Arrête ça m’intimide les compliments ! :D “Performances” !! Je suis content que ça vous plaise, c’est le principal. Pour info je suis en train de reposter les vidéos sous des formats évitant à certains de mes lecteurs de planter lorsqu’il vi…

Peace time political micromanagers

Too simplistic and patently unfair to the troops at large.

Bradky on August 28, 2007 at 1:24 AM

political interpretation problems?

Wheres the reference to the troops?

You want need simplistic? You’re misguided.

Same answer.

Speakup on August 28, 2007 at 10:34 AM

Some day you’ll catch on that political leaders aren’t associated in the the same way military leaders are.
Civilian political leaders are separate from military leaders comprende’?

If your stones are just fine you can admit your wrong now

and

misguided, however I doubt you can much less will.

All you have to do to gain my apology is point out my reference to the military.

My stones are just fine thank you – quit touching my foot by the way. I take it you didn’t look up the mission statements…
NORAD is a defensive operation, period. So having Fred stroll into the wrong command post as you suggested is as silly as the idea that all of the world’s problems can be vaporized – may have seemed real in “War Games” but it was inaccurate. And if he doesn’t run for president (and win) he’d get jacked up by the security folks for being in an unauthorized area, deep voice or not.

Apologies for attributing wrong comment to you above

Double checked and see you made the comments

Peace time political micromanagers that can’t operate in real time in charge of war actions they neither understand nor have the courage to carry out, much less willing to take the heat needed to be successful.Or, multiple individual team member failure due to yellow belly cranialfeceitis leading to joint clusterf**k syndrome.

to which i replied

Too simplistic and patently unfair to the troops at large.

Bradky on August 28, 2007 at 1:24 AM

For that you owe an apology to our military folks — nothing for me to admit being wrong about

Speakup on August 28, 2007 at 4:37 PM

My stones are just fine thank you – quit touching my foot by the way. I take it you didn’t look up the mission statements…
NORAD is a defensive operation, period. So having Fred stroll into the wrong command post as you suggested is as silly as the idea that all of the world’s problems can be vaporized – may have seemed real in “War Games” but it was inaccurate. And if he doesn’t run for president (and win) he’d get jacked up by the security folks for being in an unauthorized area, deep voice or not.

I wouldn’t use a Staligrad

Well, choose any insurgency where extreme violence and war crimes failed to break their back. How about the Japanese occupation of China? They raped a whole city, but the Chinese still fought on.

Bradky on August 28, 2007 at 1:24 AM

Just wondering if you ever had the stones to admit you were wrong.

Don’t worry I didn’t expect you did.

MNDavenotPC on August 28, 2007 at 2:18 PM

You don’t break the back of an insurgency by scorching the earth. Massive firepower isn’t always the right answer. The Germans pounded Stalingrad into rubble, but the Russians still fought back.

What you are suggesting is not the warfare of Clausewitz, which was about attacking the center mass of your enemy, its the Crush Your Enemies of Conan.

Now… relook at the recent success in Iraq. The recent changes in strategy and tactics have been as much about Petraeus taking over and letting his “well trained” staffs and subordinate commanders do what they were trained to do.

I don’t think Wass de Czege was suggesting that you and others got no classes in OOTW. I think he was suggesting that the O4-O6ers have some very real experience that is directly relevant to the current situation (and beyond) that others do not. Petraeus — with his time in Mosul — is an excellent example also. That’s a reason why we now have a new counter-insurgency manual. The suggestion of people like the late Capt. Travis Patriquin that we could win in Anbar by cultivating the tribal sheikhs would be another example. Mind you, ABC News was unaware of the extent to which we were doing that already when they reported on it, but that’s a separate issue. And I did note in my original comment how good the US military is at adapting, so I don’t think the difference in opinion here — if any — is all that large.

As for Allah’s title, “Blame the Generals?” is provocative and gets people involved. But I wouldn’t blame the Generals for a phenomenon that occurs in so many major conflicts, whether it’s McClellan/Grant, Westmoreland/Abrams, etc. The first strategy, or first batch of leaders may not win, but the US military (again) is very good at adapting.

