was quite different. In the South Korea case, the IAEA made a “casual inquiry” about the issue to South Korea by fax, and did not start an official investigation until 5 years later. (8) This investigation lasted 2 months, as stated above, and the issue was dropped. This unequal treatment is heightened by the fact that, unlike Iran, South Korea’s plutonium experiments were conducted in IAEA safeguarded facilities. (9) In addition, although there was never any evidence that Iran’s experiments were related to nuclear weapons, there were reports that South Korea’s experiments were run specifically to give the option for South Korea to make nuclear weapons if they chose to. (10) The South Korean government claimed that it did not know about these experiments, which was highly implausible given the fact that they were conducted by government workers in a government facility. (11)

At the same time that South Korea was isolating plutonium, they also isolated 153 kilograms of uranium metal at three nuclear facilities that were kept secret from the IAEA. (12) South Korea claimed that the metal was isolated to use in nuclear power related experiments, but the amount that was isolated made this explanation implausible. (13) When this activity was discovered by the IAEA, South Korea claimed that most of the uranium metal was isolated from imported phosphate fertilizer, and also from an indigenous mine of uranium-rich coal. The easiest way to isolate uranium is from readily available yellowcake, and using such obscure sources raised questions as to why such secrecy was required. (14) Also, the explanation as to the source of the uranium was not feasible, (15) and the issue was still being questioned months after the IAEA had already decided not to refer South Korea to the Security Council.

When Iran isolated uranium metal to use in experiments, (16) the issue was used as proof that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons. (17) John Bolton said in relation to Iran that “the only real use for uranium metal is a nuclear weapon.” (18) But when South Korea isolated 153 kilograms of uranium, the issue was dropped. On top of isolating such a large amount of uranium, South Korea could not account for all of it, and claimed that 15 kilograms of the material had been “lost.” (19) If it was discovered that Iran “lost” 15 kilograms of uranium, they would have been bombed by the US the next day. In addition, Iran has a legitimate reason for isolating uranium metal for use in enrichment experiments, because its Bushehr reactor will use enriched uranium as fuel. South Korea has no similar excuse, because its CANDU heavy water reactors use uranium dioxide as fuel, and not uranium metal. (20)

In addition to the plutonium and uranium metal isolation in the early 1980’s and reports of their links to a possible nuclear weapons program, there were also reports of a nuclear weapons program in the early 1990’s, (21) These reports were also ignored.

The revelation that prompted the release of the above nuclear activities was the uranium enrichment experiments that were run by South Korea in 2002. When Iran enriched uranium to a level of 15%, this was taken by the Bush administration as clear evidence of a nuclear weapons program. (22) South Korea enriched Uranium to 77%, (23) but this was not an issue, even though 77% is easily considered weapons grade. (24) South Korea claimed these experiments were run without knowledge of the government, but as above, these experiments were run by government officials at government facilities. (25) The IAEA also negated this excuse, saying that the enrichment experiment was the culmination of at least 10 experiments by a team of 14 scientists over 8 years, and was authorized by the director of South Korea’s atomic research institute. (26)
These experiments were deliberately kept secret from the IAEA (27) by denying inspections on two separate occasions, (28) only letting the inspectors in over 2 years later, (29) after the facility had been “scrapped”. (30) When the inspectors were finally let in, they were not allowed to take environmental samples. (31) In addition to scrapping the facility, documents relating to the laser research equipment that was used was also “scrapped”, along with documents relating to the lost uranium mentioned above. (32)
As already mentioned, the IAEA decided not to refer South Korea to the Security Council only two months after these revelations occurred, even though their investigation was still ongoing. References to this investigation were removed prior to the release of the report, (33) and the results of the investigation were never released.
All of these revelations were revealed from September to November, 2004, and the IAEA Board of Governors decided not to report South Korea to the Security Council on November 27. (34) Ten days before this decision was made, the Board was presumably making their decision about what to do about South Korea’s clandestine nuclear weapons program being run over two decades. Actually, at that time the Board was concerned about uranium metal and laser enrichment experiments. These concerns, however, only related to Iran, not South Korea. (35)
Similar revelations have occurred recently in at least 15 countries, and none have resulted in a referral to the Security Council. (36)

Can you explain this?

