I haven’t read it yet. But from the media storm that is building, I offer the following comment:

Given CIA’s STUNNING FAILURE and the UTTER INCOMPETENCE OF THE CIA to detect the attacks on the United States in 1998 (African embassies), 2000 (USS Cole), and 2001 (9/11), I find it myself completely ambivalent to his complaint that he was taken out of context by the White House.

Rather, he owes the families of the Americans who died in these events abject personal apologies for failing to do his job.

Please refer to my opus above.

LTC Yingling asserts that (1) the system must change, (2) there must be Congressional Oversight and (3) Congress must hold accountable the services. My position is Yes, No, Maybe. Yes, the system must change.

I don’t disagree that Reid is an SOB, but that is not my point. I agreed with LTC Yingling that the system of selecting generals must change; the agency that has the power to change or create laws is Congress, whether we like it or not. I disagreed with Congressional oversight because they already have it and more of it is scary. I was a maybe with holding accountable the service, because like I stated the Goldwater Nichols act has requirements that are not enforced. The act was intended to solve some of the Vietnam era shortcomings of officer accession. I also wanted to see 360 evaluations because it would reduce the negative attributes I have found in some generals. This is not a new problem. Read the Pentagon Wars by James Burton and see how the Generals acted. Also read Roberts Ridge by Malcolm MacPherson and see what they said about a certain general. Leadership issues within the flag/general ranks are systemic. Not one acquisition program under the leadership of a flag/general is under budget. Albeit that Congress has a large role in keeping this programs alive, the complicity of generals is concerning. I can bring up specific incidences of bad behavior by generals in an operational setting, but I don’t want to do that because it is an opsec violation to talk about specific operations, planning, and tactics. In the end, the Bush administration has done a lot to place good officers in positions that are of value. I have meet and worked with General Hayden, who is an outstanding officer. I think General Petraeus is an outstanding officer. I think Admiral Fallon is a competent officer. But with that said, there are more than a handful that are useless, and should have never risen to the rank.

“Surrender monkey” seems to be a popular term these days, though given my limited 20 year military career I don’t quite understand how it applies to the current situation. You see, disengagement is different from surrender. Taking your ball and going home is different from handing your sword to the enemy that vanquished you. And this is not to suggest I support disengagement from Iraq – I do not – but if you’re going to use military terms you might as well understand what they mean.

Yes, militaries are supposed to find ways to win wars, and that is the core of the problem that the LTC addressed – the military is incapable of finding strategies to win (as opposed to tactics) when it promotes yes-men and institutional thinkers to the top ranks. Gen. Petraeus is finally the sort of General we need, but one wonders if he had put on his 4th star prior to OIF if his counsel would have resulted in forced retirement as it did for Shinseki?

And let’s discuss “win wars” for a minute. Iraq is certainly a very dangerous conflict, but it is only partially a war. The military cannot, by itself, solve all of the problems in Iraq. The conflict transcends what can be accomplished through military violence alone. Even so, the military has had the task – a relatively simple one – of providing security for the Iraqi people. It has so far failed in this basic task. The surge may reverse this – time will tell, but time is short, and THAT is the fundamental problem. We have the rest of this year to quell violence in Iraq before our troop numbers drop significantly early next year.

So what you are saying is that there are not enough liberal surrender monkeys in the higher echelons, news flash militaries are suppose to find ways to win, not surrender at the first sign of difficulty.

Rock on…………….

In any event, Congress has every right to involve itself in the promotion process and the military. The Executive under the Constitution pretty just the Commander of the armed forces. Almost everything else falls to Congress – the service’s funding, organization and, yes, even promotion. The UCMJ was passed by Congress. Every piece of military hardware you use was provided by Congress. Your pay and benefits come from Congressional authorizations. You may not like it because the Dems are in the majority, but the Constitutional dividing lines are quite clear.

LTC Yingling is pretty accurate in his analysis. Like Navy Chiefs, the Flag ranks are populated by those picked using the “good ‘ol boy” network. Implementers are chosen over innovators and there’s very little diversity above O-6. And by diversity I don’t mean race or sex (though that is also the case), but diversity of thought.

This guy served with LTC McMasters in Tal Afar in 2005. It was a full on fight and the 3rd ACR, himself included, conducted themselves as warriors. I helped support operations in that AO so I saw it first hand.
Trooper on April 27, 2007 at 5:09 PM

Be that as it may, his entire solution ends up in the hands of congress and that is just a non starter. He obviously does not understand politics.

How would a congressman’s intervention have helped the situation you described where the mission was upset by a general? I don’t doubt that there are incompetent generals out there, but I don’t understand how the influence of someone like Harry Reid (for instance) would be beneficial to anyone.