Rumsfeld was an idiot! …

sabbott on August 28, 2007 at 10:12 AM

Yes! But, he was a loyal idiot, that told the Shrub what he wanted hear!

(former Bush supporter, still a conservative and little “r”epublican.)

The Opinionator on August 28, 2007 at 11:25 AM

Minimum Time in Grade for COL is 3 years. So if McMaster made O-6 in 2003, he could get looked at for BG in 2006. Also, they don’t take into account Below the Zone or In The Zone for General Officer promotions. If you want to look into it further, try DA ‘Pamphlet’ 600-3 Commissioned Officer Development And Career Management. Its just a few pages shy of 500 pages and deals mostly with ranks below general.

I hope you are correct about McMaster. If he has been passed over twice, usually that means once below the zone (fast track) and then in the Zone. Perhaps he got two below the zone looks, in which case he will get another look. Problem for me is that if he misses then he goes to the above the zone look which is not a good sign. Even if promoted at that point, BG is about as far as he would go.

Brad,

about the only way a captain in the army has 12 years of service is if he counts his college time or has been passed over. Typical below the zone look for Major is at 9 years service.

When America goes to war, what often happens is that the peacetime commanders are dismissed and replaced by their young Turk subordinates who are more aggressive and willing to take on more risk. For example, in WWII virtually all the submarine commanders in the US Navy were replaced by younger, more aggressive subordinates willing to place their boats in harm’s way. In the US Army, virtually all the general officers who won WWII were field grade officers at the beginning of the war. Eisenhower was never a full colonel, skipping right from lieutenant colonel to general.

I suspect that the excessive credentialization and ticket punching of the peacetime officer promotion process has bred a tamer, more orthodox, conformist military officer more adept at jumping through neat bureaucratic hoops than fighting a messy war.

Peace time political micromanagers

Too simplistic and patently unfair to the troops at large.

Bradky on August 28, 2007 at 1:24 AM

political interpretation problems?

Wheres the reference to the troops?

You want need simplistic? You’re misguided.

Same answer.

“The crux of the problem in our Army,” Wass de Czege wrote, “is that officers are not systematically taught how to cope with unstructured problems.” Counterinsurgency wars, like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, are all about unstructured problems.

{sigh} Here’s some facts to chew on:

In 1989 I attended Officer Basic Course where we studied strategy and tactics of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). In 1991 I attended Officer Advance Course where we were taught higher level strategy and tactics of OOTW. In
1998 I attended Combines Arms and Services Staff School where we studdied staff coordinatino and planning for OTTW. And at various point along this time line I attended numberous training excercises focussed on OOTW.

What is OOTW focus? It is coping with unstructured problems such as counterinsurgency wars, like those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Now… relook at the recent success in Iraq. The recent changes in strategy and tactics have been as much about Petraeus taking over and letting his “well trained” staffs and subordinate commanders do what they were trained to do.

The micromanagement of the combat from the Pentagon has been replaced with trained field commander hands-on management on the ground. At it is working. Amazing, isn’t it?

The commissioned promotion system, in my limited experience, is very political, and friend and family influences can carry an otherwise non-stellar individual much farther than they would make it on their own.

BadgerHawk on August 27, 2007 at 9:49 PM

Speaking from personal experience, your statement can be summed up thusly.

Officer Corp: Form (appearance & connections) over substance takes precedence.

Enlisted Corp: Substance (ability & performance) over form takes precedence.

But as many of us older folks know, a college education and a few years experience does not an expert make.

Bradky on August 28, 2007 at 1:02 AM

The intemperate enthusiasm of youth vs the wisdom of the old lion.