1) “We need to reconstruct the undeclared programme that has taken place for 18 years.” Press statement given by Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, one month after Iran was referred to the Security Council, 6 March 2006. Copy here:
iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2006/transcr06032006.html
2) “For two decades, South Korea covered up a series of sensitive nuclear laboratory experiments by omitting reports, falsifying reports or closing buildings to international inspectors, according to a report by the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.” The International Herald Tribune (citing the New York Times), “Nuclear agency’s headaches proliferate; Report details South Korean cover-up,” 25 Nov. 2004, by James Brooke.
3) “Following a meeting of the 35-nation board of governors, the IAEA chided South Korea for breaching nuclear safeguards with the experiments, but allowed it to escape referral to the UN Security Council.” Agence France Presse, “South Korea breathes sigh of relief over IAEA decision on nuclear tests,” 27 Nov. 2004
4) “Total amount of plutonium separated in the research activities is estimated by the
agency to be about 200 milligrams.” A.A. Soltanieh, “Iranian nuclear activities and interaction with the IAEA,” Atoms for Peace: An International Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, copy can be found here:
ucm.es/BUCM/revistas/cps/16962206/articulos/UNIS0606130141A.PDF
Also, see:
“The Agency has been following up with Iran information provided by Iran concerning experiments involving the separation of small (milligram) quantities of plutonium”:
GOV/2006/27, paragraph 27:
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf
5) “Iran has been caught secretly developing the technology to produce a nuclear bomb, The Independent can reveal. It has been forced to admit producing plutonium - the material associated with nuclear arms - after concealing its nuclear weapons programme from UN inspectors until last month, according to a confidential report by the International Atomic Energy Agency” The Independent, “Iran Developing Nuclear Bomb Technology,” 12 Nov. 2003 by Leonard Doyle and Andrew Buncombe
6) “On 20 August 2007 the Agency stated that earlier statements made by Iran are consistent with the Agency’s findings, and thus this matter is resolved.”
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-48.pdf
7) “According to the international media, the IAEA report says South Korean scientists produced a total of 0.7 grams of plutonium comprising 98 per cent of fissile PU-239 in its 1982 test.” BBC Worldwide Monitoring quoting Chungang Ilbo, “South Korea downplays UN nuclear report,” 13 Nov. 2004
8) “The first indication of a plutonium experiment came to light in 1998 after international inspectors detected traces of the substance at a government-run nuclear research center in Seoul, according to the South Korean science ministry. IAEA sources said the samples were inconclusive, and inspectors began additional testing in other areas of the country. The South Korean government said the IAEA made only a “casual inquiry” by fax in 1998 and submitted an official request about the incident in 2003. During that work, the South Koreans allegedly dismantled a test site, moved equipment and failed to notify the IAEA about the experiments while they knew the agency was trying to determine whether such tests had been conducted, according to the diplomats. By 2003, inspectors had collected irrefutable evidence of plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment, and they confronted the South Koreans with it last December.”
Washington Post, “S. Korea Admits Extracting Plutonium; Acknowledgment of ‘82 Test Follows Disclosure on Uranium,” 10 September 2004 by Anthony Faiola and Dafna Linzer
9) “The inspectors also uncovered a plutonium separation experiment in 1982 that was carried out ‘in a safeguarded facility and was not declared to the agency.’” (inside quote from IAEA report)
The International Herald Tribune, “Nuclear agency’s headaches proliferate; Report details South Korean cover-up,” 25 Nov. 2004 by James Brooke
10) “A former senior U.S. official responsible for conducting U.S.-Asian nuclear diplomacy said in September that, when Korean scientists conducted reprocessing experiments in 1982, South Korea ‘wanted to be ready’ to separate plutonium to produce nuclear weapons should the country’s leadership deem that necessary for national security reasons.”
Nucleonics Week, “ROK military said to have begun nuclear weapons plan in 1980s,” 18 Nov. 2004 by Mark Hibbs
11) “A week after admitting that government scientists enriched tiny amounts of uranium four years ago, the South Korean government disclosed on Thursday that scientists in 1982 conducted an experiment in plutonium extraction at a state-run research facility.” International Herald Tribune, “Seoul tells of 1982 test to extract plutonium; Admission follows revelation of uranium experiments in 2000,” 10 Sept. 2004 by Andrew Salmon