In the bigger picture, Congress setting timelines for withdrawal is unprecedented (and probably unconstitutional)isn’t it? I am appalled by the political games the Dems are playing, down to purposely presenting the bill to Bush on the anniversary of “Mission Accomplished”. This is the worst sort of political interference and exploitation.

As an aside, I heard today that they are outraged that the Iraqi Parliament plans to take July and August off when there is so much important legislation to pass (in their view).

Pot to kettle much?

The second issue is the characterization of LTC Yingling’s article. One could take it as “whining” by a “passed over” officer, although I would argue there is no evidence to support that assertion. Or one could take it as a venting of frustration from a dedicated officer who wants only to be able to complete a mission. I would argue for the latter. I have been in several situations where the mission has been upset by a general. My team was tasked with building a bridge as part of a civil affairs operation. Unfortunately, the money was the type that required hiring a US contractor and not local contractors. We found a solution that required only Seabees. It was cheaper, faster, and provided training to the Seabees. We could use the money elsewhere. When we presented this plan to the commanding general, he flatly turned us down. It made absolutely no sense to spend money where it was not needed! And on top of that, the money that was original alloted was later siphoned off for other things. There was frustration that the general only proved to be a roadblock at trying to get a mission completed and did not provide any “leadership” in getting the end result that was part of his guidance. It is frustrating to be tasked by a general to acheive a goal and then have all your tools taken away. I have run into this more than once and I have a feeling that LTC Yingling has too. As one staffer said to me one time, if you don’t make any decisions, then you can’t be blamed for any decisions made. Only those without mistakes get promoted.

Ad hominem attacks aside; this is a naive statement. Politicians already have great influence in the military ranks. The system for promotions of Generals is intertwined with the political process.

I am intimately familiar with the general officer promotion system and the nomination and confirmation process. As long as the political input is restricted to the confirmation process there is no problem. However, when politicians begin to meddle in the internal operations of a military department that process itself will become political. As with any large organization there will be some errors but the overall process will remain both valid and effective. There is no naiveté here, but there is a valid fear that narcissistic politicians seeking political favor will corrupt our great military institutions

I’m not sure what this guy’s real problem is but to suggest that an enormous gaggle of politicos should nit pick and meddle in internal military matters is blatantly stupid.

Ad hominem attacks aside; this is a naive statement. Politicians already have great influence in the military ranks. The system for promotions of Generals is intertwined with the political process. Generals are nominated by the services. That list gets sent to the SecDef, who usually rubber stamps. The list then gets sent to POTUS who then forwards it to Congress (specifically the Senate) for confirmation. The whole process is pretty much a rubber stamp process, because there is a tradition of deference to the uniformed members, at least in the executive branch. Congress may delete from the list, and has deleted from the list. The reasons some were deleted from the list is mostly due to things not related to warfighting, i.e. the person was against a certain military acquisition. One only needs to look at the 1990s to see the lack of leadership in killing programs that didn’t have any relation to real warfighting. I will invoke the specter of NMCI as an example. Concocted by some senior officer, it is a program that did not address a burning need, nor a combat capability. Originally a 3 billion dollar program it has balloned out of control to a 11 billion dollar fiasco. Not one senior ranking officer had the leadership to keep costs under control or address the sever shortcomings of the system. This is the type of leadership that LTC Yingling is attacking.

In other words, it’s tough to be trained under one set of Rules of Engagement, and then be expected to execute under something much more restrictive (if not fooling) set of rules.

This is a problem strictly at the very highest levels of command.

Rplat,

Makes perfect sense to me!

His view of the “corporate culture” of senior military leadership is accurate. I can claim this because I have spent 15 years in the military, at the tactical, operational, strategic level. I have work for several command staffs and I have worked in an ancillary capacity to several other command staffs. When I say command staff, I mean at the Combatant Commander level (e.g. PACOM), on down through Task Force command staffs, to the service and type specific commands.

Responsibilities of Generalship –
I agree with LTC Yinling’s opening statements that “the most tragic error a general can make is to assume without much reflection that wars of the future will look much like wars of the past,” and that “the general is responsible for explaining to civilian policymakers the demands of future combat and the risks entailed in failing to meet those demands.” Along with the prestige and position of a general/flag rank, comes the additional responsibility of providing strategic leadership for the service itself and the civilian leadership. Too many ignore this responsibility and only revel in the perks and privileges of rank.

Failure of Generalship –
I agree that there is a failure of generalship. There are numerous examples of “lazy” intellect and leadership.