In the Armed Forces Journal article referenced, Yingling opens with:

“You officers amuse yourselves with God knows what buffooneries and never dream in the least of serious service. This is a source of stupidity which would become most dangerous in case of a serious conflict.”
- Frederick the Great

And closes the article with:

This article began with Frederick the Great’s admonition to his officers to focus their energies on the larger aspects of war. The Prussian monarch’s innovations had made his army the terror of Europe, but he knew that his adversaries were learning and adapting. Frederick feared that his generals would master his system of war without thinking deeply about the ever-changing nature of war, and in doing so would place Prussia’s security at risk. These fears would prove prophetic. At the Battle of Valmy in 1792, Frederick’s successors were checked by France’s ragtag citizen army. In the fourteen years that followed, Prussia’s generals assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much like those of the past. In 1806, the Prussian Army marched lockstep into defeat and disaster at the hands of Napoleon at Jena. Frederick’s prophecy had come to pass; Prussia became a French vassal.

What is important here is that both sides reexamine, and re evaluate their conclusions, and learn from the experience.

In the heat of the moment, for most of us low lifes, BadBrad said it well:

If you have done your job, you have notified your commander of what you need to accomplish what he wants done and how your shortfalls, if not filled, will affect the mission. It is then up to him to

a. give you all or some of what you need

b. change or chancel the mission or

c. tell you to do it anyway.

At that point, there is no “pouting your foot down”. Somebody has seen too many movies.

The critics who claim this article, and others, are proof of a badly flawed military are missing the most important point; this debate is proof that the US Military is adapting, and is learning how to do it better. This is an ongoing, never ending process; there is no final answer.

The ultimate proof is the improvement in Iraq, however small it might appear.

The team comprises an unusual mix of combat experience and high academic achievement. It includes Colonel Peter Mansoor, Gen Petraeus’s executive officer and a former armoured division commander who holds a PhD in the history of infantry; Col H R McMaster, author of a well-known critique of Vietnam and a seasoned counter-insurgency operations chief; Lt-Col David Kilcullen, a seconded Australian army officer and expert on Islamism; and Col Michael Meese, son of the former US attorney-general, Edwin Meese, who was a member of the ill-fated Iraq Study Group.

Also don’t believe the hype about McMaster being passed over to BG. He went from LTC and Cav Squadron Commander in 1999-2002, to COL and Cav Regiment Commander in 2004. He might be eligible for promotion to one star, but he does not enough time in rank because he is already on the FAST TRACK.

“Americans love a winner. Americans will not tolerate a loser. Americans despise cowards. Americans play to win all of the time. I wouldn’t give a hoot in hell for a man who lost and laughed.” Speech to the 3rd Army 1944.

bnelson44 on August 28, 2007 at 1:41 AM

More specifically, Gen. George S. Patton, Speech to the 3d Army.

As Savage likes to say, we need more Patton and less patent leather.

Doesn’t that depend on whether you’re referring to a General or a PFC? It’s the duty of the PFC to follow the (sometimes) absurd orders given to them, and accomplish the mission no questions asked. We can’t say the same for higher ranking officials giving those orders and following political directives instead of common sense.

thedecider on August 27, 2007 at 10:19 PM

Just check what happened to any officer who dared disagree with Rumsfield and his lapdog Wolfowitz… There is one phrase that sums up the rumsfield pentagon: “Groupthink”.

That is why they had to bring in a retired general to take over Army CoS. Noone wanted it. Why? Because the civilian leadership thought they could run the military better than the generals and this attitude pervaded long before Iraq or Afghanistan. There was many Army Times articles about how Rumsfield shunned most, if not all, Generals in his ‘Rush’ to modernize the military to his own exacting standards.

As an officer it IS your job to think not just blindly follow orders. When you have “issues” or logistical problems you are supposed to bring them up to your higher… but there is always the possibility (as has happened to me in command of a company in OIF1) that your CO will look at you and say “Noted, drive on anyway”. If you have done your job, you have notified your commander of what you need to accomplish what he wants done and how your shortfalls, if not filled, will affect the mission. It is then up to him to a. give you all or some of what you need b. change or chancel the mission or c. tell you to do it anyway. At that point, there is no “puting your foot down”. Somebody has seen too many movies.

As for the guy who claims that the Army was unprepared for Afghanistan when it started… as I recall the 3/101st (187 infantry) was one of, if not the, first US unit in Afghanistan and the 10th MTN was there also.