12) “IAEA Chief Mohamed ElBaradei said Monday that South Korea produced 153 kilograms of uranium metal in 1982 at one of three nuclear facilities undeclared to the watchdog.”
Xinhua, “IAEA to send second inspection team to South Korea,” 15 Sept. 2004
13) “Likewise, said one former IAEA safeguards official, the conversion by the ROK of 150 kilograms of U metal outside of safeguards at Kaeri ‘raises major questions about why they did it,’ especially since the ROK carried out plutonium separation experiments at the same time. ‘If they had 150 kg it’s a lot of uranium metal, you don’t need anywhere near that much to do lab experiments,’ the former IAEA official said.”
Nucleonics Week, “ROK secretly converted uranium used in U-235 laser separation,” 16 Sept. 2004 by Mark Hibbs
14) “The inspectors reported that they also uncovered a secret program in the early 1980s to produce natural uranium from imported phosphate fertilizer and from a South Korean mine of uranium-rich coal. The goal of this effort, reportedly, was to have available for secret experiments a uranium supply unlisted on the nation’s internationally controlled inventory. ‘We knew the deposits existed, but did not know they were actually mining it, separating it and processing it into pure uranium,’ said Peter Hayes, director of Nautilus Institute, a California group working for nuclear nonproliferation on the Korean Peninsula. Referring in a telephone interview to uranium ore, he added: ‘There is a lot of very cheap yellowcake on the market, so why would they be doing this? And why would they be trying to keep it relatively quiet?’”
The International Herald Tribune (citing the New York Times), “Nuclear agency’s headaches proliferate; Report details South Korean cover-up,” 25 Nov. 2004, by James Brooke.
15) “But 125 kilograms would have been insufficient to produce 150 kilograms of
uranium metal. Moreover, the IAEA has found that samples of uranium said to
be from the Goesan mine are depleted relative to the amount of uranium 235
expected in natural uranium–yet another anomaly for South Korea to explain.
The depleted uranium could only have come from imported uranium from
which the uranium 235 had been removed. Reconciling these disparities will be
complicated further because two laboratories (and a third that produced
depleted uranium) were dismantled in 1994.”
Jungmin Kang, Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February 2005) pp. 40-49 (vol. 61, no.
01), copy available here:
gees.org/documentos/Documen-274.pdf
16) “358.7 kg UF4 (mainly imported) used to produce 126.4 kg uranium metal”
GOV/2004/60, page 2 of Annex:
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-60.pdf
17) For example: “Iran has acknowledged the production of uranium metal (which bears little relationship to an energy program which is what the Iranian government asserts to be its only purpose)”
Jean du Preez and Lawrence Scheinman, “Iran Rebuked for Failing to Comply with IAEA Safeguards,” James Martine Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 18 June 2003:
cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030618.htm
18) “’The only real use for uranium metal is a nuclear weapon,’ [Bolton] said. ‘Why is Iran experimenting with small quantities of uranium metal? Why are they reluctant to allow the IAEA to make copies of documents?’”
Judy Aita, “Iran Should Be Sanctioned, U.S. Envoy Bolton Says,” America.gov, 31 Aug. 2006:
america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/August/20060831175737jatia0.2994043.html
19) Cho Chung-won, director-general of the Science and Technology Ministry: “Some 15 kilograms of uranium metal were lost in the course of experiments.”
Xinhua, “IAEA to send second inspection team to South Korea,” 15 Sept. 2004
20) “It should be noted, however, that the fuel used in South Korean nuclear power stations is uranium oxide. There is no plausible peaceful use for uranium metal in South Korea.”
The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), “Shame on S. Korea for covert N-program,” 15 Sept. 2004
See also this history of the CANDU reactor:
Gord L Brooks, “A Short History of the CANDU Nuclear Power System,” Paper prepared for the Ontario Hydro Demand/Supply Plan Hearing, Jan. 1993:
canteach.candu.org/library/19930101.pdf
Page 10: “By October, 1955, a further key technical decision had been taken. This involved the switch from uranium metal as the fuel material to uranium dioxide”