First, the “Transformation” initiative of the 1990s was not based in reality even though it was pushed by the generals. As LTC Yingling stated it was almost exclusively on high-technology conventional wars, and ignored the stability and counterinsurgency operations. I still remember the “network centric warfare” meme. It was repeated over and over again by military leaders, but it was a theory with no basis in reality. It was a theory that was based in spending enormous amounts of money on technology that was not needed and did not work. During the time period of “transformation,” the generals chose prized acquisition programs over manpower. In the 1990s, the troop levels of all the services declined, but spending on acquisition programs remained the same; the crusader, the Comanche, the F-22, the Seawolf, and a dozen other programs survived for no other reason than it was new and fit within the “transformation” framework. They were all a waste of money and were only killed or limited by Rumsfeld, even though he was fought tooth and nail by the generals. No one talks about network centric warfare or transformation anymore because it has no place in real combat.

Second, the generals ignored stability operations and counterinsurgency operations, and still ignore those capabilities. One example is from personal experience. I will not name the command or the AOR for OPSEC reasons. The issue involved post conflict planning and what to do with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)/Refugees. From the scenario, it was a large problem that needed addressing, but the Director of Operations (J-3) and the General’s staff refused to include any stability/civil operation planning in the final document. The J-3 dismissively stated that “it was not his problem.” When we attempted to bring the issue to the General’s attention, he stated that if it wasn’t important to his J-3, then it wasn’t important to him. This type of overt intellectual malfeasance is more common than one would think. Not more than a year later in a different command staff, another general refused to write in to the Air Plan civil operation flights even though the Air Plan could easily support such missions. The only reason given by one of his staff was that he was a “warfighter” and not the Red Cross.

The Generals We Need
Finally, LTC Yingling is almost right on his last assertion that “neither the executive branch nor the services themselves are likely to remedy the shortcomings in America’s general officer corps.” The corporate culture of the military is skewed to promoting ineffective and sub par generals, but I place the blame most heavily on the services, although the executive and Congress do not get a free pass.

LTC Yingling asserts that (1) the system must change, (2) there must be Congressional Oversight and (3) Congress must hold accountable the services. My position is Yes, No, Maybe. Yes, the system must change. There must be a higher standard when promoting; 360 evaluations is a good way to get a higher quality general. The current system reinforces negative attributes, instead of thinking about the mission, goals, and end result; most officers focus on “pleasing the boss” even though it may be wrong. For example, I heard an operations officer state that “it was our job to make the boss’ bad idea look good.” The ops officer was not concerned that the idea did not address the mission, its goals or end results; he was only concerned that the boss was happy. This type of leadership is awful. It demoralizes intelligent junior officers with creative ideas that address the mission. Most of these junior officers leave the service because their intellect can be used elsewhere. GE’s old CEO Jack Welch stated that the best place to find motivated intelligent personnel were in the junior officer ranks of the military. He never said anything about the quality of senior officers or generals.

Second, Congress already has oversight. There is no need for more oversight, they just need to use what they have already.

Third, Congress needs to enforce standards that are in effect now. For example, there is a requirement that all generals have joint experience, but this requirement has been long ignored by everyone; the services, the executive, and Congress.

Overall, I feel LTC Yingling is right on. Based on my experience and my observations, there is a problem with senior leaders that needs to be addressed. The solution is to change the “corporate culture” of the senior leadership.

duff65,

I got the impression that the author of the piece is a huge blowhard and “academic” and believes that if only HE, with his superior intellect, had been made a general we’d be living happily ever after.

The military didn’t lose in Nam. They had just won big when congress pulled the rug out from under them.

If there is a problem it is congress. Most senior officers are reluctant to speak out for political reasons.

The Machine has a good point. It may not be all sour grapes, but it is more likely that someone with little or no promotion potential (however undeserved it may be) would be the one unloading like this. Doesn’t invalidate anything; just something to consider.

Leaders range from crappy to stellar. I’m sure the Army has a full range. From my experience (25 years – USAF), we have many more stellar than crappy. Thank God.

Wind Rider on April 27, 2007 at 6:10 PM

One key element, that most miss, is that we really have taken VERY few casulties in this war. Yes, every casulty is bad, but we used to loose more military people to ACCIDENTS every year in the 70′s, than we are now loosing during active operations.

We ARE winning over there… but the bomb a day Jihadist/media strategy is winning over here…

Just where is the US Government propoganda? Where is the good side of the story? (besides a few websites).

On a side note, there will ALWAYS be soldiers who disagree with Generals… and will be willing to tell you so… Crap, I hated Powel with a passion… he sold us down the river and wouldn’t let us finish Desert Storm!!! I hated Reagan for the stupid ROEs we had in Lebanon in 83…

I lost my WWII and Korea Vet father last year, and inherited some of his letters from that era… believe me… he hated his Commander’s… thought they were idiots (in colorful language that I NEVER heard from him growing up…)… and he was part of the “Greatest Generation”….

“Iraq is America’s Valmy.”

…and Harry Reid is our Marshall Petain.

At least now we have a template for Iran and Syria. Just blow it to smithereens and then let the U.N. go in there and “occupy” it.