21) “In September, Japanese media reacted to revelations of Korea’s previously unreported nuclear activities by raising suspicions that the ROK had tried to make nuclear weapons since the 1980s. In Korea, however, the media did not investigate the issue, with the exception of the Chosun Ilbo newspaper’s monthly edition, which in late September concluded that a nuclear weapons development program called ‘Project 88’ had gotten started during the early 1990s on orders from the ROK military… The Chosun Ilbo research which was not published in September suggested that former ROK president Kim Young-sam personally intervened around 1994 to prevent the Korean military from developing nuclear weapons. In at least one interview held with other reporters since then, Kim has corroborated that version of events, interviewers said…Last month, a lawmaker in the ROK National Assembly close to the defense establishment told Nucleonics Week that, beginning around 1988, the Joint Chiefs of Staff secretly began outlining contingency plans to develop nuclear weapons. This, the source said, was in response to moves in the U.S. Congress to pull U.S. troops out of South Korea. The Nunn-Warner amendment to the 1989 defense appropriations bill mandated a withdraw of 7,000 U.S. troops from ROK territory; that was done in 1991. But two more withdrawals foreseen under Nunn-Warner were shelved, in response to White House concerns about North Korean nuclear behavior. The legislator said that when U.S. President George H.W. Bush assured the ROK military that troops would stay, the Joint Chiefs suspended further consideration of nuclear weapons development.”
Nucleonics Week, “ROK military said to have begun nuclear weapons plan in 1980s,” 18 Nov. 2004 by Mark Hibbs
22) “That disclosure took place Aug. 23. While the amount of uranium that South Korea has admitted to enriching was small, about two-tenths of a milligram, it was enriched to nearly 80 percent, a level so high that is useful only for making nuclear weapons, not electric power. When it was disclosed last year that Iran used a similar method to attempt to enrich uranium, a process called laser enrichment, the Bush administration said that effort was clear evidence that Tehran was seeking to build a nuclear weapon.”
The International Herald Tribune quoting the New York Times, “Seoul says scientists enriched uranium; Government tells of rogue program; a U.S. policy setback,” 3 Sept. 2004 by David Sanger
23) “In interviews late last week, diplomats with knowledge of both covert programs disclosed that South Korean scientists enriched uranium to levels four times higher than did their counterparts in Iran. Seoul conducted those experiments, in violation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, two years before Iran did and kept them secret for nearly two years after Iran’s came to light, said the diplomats, who would discuss the investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency only on the condition of anonymity…Iran was far less successful than South Korea at laser enrichment, according to diplomats and IAEA reports. In 2002, Iranian scientists enriched uranium to about 15 percent while the South Koreans, working two years earlier, enriched uranium to 77 percent, well within the range necessary for a nuclear explosive.”
The Washington Post, “S. Korea Nuclear Project Detailed; Work Called Near Weapons Grade,” 12 Sept. 2004 by Dafna Linzer
24) “’Not only did they have an undeclared uranium-enrichment program, but they were actually making something close to bomb-grade, so you have to conclude someone wanted to develop a capability to make nuclear weapons,’ said David Albright, a former IAEA inspector and head of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security.”
The Washington Post, “S. Korea Acknowledges Secret Nuclear Experiments; IAEA Announces Probe of Activities,” 3 Sept 2004 by Dafna Linzer and Joohee Cho:
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56258-2004Sep2.html
25) “Seeking to explain the enrichment of uranium four years ago in his South Korean atomic research institute - an action that was covert until admitted last month to the International Atomic Energy Agency - the institute’s director, Dr. Chang In Soon, cast all blame for the treaty-breaking experiment on ‘the crude curiosity of the research scientists.’ Dr. Chang’s faulting of the scientists strains credulity because the researchers he sought to blame were government scientists working at a government institute.”
The Boston Globe, “Korean Chain Reactions,” 8 Sept 2004
26) “The agency’s report described the test as the culmination of an eight-year sequence of ‘at least 10’ experiments by a 14-member team of scientists working with [director of South Korea’s atomic research institute]Chang’s authorization.”
The International Herald Tribune (citing the New York Times), “Nuclear agency’s headaches proliferate; Report details South Korean cover-up,” 25 Nov. 2004, by James Brooke.
27) “Diplomats at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna said the agency had begun to suspect that South Korea was conducting nuclear experiments more than six years ago and said South Korean officials had worked hard to hide the experiments from inspectors. ‘They had a fairly elaborate plan involving denial and deception in order to evade detection by inspectors,’ said one diplomat who would discuss the agency’s investigation only on condition of anonymity.”
Washington Post, “S. Korea Admits Extracting Plutonium; Acknowledgment of ‘82 Test Follows Disclosure on Uranium,” 10 September 2004 by Anthony Faiola and Dafna Linzer
28) “On 10 December 2002 and again on 1 April 2003, the Agency requested permission from the ROK as a transparency measure to visit KAERI’s Laser Technology R&D Centre in Daejeon, in order to confirm the nature of activities undertaken at the Centre. Both requests were refused by the ROK. Following the entry into force of the ROK’s Additional Protocol, the Agency was allowed to visit the Centre in March 2004, but the ROK did not permit the Agency to take environmental samples.”
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-84.pdf
29) “’In 2001, the IAEA asked to conduct a regular inspection and was denied. That happened at least twice before the South Koreans, under some protest, allowed the inspectors in two years later,’ a diplomat said.”
The Washington Post, “S. Korea Nuclear Project Detailed; Work Called Near Weapons Grade,” 12 Sept. 2004 by Dafna Linzer
30) “We enriched 0.2 gram of uranium through a series of the experiments and then immediately scrapped the facility.”
The Korea Herald, “Uranium test stemmed from curiosity,” 11 Sept. 2004, by Chang In-soon, president of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute in Daejeon, who approved the uranium enrichment experiments in 2000.
31) “the Agency was allowed to visit the Centre in March 2004, but the ROK did not permit the Agency to take environmental samples.”
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-84.pdf
32) “’We understand the IAEA team does not care much about the scrapping of the documents on operation of the laser research equipment and lost metal uranium,’ an official said” Yonhap News Agency, “UN inspectors leave South Korea after nuclear tests probe,” 7 Nov. 2004
33) “An IAEA report to the Board of Governors this month on past undeclared activities in the Republic of Korea (ROK) did not include information from an ongoing inquiry by the Department of Safeguards into the reasons for the hidden work. Some IAEA officials suggested that an assessment was not called for, and would not be reported to the board in the future. The IAEA secretariat in early November deleted substantial language from an initial draft of the ROK report, according to sources. The expunged passages in part reflected an ongoing internal evaluation, being conducted in parallel with materials accounting verification, into the background and purpose of the hidden activities, they said.”
Nucleonics Week, “IAEA report on ROK activities didn’t include assessment,” 2 Dec 2004 by Mark Hibbs
34) “Following a meeting of the 35-nation board of governors, the IAEA chided South Korea for breaching nuclear safeguards with the experiments, but allowed it to escape referral to the UN Security Council.” Agence France Presse, “South Korea breathes sigh of relief over IAEA decision on nuclear tests,” 27 Nov. 2004
35) “’There’s no reason why these guys should be playing around with uranium metal, and you don’t do laser enrichment to put electricity in a light bulb,’ said a Western diplomat on the IAEA Board of Governors.”
Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Dissidents Claim Iran Obtained Weapon-Grade Uranium, Bomb Design From Khan,” 17 Nov 2004:
nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004/11/17/28119636-950b-4e67-9b4a-b2a2102183ec.html
36) “What Iran has yet to do is provide the IAEA sufficient information on the history of its centrifuge programme for it to satisfy itself that there are no ‘undeclared nuclear materials or activities.’ However, this alone can hardly constitute grounds for referring the country to the Security Council under Article III.B.4 of the Agency’s Statute since the IAEA, in the past two years, has found discrepancies in the utilisation of nuclear material in as many as 15 countries. Among these are South Korea, Taiwan, and Egypt. In 2002 and 2003, for example, South Korea refused to let the IAEA visit facilities connected to its laser enrichment programme. Subsequently, though Seoul confessed to having secretly enriched uranium to a 77 per cent concentration of U-235 — a grade sufficient for fissile material — neither the U.S. nor EU suggested referring the matter to the UNSC.”
The Hindu, “Iran and the invention of a nuclear crisis,” 21 Sept 2005, by Siddharth Varadarajan:
hinduonnet.com/2005/09/21/stories/2005092105231000.htm

dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 3:44 PM

rockhauler:

the threats Iran makes against western civilization

These threats are fabrications. See my post “dave742 on April 8, 2008 at 7:31 PM” here.

You’re entire worldview is based on lies.

dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 4:03 PM

rockhauler on June 17, 2008 at 3:54 PM

Yeah, the whole “death to America” chants kinda makes the whole thing moot as far as I’m concerned.

Romeo13 on June 17, 2008 at 5:05 PM

SECOND LOOK AT BEGGING FOR MERCY AND FORGIVENESS!

Mike H on June 17, 2008 at 5:49 PM

Iran has not started a war in 1,000 years.
dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 5:31 PM

It appears that in dave’s world 1979 didn’t happen.

Limerick on June 17, 2008 at 6:09 PM

Limerick:

“I guess that means we have the right to shoot illegal combantants on the battlefield. That’s in a treaty too.”

I never looked this up. If it is legal, sure. Can you tell me where this is from? Maybe I can look it up for you.

Romeo13:

“Iran has not started a war in 1,000 years.” -Dave
“Iran has not been a country for 1000 years..” -Romeo13

Why is it that the only things you people are able to debate are these ridiculous trivialities? Ok, genius, I will rephrase:

The Persians have not started a war in over 1,000 years.

Here is the original quote:
“Zum einen die Geschichte - der letzte iranische Angriffskrieg liegt über 1000 Jahre zurück.”
Michael Luders, “Kalkulierte Provokationen; Die gewagte Strategie des Iran / Ein Essay,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 August 2007

dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 6:40 PM

dave=enabler

jerrytbg on June 17, 2008 at 9:17 PM

Oh, I almost forgot, Dave. You’ve probably got Mahmoud and Hugo Bobble-heads on your desk to go with your Che mousepad and Castro coaster set.

There, I feel better now.

hillbillyjim on June 17, 2008 at 9:24 PM

hillbillyjim:

“And of course the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran was just a friendly invitation to a game of checkers.”

Seizing an embassy is not starting a war, imbecile. Do you know what group was responsible for seizing the embassy? The MEK. Ever watch FOX news? Ever see Aliriza Jafarzadeh on FOX news? He works for FOX news, and he is also a member of the MEK. Why are you watching FOX news if they employ members from the group responsible for the embassy bombing?

From the National Post:
“In 1979, the MEK announced that, ‘After the Shah, it’s America’s turn.’ And that same day, MEK members took part in the storming of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. U.S. hostages were held captive, with MEK help, for 444 days”

In a background paper for UN speech to be given by Bush:
“Iraq shelters terrorist groups including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), which has used terrorist violence against Iran and in the 1970s was responsible for killing several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians.”

From an FBI report on the MEK given to Congress at the request of John McCain [Go to thomas.gov/, click on Congressional Record, then on 103rd Congress, and search “MEK”. Results = “Supporting the Right Opposition Groups in Iran and Iraq”]:
“MEK perpetrated bombings and assassinations, after the aborted maiden effort in 1971, resumed in 1972. The organization’s targets included US military advisors stationed in Iran. For example, the MEK claimed responsibility for the assassination of US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hawkins in 1973, the assassination of US Air Force Colonel Paul Schaeffer in 1975, and the assassination of US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Jack Turner, also in 1975. The MEK also targeted US civilians associated with defense projects (five killed in 1976)…the MEK was also intimately involved in the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979. Eyewitnesses and MEK documents indicate that the MEK led the assault on the Embassy and then pleaded with Khomeini not to engage in dialogue with the United States government, nor release the American hostages seized during the action. In fact, Congressional testimony indicates that Rajavi insisted to Khomeini that there was much more to gain by holding the hostages than by releasing them.”

The US now supports the MEK. They shelter them in camp Ashraf as a base from which to launch attacks into Iran. You seem very upset about the embassy takeover. How do you feel about the US supporting those responsible?

dave742 on June 17, 2008 at 10:25 PM

Seizing an embassy is not starting a war, imbecile.

Seizing an embassy is an attack on sovereign US soil, under international law.

Of course, Jimmy saw the goodness of their hearts…of course it didn’t start a war.

Imbecile, eh? At least I didn’t double post.

hillbillyjim on June 17, 2008 at 10:48 PM

hillbillyjim:
BTW, our Senate has also quoted the MEK in the text of one of its bills. This was the idea of Alabama Republican Senator Jeff Sessions. Do you think its OK for our Senate to quote terrorists responsible for the embassy takeover in the text of its bills?

dave742 on June 18, 2008 at 8:02 AM